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ABSTRACT 
Collaboration is predicated upon inclusive, equitable deliberation and decision-making amongst 
state, private and civil actors. Through pooling of knowledge and resources, participants are 
expected to share knowledge and to develop effective and mutually acceptable solutions to water 
problems. This approach is increasingly being used by governments to support and enable water 
governance at regional and watershed scales. However, the ability of collaboration to generate 
improved social and environmental outcomes can be undermined by power imbalances 
interacting at individual, watershed, state, and global scales. These imbalances are particularly 
apparent when natural resource industries participate in collaborative processes. Influential 
economic actors often have the capacity to exert influence at multiple scales in ways not available 
to most other actors. Industry actors are also systemically privileged in environmental policy-
making due to the nature of dominant socioeconomic systems. The ways in which powerful 
natural resource industry actors use and affect collaborative approaches to water governance have 
not yet been satisfactorily explained and accounted for in the literature. More broadly, the role 
and function of power in general represents an incomplete area of understanding with respect to 
collaboration for water governance.  
The purpose of this thesis was to critically examine the roles of the state and industry in 
collaborative water governance processes through a power lens. The study pursued four specific 
objectives: (1) to develop a conceptual framework for examining power and its implications for 
collaborative approaches to water governance; (2) to apply this framework to determine the 
extent to which relationships of power are explicitly or implicitly identified and addressed in 
literature on collaborative approaches to water governance; (3) to empirically examine the 
positions of the state and industry in Canada with respect to power in collaboration for water 
governance, and; (4) to determine if, or under which conditions collaborative approaches to 
governance for water can achieve desired social and environmental outcomes. 
A systematic review was first used to examine the extent and quality of attention to power 
in literature on collaboration for water governance. Findings from the review revealed that the 
majority of literature examined did not fully recognize or account for power beyond more visible 
and obvious expressions. A cross case study analysis of two Canadian instances of collaboration 
– the Athabasca Watershed Council in Alberta, and the Thames-Sydenham and Region Source 
Protection Committee in Ontario – was then used to empirically examine the roles of the state and 
industry. The case studies allowed examination of the ways that power imbalances manifest at 
 vi 
distinct state and process-level scales in situations defined by the presence of powerful natural 
resource industry firms. The cross-case analysis revealed that the state fundamentally shapes 
collaboration through power exerted external to the collaborative process. Findings also revealed 
that natural resource sector firms often do not need to participate in collaboration because they 
are able to achieve their policy goals through avenues of influence external to collaboration. 
The thesis reveals that power is not fully accounted for in current literature on collaborative 
approaches to water governance. Moreover, many of the issues disparately addressed by 
collaborative water governance scholars (e.g., inclusion, participation incentives, outcomes) can 
be organized into cohesive, transparent relationships by examining collaboration through power. 
The thesis also reveals that collaboration for water governance is fundamentally shaped by power 
exerted outside of collaborative processes, significantly at the agenda setting and policy selection 
stages. Finally, the study provides insight into the motivations of firms with respect to 
collaboration for water governance. These motivations are inconsistent with the presupposition 
that collaborative participants will commit to two-way influence, learning and communication. 
This challenges the ability of collaborative approaches to water governance to achieve the better 
social and environmental outcomes that often justify their use. While findings specifically address 
collaboration in Ontario and Alberta, they will be relevant to other instances of collaborative 
water governance, and collaborative environmental governance more broadly. 
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1 Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Context and Problem Rationale 
The landscape of water policy making has changed significantly in the past half century. 
Traditional government command-and-control models have shifted as diverse actors and 
processes augment, support, and occasionally replace, state-centric governing models. This shift 
reflects broad societal changes in public values, state and non-state capacities, and the complex 
nature of environmental problems facing the world. Emerging co-operative governance models, 
including adaptive co-management (Armitage, et al. 2009; Berkes 2009), community-based 
natural resources management (Kellert, et al. 2000; Leach, et al. 1999), and collaborative 
environmental governance (Holley, et al. 2012; Koontz, et al. 2004), are being used to integrate 
the knowledge, resources and capacities of diffuse actors to address increasingly complicated 
water problems.  
“New” governance models have introduced, highlighted or exacerbated a host of challenges 
to modern democracies. These include fundamental questions of power, legitimacy and 
accountability (Ansell and Gash 2007; Kallis, et al. 2009; Margerum and Robinson 2015; 
McClosky 2000; Newig and Fritsch 2009; Trachtenberg and Focht 2005). Widely embraced at 
levels from the local (e.g., Frame, et al. 2004) to the continental (e.g., Newig and Koontz 2014), 
modern co-operative governance approaches have been challenged by the presence of 
disproportionately influential actors (Holley, et al. 2012; Sabatier, et al. 2005b), governments 
reluctant or unable to relinquish control over policy decisions (Fish, et al. 2010; Hardy 2010), and 
the harsh, yet increasingly contested, economic imperatives that often dictate environmental 
policy decisions (Schmidt 2014; Swyngedouw 2005). Underlying these concerns is a lingering 
question of whether or not these new governance methods are actually able to produce 
environmental solutions superior to those made through traditional command-and-control 
methods (Gunningham 2009; Koontz and Thomas 2006; Lubell and Lippert 2011; McClosky 
2000; Newig and Fritsch 2009).  
This research was motivated by interest in the potential of new governance approaches to 
improve the nature and outcomes, social and environmental, of water policy decisions under 
existing institutional and socioeconomic conditions. Co-operative approaches to the governance 
 2 
of water and other environmental issues have been widely adopted in Canada (Nowlan and 
Bakker 2010), including in regions marked by conflict over resource extraction and processing 
(e.g., the Alberta oils sands, Chemical Valley in Sarnia, Ontario). The mix of actors, institutional 
relationships and multi-level socioeconomic pressures in these regions have the potential to 
present challenges to co-operative governance and thus offer intriguing cases through which to 
examine its potential. Three aspects of the shifting landscape of water governance are particularly 
important in this thesis: collaboration as an approach to water governance, natural resource 
industries as powerful environmental policy actors, and power as a concept fundamental to 
understanding the functioning of society.  
Collaborative water governance, according to its proponents, has the potential to 
incorporate diverse forms of knowledge in policy decisions (Taylor and de Loë 2012; Weber and 
Khademian 2008), increase the acceptability of proposed solutions (Memon, et al. 2010), and 
tailor solutions to local conditions (Innes and Booher 2004; Margerum 2011). Discussion and 
debate among an inclusive set of interests are used to foster normative benefits such as 
empowerment, relationship building and co-learning (Ansell and Gash 2007; Innes and Booher 
2010; Lane and Robinson 2009; Margerum 2011; Weber 2009). However, collaborative 
processes, as with many new governance methods, often rest uncomfortably within existing 
social, economic and political conditions (Lane and Robinson 2009; Memon and Weber 2010). 
These conditions can be at odds with the equitable, deliberative, time and resource-intensive 
processes that both theorists and practitioners state are required for effective collaboration 
(Emerson, et al. 2012; Koontz and Newig 2014).  
As a key segment of society, natural resource sector firms possess vast institutional and 
technical capacity and often play an important role in collaborative water governance (Holley, et 
al. 2012). Neoliberal trends emphasizing the decentralization of services and responsibilities to 
actors outside of government have bolstered the role of firms in performing tasks previously 
assumed by the state. These include functions such as monitoring, analyzing and interpreting 
environmental data, rule setting, and financing (Falkner 2008; Hessing, et al. 2005). These 
evolving roles for the private sector add to its traditional function as the fundamental driver of 
economic prosperity in liberal, capitalist economies. This increased responsibility, combined with 
the central function of the private sector in modern economies, creates an interdependent 
relationship with the state (Brooks and Stritch 1991; Hale 2006). The result is a powerful and 
privileged position for industry with respect to environmental policy-making (Dür and De Bièvre 
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2007; Fuchs 2007; Lindblom 1977); this position can challenge the normative ideals that 
underpin collaborative processes.  
Power and privilege define the ways that actors participate in, and influence, collaboration. 
Throughout the academic literature on collaborative environmental governance, the role and 
impact of power is frequently acknowledged (e.g., Ansell and Gash 2007; Blackstock, et al. 
2012; Emerson, et al. 2012; Innes and Booher 2010). Power has been described as arguably “the 
central concept of the social sciences” (Haugaard and Clegg 2009:1). It plays a contested yet 
essential role in shaping collaborative water governance processes and outcomes (Ansell and 
Gash 2007; Fung and Wright 2003) and is interconnected with governance concerns such as 
legitimacy, accountability and transparency (Rogers and Hall 2003; Chapter Two). Several 
seminal works on collaborative environmental governance address the concept of power. Ansell 
and Gash (2007) identify power and resource imbalances as fundamental in defining starting 
conditions and interactions in collaboration. Innes and Booher (2010) argue that mediating power 
in collaborative processes can slowly shift culturally dominant power structures. Holley et al 
(2012) discuss power as differentially affecting the success of collaboration on local versus 
broadly scaled issues, specifically related to private sector involvement. In these cases, and in 
many others, power in collaborative processes is reflected in issues related to knowledge (Taylor 
and de Loë 2012), capacity (Koehler and Koontz 2008), inclusion (Shilling, et al. 2009), visible 
conflict (Huxham, et al. 2000), retention of veto power by the state (Abers and Keck 2009), 
influence over public discourse (Pares 2011), and access to decision-makers (Hardy 2010). 
Examining collaboration through a power lens can provide a framework for analyzing the 
actions and motivations of different actors. In the process, it can reveal systemic patterns behind 
seemingly disparate actions and effects. This knowledge can expose barriers with the potential to 
inhibit successful collaboration. It can also enable the design of processes that are better able to 
achieve normative goals of inclusion, equity, learning, and reasoned debate. In the case of natural 
resource industry firm involvement, where power imbalances are likely to be exacerbated and 
attempts at collaboration are often problematic (e.g., Benson, et al. 2013; Gunningham 2009; 
Sabatier, et al. 2005b), power-based analysis can reveal the scales and methods through which the 
“powerful” pursue their policy goals (Fuchs 2007; Macdonald 2007).  
The purpose of this research was to critically examine the roles of the state and industry in 
collaborative approaches to water governance through a power lens. Research focused on the 
ways in which interrelationships between these two key actors impact collaborative processes and 
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outcomes, and the overall feasibility of using collaboration in water policy-making contexts 
where industry is a critical player. The study pursued four specific objectives: 
1. To draw on existing literature to create a conceptual framework for examining power and 
its implications for collaborative approaches to water governance; 
2. To apply the framework developed in Objective One to determine the extent to which 
relationships of power are explicitly or implicitly identified and addressed in literature on 
collaborative approaches to water governance; 
3. Building upon findings from Objective Two, to empirically examine the positions of the 
state and industry in Canada with respect to power in collaboration for water governance, 
and;  
4. To determine if, or under which conditions, as revealed by analysis grounded in power 
theory, collaborative approaches to governance for water can achieve desired social and 
environmental outcomes. 
The objectives build upon each other. By establishing the treatment of power in the collaborative 
water governance literature, Objectives One and Two direct the research focus for Objectives 
Three and Four. Application of the framework developed through Objective One establishes the 
depth to which power is examined and accounted for in literature on collaborative approaches to 
water governance and thus determines the specific gaps targeted during empirical research. 
Specific and systemic attention to power in literature on collaborative approaches to water 
governance is rare despite its potential explanatory power, fundamental influence on 
collaboration, and frequent references to power in the collaboration literature (e.g., Ansell and 
Gash 2007; Blackstock, et al. 2012; Emerson, et al. 2012; Frame, et al. 2004; Gunningham 2009; 
Taylor and de Loë 2012). The research presented here directly addresses power in order to reveal 
its explanatory potential and the ways that it shapes and impacts collaborative processes. It makes 
a significant and original contribution to knowledge in three ways. First, the thesis establishes the 
existence of a weakness in understanding related to power in literature on collaboration for water 
governance; in so doing it characterizes the boundaries and nature of this gap in understanding 
and reveals that accounting for power that operates outside the collaborative scale is a particular 
challenge for the literature in question. .   
The second major contribution of this thesis builds upon the first contribution through a 
power-based analysis of natural resource industry firm involvement in collaboration for water 
governance, as mediated by the state. It addresses a gap in knowledge related to the ways that 
governments respond to economic and other pressures to shape collaborative processes and 
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outcomes through actions and decisions both within and outside of processes. While the role of 
the state in collaboration for water governance has been examined by others (e.g., Agranoff and 
McGuire 2003; Koontz, et al. 2004; Watson, et al. 2009), using a power-based approach has the 
potential to generate additional insights. For example, this research revealed that prevailing 
preferential relationships between governments and some industry actors fundamentally shape the 
content, process and outcomes of collaborative approaches to water governance.  
The third significant and original contribution to knowledge from the work reported in this 
thesis responds to a gap related to understanding of the ways that natural resource industry firms 
use and affect collaborative processes for the governance of water. Other scholars have examined 
collaborative environmental governance in the context of industry firm involvement (e.g., 
Gunningham 2009; Holley, et al. 2012; Parkins 2010). However, understanding is incomplete 
with respect to the motivations, actions and opportunities available to firms, and the 
consequences for collaborative processes and outcomes. Using a power-based analysis, this 
research addresses these themes and reveals that the motivations and actions of firms are 
inconsistent with those assumed by collaborative theory, and that this has significant 
consequences for the practice of collaboration.  
As a focal point for studying collaborative governance, water is particularly useful for a 
number of reasons. Water is fundamental to many other environmental issues that are often 
subject to collaborative governance approaches including forestry (e.g., Parkins 2010; Takeda 
and Ropke 2010) and land use planning (Healey 1998; Koontz 2005). As a result, water 
governance is subject to overlapping social, political and legal structures, operating at multiple 
scales and analytical levels and providing any number of sites for contested power relations to 
play out (Zeitoun and Allan 2008). This has resulted in a significant pool of literature addressing 
collaboration for water governance that provides a foundation on which to build (Fish, et al. 
2010; Hania 2013; e.g., Innes, et al. 2007; Koontz and Newig 2014; Margerum and Robinson 
2015; Memon and Kirk 2012; Sabatier et al. 2005; Taylor and de Loë 2012; von der Porten and 
de Loë 2013a) 
Development of a conceptual framework to examine power in collaboration for water 
governance required insights and ideas from scholarship on collaborative governance, power and 
state theory. The term “framework” is used here in the way suggested by Ostrom (1990:192), as a 
“set of variables and the types of relationships among variables that need to be examined in 
conducting any theoretical or empirical study of a particular type of phenomenon”. In this case, 
the framework identifies potential tangible manifestations of the exertion of power, as defined 
 6 
below, in collaborative water governance, and organizes those manifestations to reveal a larger 
picture of how power is being exercised. The framework is specifically targeted at power issues 
that arise as a consequence of the involvement of natural resource industry firms in collaborative 
approaches to water governance.  
The study used mixed quantitative and qualitative methods to address research objectives. 
Objectives One and Two were addressed using a systematic review to investigate the extent of 
attention to power in scholarship on collaboration for water governance. Building upon gaps 
related to power identified through the review, Objectives Three and Four used a cross case study 
analysis of two Canadian collaborative processes: the Athabasca Watershed Council in Alberta, 
and the Thames-Sydenham Source Protection Committee in Ontario. The case studies allowed the 
opportunity to examine the ways that consequences of power and power imbalances manifest at 
distinct state and process-level scales in situations defined by the presence of powerful corporate 
natural resource industry firms. Working to address Objective 3, investigation and analysis were 
specifically focused on the positioning and roles of the state and industry, and their commitment 
to collaborative processes and outcomes. The cases studies also illuminated power-related 
variables with the potential to affect the achievement of collaborative process goals.   
While this thesis specifically examines power relative to collaborative water governance, 
many of the contexts and issues identified will be familiar to broader collaborative environmental 
governance scholars. Issues of equity, natural resource industry influence and the nature and 
functioning of the state are prevalent across environmental contexts (e.g., Culley and Angelique 
2011; Jentoft 2007; Parkins 2010). As such, the thesis contains insights that will be of use in 
fields beyond water.  
This thesis is presented as a collection of three interrelated manuscripts designed to be 
publishable in academic journals. Each presents its own distinct research questions, theoretical 
grounding, methods, results, analysis and findings. One of the goals of this introductory chapter is 
to clearly nest these three articles within a broader picture outlined by the research objectives and 
rationale as presented above. Additional contextual information and details are offered to 
supplement those provided within the manuscripts themselves. The remainder of this chapter 
reviews relevant literature related to collaborative governance, power theory, state theory and 
business involvement in environmental making, and presents an initial synthesis of these 
literatures. The empirical research context is presented, followed by an overview and justification 
of the methods used. The last section maps out the remainder of the thesis. 
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1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 Governing Collaboratively 
Governance as a concept is the subject of various interpretations and definitions (e.g., Kooiman, 
et al. 2008; Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998). In general, governance is concerned with the business of 
making decisions and taking actions, and the means through which these processes are conducted. 
In the last several decades, there has been a surge of interest in the inclusion of non-state actors in 
the governance process resulting in a wide array of co-governance processes (Lemos and 
Agrawal 2006; Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004).  The justification for more inclusive governance 
is rooted in considerations such as increasing complexity in terms of the problems facing society, 
decreased government capacities as a result of often controversial neoliberal political trends, and 
changing norms with respect to the roles that the public and private sectors should play in 
decisions that affect them (Hardy 2010; Innes and Booher 2010; Koontz, et al. 2004; Memon and 
Weber 2010).  
Collaborative governance is an approach to governing that acknowledges broad roles for 
state, private and civil society actors (Ansell and Gash 2007; Frame, et al. 2004; Innes and 
Booher 1999; Koontz and Thomas 2006; Leach, et al. 2002). For contemporary environmental 
problems that cross social, economic and political boundaries and cannot be solved by any one 
actor on their own (Duit and Galaz 2008; Innes and Booher 1999), collaboration is increasingly 
being used to mobilize people, ideas and resources (Koehler and Koontz 2008; Memon and 
Weber 2010; Robinson, et al. 2011).  
Collaboration represents a shift from the representative democratic models common in 
many countries. The inclusion of non-state actors into decision-making processes reflects theory 
on deliberative democracy (e.g., Dryzek 2000; Fung and Wright 2003; Parkinson 2003), much of 
which is grounded in Habermasian ideals of communicative rationality (Healey 1997; Murray 
2005). Communicative rationality operates upon the assumption that, as processes approach 
theoretically ideal conditions, known as “ideal speech” situations, equitable, mutually agreed 
upon solutions are more achievable (Conley and Moote 2003). Ideal speech situations are 
characterized by broadly inclusive, honest, informed, equitable, dialogue-based approaches to 
problem solving that generate ethical and rational consensus-based outcomes (Habermas 1981; 
Innes and Booher 1999; Murray 2005). As will become clear below, many of these characteristics 
are commonly linked to collaborative governance processes in the literature.  
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The inclusive nature of collaboration introduces important questions with respect to the 
legitimacy and accountability of collaboratively made decisions, especially in situations where 
states seek to collaborate on issues for which they are democratically responsible (Gunningham 
2009; Hardy 2010; Holley, et al. 2012; Robinson, et al. 2011). For this reason, collaborative 
processes often do not have direct decision-making authority but instead exist within larger 
governing structures and processes. This creates an inherent tension with respect to integrating 
place-based and issue-specific collaborative outputs and outcomes into the larger responsibilities 
and priorities of representative democracies (Emerson, et al. 2012; Lane and Robinson 2009; 
Pares 2011).  
As a starting point for understanding the perspective on collaboration taken here, 
collaborative environmental governance represents power and responsibility sharing amongst 
state and non-state actors (Carlsson and Berkes 2005). The general nature of this definition 
emphasizes a key challenge within literature on collaborative environmental governance: that of 
distinguishing it from other co-operative arrangements such as co-management (e.g., Carlsson 
and Berkes 2005), adaptive co-management (e.g., Armitage, Berkes, and Doubleday 2007), or 
broad stakeholder participation (e.g., Bulkeley and Mol 2003). Examining published literature, it 
is clear that collaboration can take a number of different forms (e.g., Innes and Booher 2010; 
Memon and Kirk 2012; Pares 2011; Taylor and de Loë 2012). Ansell and Gash (2007) propose a 
definition that specifically includes public agencies as key actors while other scholars identify 
collaborative processes that have been initiated by grassroots non-state actors (e.g., Innes and 
Booher 2010; Lubell 2004b). Some collaborative processes stand alone at the watershed or sub-
watershed level (e.g., The California CALFED Bay-Delta Program), while others represent broad, 
state-led initiatives directing parallel, watershed-scale collaborative processes across a province 
(e.g., The Ontario Clean Water Act), country (e.g., the Australian National Water Initiative), or 
continent (e.g., The European Union Water Framework Directive). As Sabatier et al ( 2005:6) 
note in the context of watershed-scale initiatives, “the collaborative watershed management 
approach is not a detailed blueprint, but rather a broad strategy for solving a very complex sets of 
interrelated problems”.  
Despite the diversity in approaches to collaborative environmental governance, there are 
some clear trends with respect to common characteristics of collaborative governance. Among 
these characteristics are broad inclusion of those with a stake in the problem at hand (Conley and 
Moote 2003; Gray 1985; Margerum 2008), face-to-face deliberation (Innes and Booher 2010; 
Margerum 2008), and sharing and incorporation of a broad range of knowledge (Ansell and Gash 
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2007; Taylor and de Loë 2012). There is an emphasis on emergent understanding and learning as 
a function of knowledge sharing and relationship building (Sabatier et al. 2005). Processes 
usually pursue consensus even if the achievement of consensus is not a formal requirement 
(Ansell and Gash 2007). Finally, and of particular significance to this thesis, collaborative 
processes strive for relative equity amongst actors in terms of ability to influence decisions and 
outcomes (Ansell and Gash 2007; Barry 2011; Echeverria 2001; Gray 1989; Innes and Booher 
2010; Koontz, et al. 2004; Margerum 2007; Memon and Weber 2010). Within processes this is 
reflected in the ability of participants to meaningfully and effectively represent their positions and 
to receive fair consideration (Innes and Booher 2010).  
1.2.2 Power Theory 
The study of power is vast, contested and complicated (Haugaard and Clegg 2009; Lukes 2005). 
Applying a power lens to the study of collaborative environmental governance requires mapping 
out this complex literature and making difficult decisions about the value of applying one 
perspective on power over others. Power can be viewed, among other ways, as domination 
(Weber 1978), capacity for action (Arendt 1970; Parsons 1963), or omnipresent and fundamental 
to defining our sense of selves (Foucault and Gordon 1980). It can be distributive (where A has 
power over B), collective (where A and B have power together) (Parsons 1963), or networked 
(Mann 2012). Frameworks for analysis are numerous. Influential frameworks include Lukes’ 
(2005) three “faces” of power, Gaventa’s (2006) power cube, Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) four 
types of power, and Clegg’s (1989) “circuits” of power.     
Rather than viewing these many different conceptualizations as contradictory and mutually 
exclusive, it is more productive to view them, as different ways of examining “a cluster of social 
phenomena central to the constitution of social order” (Haugaard and Clegg 2009:4). The 
approach chosen for application to a given situation does not imply that one view of power is 
superior to others, but rather that each view represents a conceptual tool that “enables the author 
in question to make sense of certain aspects of social life” (Haugaard and Clegg 2009:4). The 
view chosen will have significant explanatory power with respect to the context under study. 
For this thesis, Lukes’ (2005) three faces of power were chosen to structure investigation 
into power in collaborative environmental governance processes. Lukes’ analytical framework is 
particularly suited to situations where power determines “what is known, what is emphasized and 
who prevails” (Zeitoun and Allan 2008). This effectively describes many policy-making contexts, 
including collaboration. Lukes’ framework is also used in other fields that discuss power in the 
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context of business involvement in environmental policy-making including global governance 
(e.g., Falkner 2008; Fuchs 2007) and political science (e.g., Kamieniecki and Kraft 2013; 
Macdonald 2007). These fields provide rich terrain for relevant insights and comparisons to the 
research questions under investigation, and will be reviewed in Section 1.2.4 below. 
The definition of power used by Lukes (2005:37) states that “A exercises power over B 
when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests”. This definition interprets power as 
domination, a limitation that Lukes himself addresses, and defends, in the second edition of 
Power: A Radical View (2005). However, despite its limits, this definition still functions as a 
useful – and necessary - starting point in examining power in the context of political action 
(Lukes 2005). To expand, power is viewed as a multi-dimensional, fluid relationship and not as a 
quantifiable entity that can be owned or possessed (Baldwin 1989; Lukes 2005). Lukes’ three 
“faces” represent a framework for analysis structured around instrumental, structural and 
discursive dimensions of power.  
The exertion of instrumental power is visible through overt competition in contested 
settings and through the measurable use of resources in this context. It is useful in studying the 
active behavior of political actors but fails to account for bias built into political systems or the 
role of agenda setting and problem framing in shaping political decisions (Lukes 2005). 
Exclusive focus on instrumental power also ignores forms of power that are not visible, such as 
power that leads to inaction rather than action (Lukes 2005; Woll 2007). 
Structural views of power specifically seek to reveal many of the factors not addressed by 
instrumental views. Structural power reflects interactions between markets and states (Strange 
1996) and is concerned with the factors affecting the ability to set and define policy agendas. It 
acknowledges that power can be exercised and decisions made before a given issue is ever 
presented to the public (Lukes 2005). The second face is embodied through ‘mobilization of bias’ 
(Schattschnieder 1960) wherein dominant, hegemonic views that privilege certain groups are 
reinforced in policy decisions or non-decisions. In this way, certain interests can be denied access 
to the decision making process. Non-decisions can result from force, threats, social norms and 
rules or dominant values (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Some interests may be inherently 
privileged by structural conditions without having to actively exercise power, thus rendering 
power hidden or invisible. Likewise, structural conditions can enable the visible exertion of 
power for some in ways not available to other interests. Conflict, as revealed through structural 
views, can be either overt or covert. However, power viewed in this way limits the object of study 
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to variables related to “decisions that have the effect of preventing currently observable 
grievances (overt or covert) from becoming issues within the political process” (Lukes 2005:39). 
Lukes’ third face of power, discursive power, seeks to move beyond structural explanations 
of power to reveal latent societal conflicts shaped by broad sociological influences. Examining 
discourse, 
...A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but 
he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very 
wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have 
the desires you want them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling 
their thoughts and desires? (Lukes 2005:27) 
This type of power transcends analytical levels and is far reaching in that public education, 
mass media and socialization are used to align societal values with the goals of those with power 
over these institutions (Lukes 2005; Shapiro 2006). Control over the political agenda is not 
necessarily associated with decisions in the traditional political sphere and examining this type of 
power thus involves analyzing contexts and actions beyond direct political forums. As with 
structural dimensions, dominant hegemonic conditions can privilege certain interests even when 
those interests make no effort to actively influence systems. Discursive power can also be 
consciously exercised by interests seeking to shape values, norms and public ideas. This 
distinction between power resulting from structure and power resulting from agency is useful 
because it makes clearer those actions and decisions that can be changed in the short term, as 
opposed to changes that will require broader shifts in institutions and ideas. Lukes acknowledges 
the inherently subjective nature of discursive analyses – “analysis…is at once value-laden, 
theoretical and empirical” (Lukes 2005:59), but maintains the explanatory value of the discursive 
dimension. 
1.2.3 Theories of Political Organization and Policy Making 
As with the study of power, theories on the organization and operation of democratic states 
constitute a vast literature (e.g. pluralism, elitism, corporatism). While this thesis acknowledges 
the multiplicity of theories, its function is not to analyze or critique state theory but rather to use 
available theory to provide structure to an analysis of power in collaborative environmental 
governance.  
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A neopluralist perspective has been applied to examination of the state in this thesis. 
Pluralism, as a starting point, describes policy-making as the result of competition between 
relatively equal interest groups within a government framework where the state acts as a mediator 
(Dahl 1961). Under pluralism, all individuals are assumed to be self-aware and capable of acting 
on their own interests (Brooks and Stritch 1991; Fuchs 2007; Furlong 2007; Kraft and 
Kamieniecki 2007; McFarland 2004). Neopluralist perspectives were developed in response to 
vast empirical evidence that interest groups are rarely equal in capacity and influence, and the 
state is rarely a dispassionate, impartial moderator. In particular, neopluralism acknowledges 
business as a privileged interest group in policy-making processes (Cerny 2010; Falkner 2008; 
Lindblom 1977; McFarland 2004), and the state as a fragmented, non-unified actor populated by 
multiple sub-factions with often competing goals, values and ideas (Cerny 2010). Neopluralist 
perspectives are employed in many analyses of participation in governance and policy-making, 
whether acknowledged (e.g., Brooks and Stritch 1991) or not (e.g., Frame, et al. 2004). 
Like theories of political organization, there are also a number of different approaches to 
analyzing policy processes in democratic systems (e.g., public choice, the institutional-ideological 
framework, policy cycles). This thesis makes use of a five-phase policy cycle approach (Figure 
1.1) as characterized by Howlett and Ramesh (1995) because it provides a clear framework for 
analyzing the processes, actors and influences acting upon and throughout the policy making 
process (Hessing, et al. 2005). In the first phase, agenda setting occurs and the problem is framed 
and defined (Doern and Phidd 1992:82-84). The nature of the problem frame depends on those 
with control over decisions at this stage and will constrain the range of solutions that are possible 
for the given problem (Torgerson 2005b). In the second phase, policy options are developed and 
can reflect concrete actions, inaction, or purposefully vague ideas. The third phase is the selection 
of policy from amongst the range of options. In the fourth phases, selected phases are 
implemented and the fifth phase is policy evaluation. In practice, the phases are not necessarily 
sequential and are often short-circuited and iterative (Hessing, et al. 2005; Howlett and Ramesh 
1995).  
Policy cycles take place within broader institutional and ideological contexts (Howlett et al 
2009). Actors both construct, and are shaped by, ideas and institutions. “Ideas” refer to the 
cognitive and normative policies, programs, and philosophies that are mediated by actors and 
shape policy contexts (Schmidt 2008). “Institutions” represent the formal and informal rules, 
customs and traditions that simultaneously shape, and are shaped by, the ideas and actions of 
actors (North 1991; Schmidt 2008). Numerous ideas and instiutions play a role in characterizing 
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any given situation. Howlett et al (2009) identify capitalism as a dominant meta-institution that 
plays a significant role in defining modern policy contexts – a meta-institution that is particularly 
relevant in examining way that natural resource industries participate in collaborative processes. 
Capitalist institutional structures define a political economic model whereby the 
concentration of the means of production is in the hands of a relative few individuals or firms, 
mediated by markets and supported by the labour and skills of the remainder of the population. In 
order for broader society to prosper, firms need to generate profit. One of the major functions of 
liberal democratic governments is to ensure the conditions that enable profit generation (Brooks 
and Stritch 1991). This is the primary condition that privileges firms in policy making contexts; it 
is discussed in more detail with respect to environmental policy making in Section 1.2.4, below. 
This condition is also a necessary contextual factor for understanding the roots of the ideas and 
institutions that shape the nature and feasibility of any proposed policy solution (Howlett, et al. 
2009).    
Figure 1.1: The policy cycle model (after Howlett and Ramesh 1995)  
 
1.2.4 Business and Environmental Policy 
Examination of the role and influence of economic interests on environmental policy-making 
represents a fourth major area of academic research underpinning this thesis. Much of this 
research integrates academic thought on power, political interaction and policy-making processes 
as outlined above, and focuses on either global governance (e.g., Falkner 2008; Falkner 2012; 
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Fuchs 2007; Levy and Newell 2005b) or political science (e.g., Brooks and Stritch 1991; 
Hessing, et al. 2005; Kamieniecki and Kraft 2013; Macdonald 2007). In general, these 
perspectives highlight that business operates from a privileged position with respect to 
environmental policy making (Brooks and Stritch 1991; Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Falkner 2008; 
Fuchs 2007; Kraft and Kamieniecki 2007; Lindblom 1977; Macdonald 2007). This privilege is a 
function of usually tacit public acceptance that much of the power of business is legitimate 
because it generally conforms to established rules that can be justified based upon the norms and 
beliefs of involved populations. Also important is the fact that, in general, there is broad public 
consent to the exercise of much of the power of business to the extent that it conforms to public 
expectation (Beetham 2013).   
Firms are motivated to work primarily for the generation of profit in order to full their roles 
in capitalist economies. However, in situations where a lack of legitimacy threatens the ability to 
continue profit generation, firms may take actions that seek to generate legitimacy. These can 
include changing firm behaviour, exerting power to change the rules that evaluate firm behaviour, 
or exerting power to change the societal values that determine the validity of firm behaviour 
(MacDonald 2007). The remainder of this subsection maps out business privilege and behaviour 
according to Lukes’ analytical framework – a common approach in these fields (e.g., Clapp and 
Fuchs 2009; Falkner 2008; Fuchs 2007; Macdonald 2007). 
The application of Lukes’ first face, “instrumental power”, to business interaction in 
environmental policy-making is fairly straightforward. Of all three faces, it is the easiest to study 
empirically because it is characterized by definite, visible cause and effect relationships (Fuchs 
2007). Examining instrumental power in the context of business involvement in policy making 
focuses on the possession of financial, technical, human and other resources that are useful in 
shaping policy outcomes in competition with others (Fuchs 2007; Torgerson 2005b). It assumes 
competition over influence, measureable use of resources in that competition, and manifestations 
of competition that are visible (Falkner 2008). 
A great deal of attention is paid to the structural power of private actors with respect to 
capacity to define policy agendas. According to Brooks and Stritch (1991), the privileged position 
of business is a function of government-industry interdependence, elite level linkages between 
actor in government and industry, increased access to resources for lobbying and influence, and 
cultural dominance as a result of an overarching capitalist economic system. 
Interdependence of governments and businesses, with a focus here on industry, is a function 
of both reliance on economic prosperity (Brooks and Stritch 1991; Rabe and Mundo 2007; 
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Schrecker 2005) and a reduction in state capacity congruent with neoliberal political trends 
(Howlett 2002). It is this relationship that grants business the legitimacy to exercise power in the 
context of capitalism. States increasingly rely upon industry for environmental data (Hessing, et 
al. 2005; Williams 2012). Industry also controls many of the resources that determine the 
effectiveness of environmental policy including finances, technical knowledge and well-
developed organizational structures (Falkner 2008; Newell 2005; Torgerson 2005b). This reliance 
on the resources of industry affords it a heightened degree of influence (Dür and De Bièvre 2007; 
Falkner 2008; Furlong 2007; Layzer 2007; Macdonald 2007). 
The integral role of industry in modern democracies enables legitimate social and working 
relationships between industry and political elites. These relationships facilitate lobbying efforts 
(Duffy 2007; Layzer 2007) and allow for elite-level access to agenda setting, policy decisions, 
and policy implementation that is not necessarily available to other actors (Falkner 2008; Fuchs 
2007; Torgerson 2005b). Industries with central roles in the economy are able to wield threats of 
industrial flight if local regulatory conditions become too onerous (Newell 2005). They also often 
benefit from a ”revolving door” where individual actors with specialized knowledge and social 
ties move between public and private sectors (Brooks and Stritch 1991; Fuchs 2007; Furlong 
2007). Access to resources also provides industry with a buffer with respect to environmental 
policy influence. Those with resources are able to undertake litigation, and to ‘absorb’ court 
sanctions (Falkner 2008; Furlong 2007; Layzer 2007; Macdonald 2007). Well-positioned 
industries or industry associations are often able to circumscribe potential government regulations 
by setting their own rules and standards or engaging in corporate social responsibility activities 
that partially or wholly address regulatory targets (Auld and Gulbrandsen 2013; Clapp and 
Meckling 2013). In general, the exercise and mediation of the structural power of industry shapes 
the nature and effectiveness of environmental policy in any given context (Brooks and Stritch 
1991; Macdonald 2007; Rabe and Mundo 2007; Schrecker 2005). 
The subversive and subjective nature of discursive power makes it difficult to study 
empirically (Fuchs 2007). Nevertheless, it is possible to outline potential discursive outcomes 
related to business participation in environmental policy-making. Control over discourse reflects 
an ability to shape societal ideals, values, perceptions and identities through control over 
knowledge, ideas and technology (Falkner 2008; Newell 2005; Torgerson 2005b). Corporate 
ownership of the media can allow direct influence over cultural and ideological views (Brooks 
and Stritch 1991; Fuchs 2007). Research centres that promote business-friendly policy 
alternatives make these perspectives readily accessible (Kraft and Kamieniecki 2007; Layzer 
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2007). Public lobbying techniques, ‘greenwashing’ of corporate activities, and industry-funded 
NGOs can also be used to influence popular opinion (Kollman 1998; Roy 2007). Generally 
speaking, the exercise of discursive power through these activities shapes societal norms and the 
ability, or inability, of policy actors to envision solutions that challenge popular discourse (Fuchs 
2007; Lukes 2005). 
1.2.5 Summary 
Collaborative approaches to environmental governance rest on a foundation of idealized inclusive 
and equitable participation. Neopluralist perspectives on the participation of actors in 
collaborative processes, especially with respect to the privileged position of firms in 
environmental policy-making, challenge these assumed foundations. The result is a potentially 
detrimental affect on the ability of collaborative processes to generate the kinds of positive social 
and environmental outcomes generally sought through collaboration. Lukes’ (2005) three 
dimension of power, and Howlett and Ramesh’s (1995) policy cycle provide useful analytical 
frameworks for structuring examination of the nature and form of these potential effects. The 
above literature will be explicitly integrated into a conceptual framework, presented in table form, 
in Section 1.4.1.  
1.3 Empirical Context 
Empirical cases, complete selection criteria for which are listed in Section 1.4, were chosen based 
on a strong potential for significant power imbalances due to the presence of natural resource 
industry actors in collaborative water governance processes. Two of the largest concentrations of 
industrial activity in Canada occur in the oil sands region north of Fort McMurray, Alberta, and in 
Sarnia, Ontario, a region anecdotally known as “Chemical Valley”. Both of these regions are 
involved in provincially mandated collaborative governance processes and are characterized by 
dynamics operating primarily at and between the regional and provincial levels. This institutional 
setting, where local or regional processes are situated within larger state-level institutions, is 
relatively common with respect to collaborative water governance processes in other jurisdictions 
around the world. For example, national water policy strategies guide water planning through 
watershed-based collaborative groups in Australia (Taylor and de Loë 2012; Wallis and Ison 
2011). In the United States, the National Estuary Program guides collaborative programs that 
work to protect coastal ecosystems (Lubell 2004a; Sabatier et al. 2005). The nature of the 
empirical context indicates a high likelihood that empirical findings will be generalizable to 
contexts in regions beyond Canada.   
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1.3.1 Athabasca Watershed Council, Alberta 
The province of Alberta self-identifies as both “Canada’s energy province” (Government of 
Alberta 2015) due to its conventional oil, heavy oil and oil sands reserves, and as the “irrigation 
capital of Canada” (Alberta Water Portal 2013). These monikers reflect the heavy reliance of the 
province’s economy on irrigated agriculture in the south, and resource extraction, including oil, 
oil sands and forestry, in the north. These economic patterns have strongly shaped the population 
distribution of the province (Clancy 2014a). Most of the population lives in the southern part of 
the province although resource-based towns such as Fort McMurray in the north (see Figure 1.2) 
are rapidly growing in size (Government of Alberta 2012).  
Alberta has a long history of dependence upon business capital (Clancy 2014b; Smith and 
Barr 1984) and this is reflected in its domestic politics. The governing party of the province has 
not changed since 1971 and a strongly neoliberal ideology is apparent in its political actions and 
decisions, specifically with respect to promotion of the energy industry in Alberta (Cohen and 
Bakker 2014; Progressive Conservative Association of Alberta 2015). The exploitation of energy 
resources has become a central component of both provincial and federal economic strategies 
since the turn of the century (Clancy 2014b).  
Broad provincial support for the energy industry in Alberta has led to widespread debate 
inside and outside of the province over the environmental implications of oil sands development. 
Oil sands mining and processing require the removal of large areas of boreal forest, displacement 
of wildlife populations, modification of fen and wetland landscapes, and the creation of large 
tailings ponds to hold waste materials with potentially harmful human and ecosystem health 
impacts (Kelly, et al. 2010; Rooney, et al. 2012). A perceived lack of commitment on the part of 
the provincial government to addressing these issues has led to widespread domestic and 
international critique (Nelson, et al. 2014; Palen, et al. 2014; Schindler 2014). 
Water use in the province is governed under the (2000b) Alberta Water Act and the (2000) 
Irrigations Districts Act. Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development (AESRD) 
and, since spring of 2014, the Alberta Energy Regulator, administer the Water Act. In 2003, the 
province released Water For Life: Alberta’s Strategy for Sustainability (Alberta Environment 
2003). This legislation outlines a broad, directional strategy and was largely driven by Lorne 
Taylor, then Minister of Environment. Water For Life emphasizes three main goals: a safe, secure 
drinking water supply, healthy aquatic ecosystems, and reliable, quality water supplies for a 
sustainable economy. The provincial government structured its approach to achieving these goals 
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around knowledge and research, water conservation, and partnerships as outlined in the Water 
For Life Action Plan (2003).  
Figure 1.2: The Athabasca River Watershed, Alberta, Canada 
 
 
Three specific types of “partnerships” are promoted under Water For Life. The Alberta 
Water Council operates at the provincial level and is comprised of nominated representatives 
from industry, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the province, and other governments. Its 
function is to provide guidance and expertise in the pursuit of Water For Life goals. Water 
Stewardship Groups operate at the local level and work on a decentralized basis to co-ordinate 
with local interests, to provide input to larger planning processes, and to carry out stewardship 
activities. Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils (WPACs), which are of principle interest 
to this thesis, are broadly representative groups organized according to the 11 major watersheds 
in Alberta. WPAC membership is comprised of Aboriginal communities, conservation groups, 
industrial actors and provincial and municipal government representatives. Through long term, 
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deliberative processes they are intended to “engage watershed residents in their work and seek 
consensus on solutions to watershed issues” (Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource 
Development 2014). In function and form, even though they are described as a kind of 
“partnership”, WPACs are consistent with the definition of collaborative water governance 
provided in Section 1.2.1.1. 
Some current WPACs, such as the Bow River Basin Council, existed prior to Water For 
Life and applied for WPAC status when it became available. Others, such as the Athabasca 
Watershed Council, a case analyzed in this thesis, were newly formed to fulfill Water For Life 
goals. As such, WPACs vary in terms of their institutional history, capacity and activity. All 
WPACs are tasked with setting Terms of Reference, conducting State of the Watershed Reports 
to characterize watershed conditions and to identify gaps in knowledge, and creating a 
comprehensive Watershed Management Plan. These management plans are clearly described as 
advisory, not regulatory, in all government documents although WPACs are encouraged to 
“[s]eek adoption of these plans by the jurisdictions (municipal, provincial and federal) and 
stakeholders with the appropriate legislated authority to implement recommendations” (Alberta 
Environment 2005:10). The Government of Alberta outlined its roles with respect to Water For 
Life partnership activities in the Enabling Partnerships document (Alberta Environment 2005). 
With respect to WPACs, these roles include the provision of at least partial administrative and 
project funding, the use of Government of Alberta staff with technical and administrative 
expertise, promotion of collaborative principles, and a commitment to reviewing and taking into 
consideration the recommendations put forward in Watershed Management Plans.  
The Athabasca Watershed Council was the last of the province’s WPACs to be designated, 
in 2009.  The watershed, pictured in Figure 1.2, is home to diverse economic interests, the most 
significant of which are oil and oil sands reserves located north of the city of Fort McMurray, 
Alberta. Forestry, pulp and paper, agriculture, coal mining and aggregate extraction activities also 
take place in the basin. Population in the Athabasca basin is concentrated upstream, south and 
west of Fort McMurray with larger settlements in Athabasca, Whitecourt, Hinton, Jasper and Fort 
McMurray itself. The head of the Athabasca River is located in the Rocky Mountains in Jasper 
National Park and is relatively protected from human impacts until it leaves the park area 
upstream of Hinton. The lower portions of the watershed, north of Fort McMurray, are home to a 
number of First Nations communities of the Athabasca Chipewyan Nation including Fort 
Chipewyn and Fort MacKay (Government of Alberta 2012). 
 20 
Complicating the institutional landscape in Alberta are a number of separate planning 
processes with overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities. As mentioned, WPACs represent 
non-regulatory, advisory, watershed-based planning processes. At the same time, the Government 
of Alberta released the 2008 Land Use Framework which assigned the authority to produce 
legally binding land use plans to collaboratively run Regional Action Committees (RAC) (Alberta 
Environment 2008b). WPACs can petition for a seat on a given RAC but there is no requirement 
that they be included or consulted despite the influence of land use activities on water issues. 
There are also other monitoring and planning processes specifically directed at the oil sands 
region. For example, the Joint Oil Sands Monitoring Program (JOSM) is a federal-provincial-
industry initiative to monitor and produce data related to oil sands operations (Government of 
Canada  2013).  
The province distinguishes between water management and watershed management. Under 
the Water Act (2000b), AESRD is responsible for establishing regulatory water management 
plans, setting legally binding Conservation Objectives to protect water levels and quality, and 
managing the shores and beds of public water bodies. The presence of Jasper National park and 
significant reserve lands under the jurisdiction of the federal government within the Athabasca 
River basin introduce another set of actors into water and watershed management in the province. 
The net result is a fragmented and overlapping institutional landscape with respect to water and 
watershed management in Alberta.  
1.3.2 Thames-Sydenham and Region Source Protection Committee 
The province of Ontario, Canada’s most populace province, is characterized by a diverse 
landscape and economy. The sparsely populated north is mainly occupied by Indigenous peoples, 
and cities, towns and communities that rely on resource extraction. Forestry, forest product 
processing, mining and mineral processing have traditionally defined economic activities and 
political decisions in northern Ontario. Most of the province’s population lives in the south and 
economic activities there reflect a very different geography. Agriculture, manufacturing and 
service industries, facilitated by both arable land and ready access to the Great Lakes, define the 
political economy of southern Ontario (Winfield 2012).  
Ontario has a varied political past and has been governed in turns by right-leaning 
Progressive Conservatives, centrist Liberals, and the left-leaning New Democratic Party. Since 
the Second World War there have been varying amounts of political attention to environmental 
issues, largely in response to shifts in public opinion, concurrent with periods of relative 
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economic stability (Harrison 1996). Environmental policies have also been a function of the 
governing party’s ideological position with respect to promotion and protection of economic 
development. At different points in time, the province has been the subject of both condemnation 
for its environmental neglect in the face of economic promotion, and praise for progressive 
policies (Winfield 2012).     
Water in Ontario is managed under many different statutes, but the Clean Water Act (2006) 
is especially important in this thesis. This legislation was enacted based upon the 
recommendations of the Walkerton Inquiry (O'Connor 2002a; O'Connor 2002c) into 
contamination of a municipal drinking water supply in Walkerton, Ontario in 2000. The 
contamination resulted in the deaths of seven people and thousands of illnesses. Among the 
recommendations produced by the Inquiry was the use of a multi-barrier approach to the 
protection of drinking water, including the use of watershed-based Source Protection Plans 
developed through collaborative governance processes. Following the inquiry, the provincial 
government convened a multi stakeholder Advisory Committee on Watershed-based Source 
Protection Planning to produce a planning framework for achieving the Inquiry’s 
recommendations (Advisory Committee on Watershed-based Source Protection Planning 2003). 
The government then produced a White Paper on Watershed-based Source Protection Planning 
(Ontario Ministry of Environment 2004) in order to outline draft framing, content and objectives 
for broad public comment and consultation. The province also convened two other committees to 
advise throughout the policy development phase. The Technical Experts Committee, a multi-
stakeholder panel of experts, produced a Threats Assessment Framework (Government of Ontario 
2004) identifying potentially significant threats to drinking water. The Implementation 
Committee, also a multi-stakeholder panel of experts, produced a Report outlining proposed 
institutional, legal and governance guidelines for the committees (Ontario 2004). Both the White 
Paper and the Implementation Committee Report proposed governance practices consistent with 
the best practices for collaborative governance outlined above. The final Clean Water Act 
addresses the protection of municipal drinking water sources through watershed-based 
collaborative processes. 
The Clean Water Act identified Ontario’s conservation authorities as lead organizations for 
Source Protection in the province. In Ontario, conservation authorities are designated under the 
Conservation Authorities Act (1990) as watershed-based entities. Some conservation authorities  
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Figure 1.3: The Thames-Sydenham and Region Source Protection Region, Ontario, 
Canada 
 
have considerably more institutional capacity than others. Thus, the province worked with the 
conservation authorities to group neighbouring watersheds into Source Protection Regions with 
attention to balancing capacity and resources. The 19 resultant Source Protection Regions do not 
cover the entire province but do encompass the more populated regions in the province’s south. 
All Source Protection Committees were selected to reflect a balance of interests, with 
membership proportioned according to one third of actors representing business and industry, one 
third representing municipal and local governments, and one third representing “other” sectors 
including non-governmental organizations. Each group has a chair and non-voting representation 
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from First Nations, public health authorities, and the provincial government. Groups are 
supported by conservation authority staff and a dedicated Liaison Officer from the Ministry of the 
Environment. Parameters contained within the Clean Water Act (2006), and a subsequent 
Discussion Paper on Requirements for the Content and Preparation of Source Protection Plans 
(2009), are consistent with those associated with collaborative processes as described above.  
The Thames-Sydenham and Region Source Protection Region groups together the Upper 
Thames River Watershed, the Lower Thames River Watershed and the St. Clair Region 
Conservation Authority. It includes larger cities such as London and Sarnia, as well as numerous 
smaller cities and towns. This region is economically dominated by agriculture but is also 
characterized by limited aggregate, oil and gas resources, and other small industries. The region 
also hosts a significant concentration of petrochemical industries in Sarnia on the shores of the St. 
Clair River, an area informally known as Chemical Valley (see Figure 1.3). While heavily 
regulated, there have been significant, well-documented and ongoing problems related to 
environmental contamination by the industries operating in and around Sarnia (Environmental 
SWAT Team 2005; International Joint Commission 2006; Luginaah, et al. 2010).  
The Clean Water Act established deadlines for the production and implementation of 
collaboratively-developed Source Protection Plans. The process requires committees to submit 
draft Source Protection Plans to the Minister of Environment. Upon review, plans are returned to 
committees with recommended and required changes that are to be collaboratively discussed and 
addressed by the committee. When a final draft has been approved by the Minister of 
Environment, these plans become regulatory, rather than advisory, documents. At the time this 
thesis was completed (early 2015), all Source Protection Plans had been submitted to the Ministry 
of Environment and several Plans had been approved.  Once approved, the plans are legally 
binding and implementation will occur going forward (Government of Ontario 2006).  
1.4 Methods 
Each of chapters Two, Three and Four contains individual methods sections that are tailored 
to the goals of the respective manuscripts. This section provides a complete picture of the 
methodological approach used to achieve the larger study objectives outlined in Section 1.1. The 
study makes use of largely qualitative methods, defined by an interpretivist approach, in order to 
allow for the depth of analysis required to investigate power. The study of power is itself 
inherently interpretivist because power shapes how reality is experienced (Flyvbjerg 1998a; 
Lukes 2005). This perception of reality defines the context within which real life actions related 
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to governing water through collaborative processes occur. Particularly relevant to the study of 
power, an interpretivist paradigm acknowledges the subjective perceptions of reality as 
experienced and expressed by both study participants and the researcher. This paradigm allowed 
for an iterative approach to the generation of understanding and knowledge throughout the project 
(Guba and Lincoln 2005).  
A systematic review was first used to examine the treatment of power in literature on 
collaboration for water governance to determine the existence, scope, and nature of a gap in the 
literature. Systematic reviews are useful for reviewing large bodies of material, synthesizing 
major findings, identifying knowledge gaps and informing future research agendas using 
transparent, defensible protocols (Petticrew and Roberts 2006; Torgerson 2003). Common in 
health research, they are generally used to analyze quantitative studies and to generate statistical 
summaries. This study makes use of a systematic review protocol suited to qualitative social 
science inquiry (Petticrew and Roberts 2006; Torgerson 2003). While some quantitative 
techniques are used to summarize findings, the analytical approach is qualitative.  
Building upon the systematic review findings, a cross case study analysis was then used to 
delve into the identified gaps. Case studies allow for situated analysis that enables a more 
complete understanding of context (Gerring 2007; Yin 2009). This is particularly important when 
studying power because of the role of context in defining the interpretation of power (Flyvbjerg 
1998a; Lukes 2005). Adopting a cross-case approach allowed for the depth of inquiry required for 
power analysis while providing some degree of generalizability (Stake 2005; Yin 2009). 
Selection criteria, outlined below, reflected the need to isolate, to the extent possible, a small 
number of independent variables (Druckman 2005). This facilitated the examination of state and 
industry roles – variables expected to be interdependent rather than strictly independent – while 
minimizing variability. The complex political economy of both empirical cases prevented clear 
confirmation of causal relationships between the variables examined and outcomes, but did reveal 
strong causal patterns that allowed the development of study findings. The cross-case approach 
also accounts for some of the difficulties with generalizability acknowledged in literature on 
collaborative environmental governance relating to research involving single cases (e.g., Conley 
and Moote 2003).  
Comparisons between the cases and generalizability were made more effective by imposing 
criteria to ensure the selection of cases with similar characteristics (Conley and Moote 2003). 
Four criteria were used. First, the study examined examples of collaborative water governance, as 
defined in Section 1.2.1, in situations where a state-level body had used legislation to initiate 
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collaborative processes at the local, regional or watershed level. This was done in order to 
examine collaboration within a relatively common state-led institutional context (e.g., Cohen and 
Bakker 2014; Gambert 2010; Hania 2013; Taylor and de Loë 2012; Watson, et al. 2009). It also 
facilitated examination of the political and socioeconomic impacts of nested collaborative 
processes with respect to power. Cases fitting this criterion allowed examination of power in the 
context of scale.  
The second criterion was the presence of at least one major, incorporated natural resource 
industry actor as a collaborative process participant. Restricting processes in this way made it 
easier to bound a potentially unwieldy power analysis by increasing the likelihood that the types 
and forms of power moving through systems would be similar. It also ensured that case studies 
would provide rich information due to the likely presence of significant power imbalances as 
predicted by theory in Section 1.2.4. Third, cases were selected where state actors were active 
participants in collaborative processes. This is a relatively common feature of many collaborative 
processes (e.g., Hardy 2010; Koontz, et al. 2004; Sabatier et al. 2005), and facilitated in-depth 
analysis of power as mediated by the state (examined in depth in Chapter 3). The fourth criterion 
was geographic diversity in order to enhance generalizability.  
A list of potential cases was compiled based on reviews of Canadian provincial and federal 
policies, academic and grey literature on collaboration and collaborative water governance 
processes across Canada, and through discussions with key informants from academia, and the 
public sector. The two cases ultimately selected – the Athabasca Watershed Council and the 
Thames-Sydenham and Region Source Protection Committee – in addition to meeting selection 
criteria, address two of the most controversial sites of industrial activity in Canada (e.g., 
International Joint Commission 2006; Luginaah, et al. 2010; Palen, et al. 2014; Schindler 2014). 
1.4.1 Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework developed for this thesis reflects an integration of literature on 
governance, collaborative governance, collaborative environmental governance, power, state 
theory, and business involvement in environmental politics. Specifically, as discussed in Section 
1.2, collaborative governance processes were viewed through a neo-pluralist lens and 
conceptually divided into phases according to Howlett and Ramesh’s (1995) policy cycle model. 
Power theory and research on business involvement in environmental politics were then used to 
map out potential impacts of power imbalances, as defined according to Lukes, on collaborative 
water governance processes. The power literature provided theoretical guidance according to  
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Table 1.1: Conceptual framework for the application of power theory to collaborative 
water governance 
Key Parameter from 
Power Theory 
Key Parameter from 
Environmental Policy-Making 
in Literature  
Specific Concern for 
Collaborative Water Governance 
Instrumental Power: 
Behaviour, decision-
making, key issues, 
observable conflict, 
subjective interests 
(seen as policy 
preferences revealed by 
political participation) 
(Lukes 2005:29) 
 
• Coercion, co-optation, 
diversion, manipulation, 
misinformation (Culley and 
Angelique 2011; Dahl 1957; 
Falkner 2008; Newell 2005)  
• Financial resource imbalances 
(Falkner 2008; Fuchs 2007; 
Levy and Newell 2005a; 
Macdonald 2007) 
• Visible difference in capacity 
(technical, social, institutional, 
etc.) (Falkner 2008; Fuchs 
2007; Levy and Newell 
2005a; Macdonald 2007) 
Coercion, co-optation, diversion, 
manipulation, misinformation  
Facilitation or bridging actors who 
mediate power  
Imbalance of financial resources  
Unequal capacities (technical, 
social, institutional, etc.) to 
participate  
Structural Power: 
Decision-making and 
non decision-making, 
issues and potential 
issues, observable 
(overt or covert) 
conflict, subjective 
interests (seen as policy 
preferences or 
grievances) (Lukes 
2005:29) 
• Control over problem 
definition and agenda setting 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962; 
Cook, et al. 2013; Guber and 
Bosso 2013; Hessing, et al. 
2005; Levy and Newell 
2005a) 
• Inclusion or exclusion of 
specific interest groups 
(Freudenburg 2005; Gaventa 
1980)  
• Elite-level relationships and 
lobbying (Brooks and Stritch 
1991; Duffy 2013; Falkner 
2008; Finger and Svarin 2012; 
Fuchs 2007; Macdonald 2007) 
• Control over information and 
knowledge (Ascher and 
Steelman 2013; Dür and De 
Bièvre 2007; Falkner 2008; 
Levy 2012; Macdonald 2007; 
Torgerson 2005b; Williams 
2012) 
• Regulatory controls on 
industry, self-monitoring, self-
regulation and private rule 
setting (Auld and Gulbrandsen 
Who instigated collaboration? 
Limits of consensus 
Problem definition or framing 
and/or agenda setting 
Inclusion or exclusion of important 
actor groups 
Decision making power residing 
with, or being retained by, the state 
Governments initiating tokenistic 
processes that exist to generate 
legitimacy instead of to influence 
decisions 
Appropriate/inclusive use of 
knowledge 
Elite level relationships 
Lobbying external to the 
collaborative process 
Control over information 
production and use 
Background of representatives (e.g. 
evidence of revolving doors) 
The structural bias of capitalism or 
implications thereof 
Governments favouring business 
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2013; Clapp and Meckling 
2013; Falkner 2008; Newell 
2005; Torgerson 2005b) 
interests 
Governments favouring non-
business interests 
Collaboration being influenced by 
external political contexts 
Discursive Power: 
Decision-making and 
control over political 
agenda (not necessarily 
through decisions), 
issues and potential 
issues, observable 
(overt or covert) and 
latent conflict, 
subjective and real 
interests (Lukes 
2005:29) 
• Bias of dominant discourse 
(Falkner 2008; Newell 2005; 
Torgerson 2005b)  
• Efforts to control discourse 
(Cook, et al. 2013; Culley and 
Angelique 2011; Falkner 
2008; Fuchs 2007; Levy and 
Newell 2005a; Torgerson 
2005b) 
Who is, or is not, favoured by the 
dominant discourse 
Efforts to control discourse 
Prescription of a “language” of 
collaboration 
Dominant, hegemonic themes or 
values related to capitalism 
influencing collaboration 
Groups having to self-censor to 
participate 
 
Lukes’ framework for analysis. The global governance and political science literatures provided 
additional theory, contextually appropriate to the study, and extensive empirical evidence of the 
ways that power moves through, affects and is affected by, environmental policy making contexts 
where private actors play significant roles.  
An interpretivist approach meant that framework development was iterative and reflexive. 
Initial versions were grounded solely in the literature but growing insights and empirical 
experience resulted in ongoing refinement, as outlined in Sections 1.4.3.1 and 1.4.3.2, below. The 
conceptual framework, specifically targeted at assessing collaborative water governance in the 
context of natural resource industry firm involvement and presented in Table 1.1, guided the 
systematic review presented in Chapter Two, and informed data collection and analysis in 
Chapters Three and Four.  
In constructing Table 1.1, Lukes’ (2005) three dimensions of power were first used to 
provide a basic structure (Column 1). Additional literature on power, business involvement in 
environmental policy making and policy process was then used to identify ways that power could 
be expressed in environmental policy making contexts as identified through existing theory and 
empirical research (Column 2). These potential expressions of power were then integrated with 
theory on collaborative governance to develop the initial set of power indicators that were used in 
coding and analysis (Column 3). As identified by Lukes (2005), others (e.g., Haugaard and Clegg 
2009), and in Section 1.2.2, there is often overlap between categories, and interpretation of these 
categories tends to be subjective. In this research, overlap was preferred to omissions. Further, in 
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applying the indicators, attention was paid to the potential for exertion of power (e.g., does elite 
level access exist for a given actor?); the active exertion of power (e.g., was elite level access 
utilized in a given situation?); and, where possible, the success of an attempt to exert influence 
(e.g., did elite level access result in favourable policy decisions?). These distinctions are apparent 
throughout the text of the thesis. 
1.4.2 Data Collection 
Data collection methods are summarized here, and reiterated as appropriate in Chapters Two, 
Three and Four. 
1.4.2.1 Systematic Review 
One of the strengths of systematic review methods is the use of clearly defined, transparent 
protocols (Petticrew and Roberts 2006). Systematic reviews use a clearly defined research 
question to state what the review seeks to discover. For the purposes of this study, the review 
sought to determine: how, and to what extent, does the literature on collaborative approaches to 
water governance address issues of power as defined by the conceptual framework?  
Clearly defined inclusion and exclusion criteria are a second major feature of systematic 
reviews and attempt to minimize researcher bias (Petticrew and Roberts 2006). This study 
focused on four main selection criteria, summarized in Box 1.1. First, the study included only 
research in English due to practical language constraints. Second, the study focused on articles 
published in academic journals as opposed to books, book chapters, conference presentations, or 
other reports. While it is possible that some materials were missed due to this restriction, it is 
nonetheless justified based on trends in literature on collaborative environmental governance 
where many authors choose to present their most salient findings in both book and article format 
(e.g.,  Gunningham 2009; Holley, et al. 2012). The criteria also defined a set time period between 
2009 and January of 2013 when the final article search was conducted. This criterion was 
imposed based on the assumption that advances in scholarship related to power prior to this time 
frame would be reflected in later scholarship. Time limitations were necessary in order to return a 
reasonable quantity of articles for analysis by a single researcher within the restrictions imposed 
by the doctoral process. 
Finally, articles were sought that specifically addressed collaborative water governance. 
Application of this criterion required two phases: the first to return a pool of articles to be 
considered for inclusion in the review, followed by a second, more intensive reading of returned  
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Box 1.1: Systematic review selection criteria 
• Articles published in English	  
• Articles published in academic journals	  
• Articles published between 2009 and January 2013	  
• Articles addressing collaborative water governance either as self-identified, or as 
defined in Section 1.2.1.1	  
 
articles to ensure they described processes that could be characterized as collaborative water 
governance as defined in Section 1.2.1. 
In the first phase, a set of search terms that broadly encompass water, governance and 
collaboration was defined (see Box 1.2). Searching pools of literature for a systematic review is 
an exercise of balance between sensitivity and specificity. Very sensitive studies make extensive 
use of many possible search terms and return a high proportion of potentially relevant studies. 
Very specific studies retrieve a relatively low number of studies that do not meet the search 
criteria. While high sensitivity is theoretically ideal, it also involves an extremely large analytical 
commitment in order to identify the relevant studies (Petticrew and Roberts 2006). For example, 
a highly sensitive pool of search terms that included many possible synonyms for collaborative 
watershed groups returned 6,264 articles while the use of terms in Box 1.2 returned 399 articles. 
Using more specific terms was thus a necessary trade-off.  
The terms in Box 1.2 were applied to Scopus and ISI Web of Knowledge. These indices 
were used because they provide very broad and complete coverage of literature published on 
collaboration, environmental problem solving, and governance. The searches were applied to 
titles, abstracts and keywords and excluded scholarship from purely natural science or 
engineering journals, focusing instead on the fields of arts, social sciences, business and multi-  
Box 1.2: Systematic review database search terms 
Keywords, Titles and Abstracts:  
collaborat*   AND  
governance OR manag* OR plann*   AND  
water* OR catchment* OR basin* OR river* OR lake* OR stream* OR groundwater OR "ground 
water" OR flood* OR irriga* OR drainage OR hydro-electric OR hydro-power OR hydropower 
OR hydroelectric OR hydrolog* OR hydro-log* 
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disciplinary fields. The Scopus scan returned 368 articles while the ISI Web of Knowledge scan 
returned 31 articles. There was considerable overlap between the two databases.  
Articles returned by the database searches were then manually examined to identify those 
works addressing collaborative water governance. In some cases, authors clearly identified their 
topic of study as collaborative water governance. In situations where authors did not self-identify, 
the full text of articles was examined to identify articles addressing processes characterized by 
broad stakeholder inclusion, face to face interaction, facilitated deliberation and negotiation, 
knowledge and resource sharing, Habermasian ideals of communication, and a desire for 
consensus or near consensus (or a majority of these factors). This phase narrowed the study pool 
from 268 articles to 51 relevant articles for the Scopus search, and from 31 articles to 19 relevant 
articles for the ISI Web of Knowledge search. Accounting for overlap between databases, the 
final study pool contained 57 articles. A complete list of articles included in the study is available 
in Appendix 1. 
1.4.2.2 Case Studies 
Data for case studies were obtained through semi-structured interviews, relevant documents, and 
personal observations between July 2013 and December 2014. Interviews were a particularly 
useful data source since many forms of business power are most effective when exercised in 
secret (Fuchs 2007) and are thus only superficially publically documented and available. 
Documents and personal observations provided context and depth, revealed potential interesting 
questions, and allowed triangulation and crosschecking between data sources.  
Both purposeful and snowball sampling techniques were used to identify potential 
interviewees from municipal and provincial governments; collaborative group staff, board 
members and participants; industry and industry associations; non-governmental organizations; 
and, other individuals with relevant insights on the collaborative processes. In Ontario, 12 
interviews were conducted with individuals operating at the watershed scale, and 9 with 
interviewees at the provincial scale. In Alberta, 10 interviewees operated at the watershed scale, 
and 10 operated at the provincial scale (Table 1.2). In both cases, the majority of interviewees 
were able to provide insights on activities at both scales. All interviewees were asked to identify 
other potential interviewees in order to broader the perspectives included in the study. Interviews 
ranged from 45 minutes to almost two hours and a number of interviewees provided follow up 
interviews or written comments. 
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Table 1.2: Summary of interviewee backgrounds and locations 
Sector Alberta Ontario 
Provincial Government	   5	   5	  
Municipal Government	   1	   3	  
Industry	   3	   6	  
Collaborative Group Staff 
(Alberta) or Conservation 
Authority Staff (Ontario)	  
5	   4	  
Civil Society Collaborative 
Group Representatives	  
5 2	  
Provincial Policy Advisors	   1	   1	  
Total 20 21 
 
Interviews were semi-structured in order to generate data that reflect the experiences, 
perceptions and perspectives of the interviewee (Mason 2004). This was especially important due 
to the context dependent nature of interpretations of power and the importance of situated study 
(Flyvbjerg 1998b). The semi-structured format allows flexibility in the content pursued and thus 
acts to decrease interviewer bias by allowing the exploration of topics beyond the set interview 
questions (Mason 2004). This is consistent with the interpretivist approach to the broader study.  
Interviews sought to determine if and how the potential consequences of power imbalances 
identified in the conceptual framework were being expressed in the cases in question. The 
political nature of power meant that it was necessary to carefully construct questions in order to 
transparently address research objectives while adhering to cultural norms. Table 1.3 maps out 
several examples of how potential issues identified in the conceptual framework were formatted 
for the semi-structured interview guide. The interview guide was iteratively refined throughout 
the study based on changes to the evolving conceptual framework and insights gained during 
interviews. Where required, early interviewees were contacted to fill in gaps related to refinement 
of the interview guide but this was generally not required as most changes constituted the 
omission of ineffective questions. Questions were modified depending on the nature of the 
interviewee (e.g. provincial government employee vs. civil society collaborative group 
participant). These differences are reflected in the interview guide. The revised and complete 
guide is available in Appendix 2. 
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Table 1.3: Examples of interview question development 
Proposed expression of power identified by 
the conceptual framework 
Example interview questions posed to 
address theme 
Is elite level access available to some 
participants affecting processes and outcomes? 
What are your goals when participating in 
collaboration? 
Do you think you are able to influence policy 
through the collaborative process? Why or why 
not? 
Where do you go and to whom do you talk 
when you want to influence policy? 
Did retention of state control, including over 
agenda setting, approval and implementation, 
impede the ability of collaboration to 
effectively address policy issues? 
Were there any issues that you would have 
liked to address that you weren’t able to talk 
about in the collaborative process? 
Do you feel like everything was on the table or 
can you identify issues that were off limits? 
How do you feel output from the collaborative 
process will be used? 
Did capacity issues affect processes? Did you feel everyone was able to participate 
equally? How or why? 
 
Interviews were all digitally recorded. During interviews, notes were made on content and 
to record personal observations. Interviews were transcribed verbatim except where interviewees 
requested sections to be considered “off the record”. All transcripts were returned to interviewees 
in order to verify their accuracy and to provide them with an opportunity for clarification.  
All interviews were conducted with the approval of, and in accordance with, the University 
of Waterloo Office of Research Ethics. Interviewees were clearly informed of the study goals and 
intent through an information letter that was either emailed or presented in person to the 
interviewee. Interviewees were presented with a consent form requesting that they acknowledge 
their free participation in the study, give consent for digital recording of interviews, and that they 
agreed to the use of anonymous quotations in any theses or published materials resulting from the 
study. All interviewees participated freely and consented to audio recording. Only one 
interviewee did not consent to the use of anonymous quotations. 
Ninety-two documents were collected for analysis across the two cases (Appendix 3). 
Documents included government policy documents, collaborative group policy documents, 
publications and technical reports, meeting minutes and agendas, draft and final watershed plans, 
government publications, policy consultation and intervention records, records of interpersonal 
communications, relevant media articles, emails, websites, and industry policy, technical and 
 33 
promotional materials. In many cases, documents were used to cross check data from other 
sources, or to further investigate issues or points raised by interviewees. Many of the documents 
used were available online through institutional websites. Interviewees and key informants 
provided the bulk of remaining documents over email or during field visits.  
Personal observations were collected and recorded over the course of the study period from 
July 2013 to December 2014. Observations were collected during all 41 interviews. Observations 
were also collected during a multi-day meeting in Stony Plains, Alberta in November, 2013, and 
at a meeting at the Lower Thames Valley Conservation Authority in Chatham, Ontario in 
October, 2013. Attendance at meetings provided the opportunity to answer questions on the 
research project from the collaborative group, speak with relevant participants, arrange 
interviews, and observe dynamics at the collaborative group level.   
1.4.3 Data Analysis 
QSR NVivo 10 was used to code and analyze all systematic review articles, interviews, 
observations, documents and transcripts. For both the systematic review and the cross case study 
analysis, coding was grounded in the conceptual framework. However, analytical methods will be 
presented separately due to differences inherent in the individual methods. 
1.4.3.1 Systematic Review  
All 57 articles that met the systematic review criteria were analyzed using the conceptual 
framework established in Section 1.4.1. The elements of the framework were used as proxies for 
power in order to ensure completeness since power takes many forms and can easily be discussed 
in detail without ever using the word “power”. For example, many scholars problematize 
incomplete inclusion of actors at the collaborative table without ever identifying this issue as a 
“power” concern, let alone a “structural power” concern. Failing to account for issues of power 
acknowledged in this way would present an incomplete picture of how power is treated in the 
literature. For the purposes of the systematic review, the conceptual framework was organized 
into a coding table with clear proxies, organized according to Lukes’ three dimensions of power. 
These codes correspond to the last column of Table 1.1, above.  
 Qualitative coding is an inherently subjective process (Saldaña 2009). This is especially 
true when coding for power due to the inherently subjective nature of power interpretation (Lukes 
2005). Compounding this, the divisions between Lukes’ three dimensions of power can overlap 
depending on context (Lukes 2005). For example, discussion of the limits of consensus can refer 
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to issues of instrumental power if some actors are coerced into agreement, structural power if 
actors agree because they feel it is the best of limited undesirable options, or discursive power if 
agreement does not reflect actors’ best interests but is consistent with dominant hegemonic 
norms. Careful attention to context and transparent judgment was thus required throughout the 
coding process. In cases where overlap between Lukes’ dimensions was unresolvable, the 
passages in question were coded for all possible options. As well, attention was given to ensure 
that coding captured attention to power whether it was viewed as a productive or corrupting 
influence (e.g. the specific inclusion or exclusion of stakeholder groups). Following coding, 
articles were categorized according to Table 1.4 according to the extent to which they addressed 
power as defined by direct attention, or through the proxies. This was done in order to facilitate 
comparison and analysis. 
Table 1.4: Classification Scheme for Articles 
Level of 
Acknowledgement 
Description 
None No acknowledgement of power, either implicitly or explicitly 
Minimal Article falls into one of the following categories: 
• Identification of power as an issue without further discussion or 
analysis 
• Attention in some depth to at least one relational or easily visible 
structural aspect of power (e.g. resource imbalances)  
• Attention to two or more aspects of relational or easily visible 
structural power in lesser depth 
• Incomplete reference to at least one issue of hidden structure or 
discourse 
Partial Article falls into one of the following categories: 
• Well thought out acknowledgement of power as an issue but failure 
to acknowledge issues of power throughout 
• Attention to at least one issue of hidden structure or discourse but 
without thorough discussion or analysis 
Strong Demonstrated recognition of relational, structural and discursive power 
and the impact they have on the collaborative processes under 
discussion but significant gaps still exist 
Very strong Well thought out discussion of all aspects of power, and recognition of 
power as an issue 
 
A number of other variables were tracked throughout the coding process in order to 
facilitate interpretation of results. First, references to power itself were tracked, as well as 
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attention to power from a theoretically informed perspective. Articles were also coded according 
to attention to Indigenous, developed or developing country perspectives to determine if articles 
examining specific contexts would be more or less likely to address and reflect understanding of 
power. A significant amount of research on collaboration and water has been done through the 
European Water Framework Directive (WFD), and the California Delta Bay CALFED process. 
Research addressing these programs was also tracked to determine if depth of study leads to more 
extensive attention to power.     
To increase transparency and limit researcher bias, two reflexive processes were used. First, 
ten randomly selected articles were given to another researcher and coded using an initial version 
of Table 1.1.  These ten articles, and interpretation of the codes themselves, were compared 
against the same ten articles as coded by the primary researcher. Differences in interpretation and 
understanding were resolved, a revised coding table was generated and the entire data set was 
coded, and in some cases re-coded, using the revised table.  
Second, the development and application of the proxies followed an analytically inductive 
process. Analytic induction reflects a commitment to closely analyzing data and findings that 
deviate from expected outcomes, understanding potential new relationships and understanding, 
and modifying original positions and assumptions to reflect improved understanding (Bloor and 
Wood 2006). This process was actively pursued throughout coding and analysis and several 
codes were added as it became clear that more precision was needed to differentiate between 
different expressions of power. For example, separate codes were added to distinguish between 
“efforts to control discourse”, and “prescription of a ‘language’ of collaboration”. This resulted in 
re-coding of the entire data set with the final version of Table 1.1, presented above.  
1.4.3.2 Case Studies 
Coding of interview transcripts, documents and observation notes reflected a balance between 
inductive and deductive approaches to content analysis. While data collection and analysis were 
initiated using deductive insights drawn from the theory and presented in the conceptual 
framework (Section 1.4.1), a combination of deductive and analytically inductive open coding 
allowed new themes to emerge. This was followed by several rounds of axial coding in order to 
identify emergent themes, relationships and patterns (Strauss and Corbin 1998). As a result, study 
findings reflect both existing theory, where appropriate, and new concepts and ideas. 
Triangulation was used to determine validity and subject saturation amongst data sources 
(Charmaz 2006; Yin 2009). 
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1.5 Organization of Thesis 
The four remaining chapters in this thesis represent three individual manuscripts addressing 
distinct aspects of the overall study goals, and a concluding chapter to summarize, integrate and 
present global findings. Chapters Two, Three and Four have each been prepared as journal 
articles for submission to three different academic journals as joint-authored publications 
(Brisbois, M.C. and R.C. de Loë). Because they must stand alone as individual papers, some 
repetition is inevitable, especially with respect to theoretical grounding, empirical context, and 
methodological approach. At the same time, the papers build upon each other and map out a 
progression of understanding with respect to power in collaborative water governance processes. 
Chapter Two addresses research objectives one and two using the systematic review. The 
chapter maps out an analytical framework for examining power in literature on collaborative 
water governance and establishes the existence and nature of the gap in the target literature with 
respect to power. The manuscript, titled Power in collaborative approaches to governance for 
water: A systematic review, has been accepted for publication in Society and Natural Resources. 
This journal was selected because it attracts a broad readership across policy and governance 
issues, and because it has previously published works examining power, institutions and natural 
resource governance and management (e.g., Hardy 2010; Lockwood, et al. 2010; Parkins and 
Mitchell 2005). 
Chapters Three and Four jointly address the third and fourth research objectives. The two 
chapters build upon findings presented in Chapter Two and seek to expand understanding of the 
roles of the state and industry in collaboration for water governance using power theory. Chapter 
Three presents a manuscript entitled States role in collaborative approaches to environmental 
problem solving: Examining control over outcomes. It has been prepared for publication in the 
Policy Studies Journal and examines the motivations and actions of the state with respect to 
collaboration for water governance through a power lens. The manuscript will be submitted for 
publication following defense of the thesis. The Policy Studies Journal was selected because it 
specifically publishes empirically grounded analyses of public policy research. It has published 
many works examining collaboration, public policy, and natural resources management (e.g., 
Eversole 2011; Howlett and Rayner 2006; Koontz 2005). 
Chapter Four examines the motivations, positioning and actions of major, corporatized 
natural resource industry firms with respect to collaboration for water governance. It also uses a 
power framework to systematically examine the different ways that power moves through and 
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shapes collaborative systems. The manuscript, entitled Natural resource industry involvement in 
collaboration for water governance: Influence on processes and outcomes, has been prepared for 
publication in the Journal of Environmental Planning and Management and will be submitted 
following the thesis defense. The Journal of Environmental Planning and Management was 
targeted because of its broad readership and focus on environmental governance and 
management. The journal regularly publishes articles addressing collaborative approaches to 
natural resources management from a critical perspective (e.g., Frame, et al. 2004; Raik and 
Wilson 2006). 
The final chapter revisits the purpose and objectives of the thesis and summarizes major 
findings from each of the three manuscripts. These individual findings are then integrated to 
present global research contributions that represent significant, original and interesting 
contributions to academic thought. The empirical nature of the case study portion of the research 
also generated a number of interesting findings for practitioners of collaborative water 
governance and these are also presented. Finally, study limitations are explored and 
recommendations for future research are detailed. 
All references are presented at the end of the thesis in accordance with University of 
Waterloo thesis presentation guidelines. Appendices containing supplementary information 
referred to throughout this introductory chapter are available at the end of the thesis.  
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2 Chapter 2 
 
Power in collaborative approaches to governance for water: a sys-
tematic review 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper uses a formal systematic review to examine the extent to which literature on 
collaborative approaches to water governance reflects understanding and awareness of power-
related considerations. Understanding power is central to understanding the political process and 
its consequences for society (Haugaard and Clegg 2009). Addressing power directly and 
understanding its implications has the potential to improve the design, study and practice of 
collaborative approaches to water governance. 
Governance is concerned with the ways that decisions are made and actions taken (Holley, 
et al. 2012). Collaboration is a specific approach to governance that broadly involves 
responsibility and power sharing between state and non-state actors (Carlsson and Berkes 2005). 
A number of different fields examine collaborative approaches to governance (e.g., planning, 
public administration, environmental management). While differences in label, language and 
approach exist, there are several characteristics common to collaborative governance processes 
that serve to bound its definition. These include broad stakeholder inclusion, face-to-face 
deliberation, shared learning, a willingness to reconsider assumptions, pooling of resources, 
construction of long term relationships, and consensus-focused decision-making (Ansell and 
Gash 2007; Conley and Moote 2003; Holley, et al. 2012; Kallis, et al. 2009; Margerum 2008). 
Strongly normative foundations of collaboration are reflected in a common underlying 
assumption of equity, fairness and balancing of interests (Gray 1985).  
Proponents of collaboration argue that, when used appropriately, decisions are reflective of 
a broad range of knowledge, acceptable to all stakeholders, and are thus less likely to be subject 
to contestation because all interests have contributed to the offered outcomes (Innes and Booher 
2010). However, collaboration proponents also point to uncertainty regarding the ability of 
collaboration to produce better environmental outcomes than traditional, hierarchical processes 
(Koontz and Thomas 2006; Newig and Fritsch 2009). The increasingly widespread use of 
collaborative approaches to water governance across both geographical locations and fields of 
 39 
study (e.g., Holley, et al. 2012; Innes and Booher 2010; Sabatier et al. 2005), makes it 
particularly important to examine all the factors influencing their effectiveness, especially given 
the significant investment of time and resources required. Examining collaboration from the 
perspective of power theory is an effective way to do this. 
Many of the variables affecting collaboration can be at least partially explained by theories 
of power (e.g., Gaventa 2006; Haugaard and Clegg 2009; Lukes 2005). For example, Ansell and 
Gash (2007:552) highlight the importance of “incentives to participate” as a separate issue from 
“power/resource imbalances”, while concurrently noting that “power and resource imbalances 
will affect the incentives of groups to participate”. Likewise, institutional design is often 
identified as an important variable in collaboration (Ansell and Gash 2007; Emerson, et al. 2012; 
Imperial 2005), but institutional design principles such as broad inclusion and transparency are 
fundamentally shaped by the intentions and motivations of those who have the power to frame 
problems and the information that can be used to address those problems (Hessing, et al. 2005).  
Theories of power provide a useful way to link together seemingly disparate variables 
influencing the effectiveness of collaborative processes. In doing so, they reveal broad causal 
factors and relationships that can provide a more complete understanding of the variables 
influencing the success of collaborative processes. This approach has been effective in disciplines 
such as global governance (Clapp and Fuchs 2009; Falkner 2008) and political ecology 
(Swyngedouw 2006). In particular, power theories make clear that achieving effective 
collaboration extends far beyond ensuring equitable participation. Broad power relationships and 
socioeconomic conditions that transcend political and geographic scales must be identified and 
accounted for (Emerson, et al. 2012). 
Water presents a useful lens for exploring the impacts of power on collaboration. The 
governance of water is characterized by interconnected and overlapping political, social and legal 
structures as sites for the contestation and reproduction of power (Zeitoun and Allan 2008). In 
addition, a long tradition of using collaborative approaches in the context of water provides a rich 
pool of scholarship for study.  
In the next section, a framework based on power theory developed primarily by Lukes 
(2005) is presented. This framework was used to inform a formal systematic review (Petticrew 
and Roberts 2006) that examined the treatment of power across a broad pool of literature 
addressing collaborative approaches to water governance. The analysis revealed gaps in the 
extent to which power has been addressed in literature on collaborative approaches to water 
 40 
governance to date, and helps point the way towards a more effective accounting of power in the 
future. The paper concludes with implications for theory and practice.  
2.2 Power and Collaborative Governance – a conceptual framework  
Power is a complex area of study. Controversy over definition and measurement means that many 
researchers choose not to engage with power despite its fundamental influence on policy-making 
(Macdonald 2007). Lukes (2005), whose perspective strongly influenced this study, developed a 
three dimensional view that interprets power, as it is exercised in the political process, as 
domination. This does not preclude the existence or importance of other views on power. It 
instead reflects the fact that applying this view to collaboration for water governance is 
contextually appropriate in “mak[ing] sense of certain aspects of social life” (Haugaard and Clegg 
2009:4). As Zeitoun and Allan (2008:9) highlight, use of Lukes’ three dimensions is appropriate 
in situations “where power determines what is known, what is emphasized and who prevails”. 
Lukes’ framework is frequently applied to environmental policy-making contexts (e.g., Clare, et 
al. 2013; Fuchs 2007; Macdonald 2007) and relevant insights from these fields have been built 
into the conceptual framework underlying this paper. 
Lukes (2005:37) explains that “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner 
contrary to B’s interests”. The specific ways that “A exercises power over B” are analyzed 
through overlapping instrumental, structural and discursive dimensions. These dimensions are 
characterized below. A conceptual framework is then presented in Table 2.1. The final column of 
Table 2.1 highlights potential implications of each dimension of power for collaborative 
processes addressing water governance.   
Instrumental power, Lukes’ (2005) first dimension, depends on possession of resources that 
are useful in shaping policy outcomes in competition with others. This type of power is 
characterized by overt competition for influence and measureable use of resources in that 
competition. Definite, visible, cause-effect relationships make it relatively easy to study relational 
power empirically (Fuchs 2007).  
Structural dimensions of power are concerned with the ability to shape policy agendas 
(Lukes 2005). They acknowledge that decisions are influenced by the social structures within 
which they are embedded. Structural power is embodied in ‘mobilization of bias’ wherein 
dominant, hegemonic views that privilege certain groups are reinforced in policy decisions or 
non-decisions (Schattschnieder 1960). Dominant views shape decisions, even absent the visible 
use of force, and can constrain the ability of marginalized stakeholders to bring forward issues  
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Table 2.1: A conceptual framework for the analysis of power in collaborative ap-
proaches to water governance 
Dimension 
of Power 
Potential Predicted Consequence of 
Power  
Specific Concern for Collaborative 
Approaches 
Instrumental 
Power 
Coercion, co-optation, diversion, 
manipulation, misinformation (Culley 
and Angelique 2011; Dahl 1957; 
Falkner 2008)  
a. Coercion, cooptation, diversion, 
manipulation, misinformation  
b. Ensuring meaningful or equal 
participation through facilitation 
Capacity imbalances that will affect 
participation (financial, social, technical, 
institutional) (Falkner 2008; Fuchs 
2007; Levy and Newell 2005a; 
Macdonald 2007) 
c. Imbalance of financial resources 
d. Unequal capacities (technical, 
social, institutional, etc.) to 
participate 
Structural 
Power 
Control over agenda setting and problem 
framing (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; 
Cook, et al. 2013; Guber and Bosso 
2013; Hessing, et al. 2005; Levy and 
Newell 2005a) 
e. Who instigated collaboration  
j. Governments initiating processes 
to generate legitimacy instead of to 
influence decisions  
g. Problem definition or framing 
and/or agenda setting 
Active or implicit inclusion or exclusion 
of actors, (Freudenburg 2005; Gaventa 
1980)  
h. Inclusion or exclusion of 
important actor groups  
Control over knowledge production, 
inclusion and use, rule setting, self 
monitoring and reporting (Ascher and 
Steelman 2013; Falkner 2008; Levy 
2012; Macdonald 2007; Torgerson 
2005b; Williams 2012) 
n. Control over information 
production and use 
k. Appropriate/inclusive use of 
knowledge  
Unequal access to, and ability to 
influence, decision-makers (Brooks and 
Stritch 1991; Duffy 2013; Falkner 2008; 
Finger and Svarin 2012; Fuchs 2007; 
Macdonald 2007)  
l. Elite level relationships  
m. Lobbying external to the 
collaborative process  
o. Backgrounds of representatives 
(e.g. evidence of revolving doors) 
Active or implicit constraints on action 
as a results of prevailing socioeconomic 
and political conditions (Brooks and 
Stritch 1991; Falkner 2008; Flyvbjerg 
1998a; Fuchs 2007; Levy 2012; Levy 
and Newell 2005a; Macdonald 2007)  
Decision making power residing 
with, or being retained by, the state 
f. Limits of consensus 
p. The structural bias of capitalism 
of implications thereof  
q. Governments favouring specific 
actors 
Discursive 
Power 
Privilege as a function of discourse, 
control over discourse (Cook, et al. 
2013; Culley and Angelique 2011; 
Falkner 2008; Fuchs 2007; Levy and 
t. Who is, or is not, favoured by the 
dominant discourse  
u. Efforts to control discourse  
v. Prescription of a ‘language’ of 
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Dimension 
of Power 
Potential Predicted Consequence of 
Power  
Specific Concern for Collaborative 
Approaches 
Newell 2005a; Torgerson 2005b)  
 
collaboration  
w. Dominant, hegemonic themes or 
values related to capitalism 
influencing collaboration 
x. Groups having to self-censor to 
participate 
 
and solutions that best reflect their interests (Flyvbjerg 1998a) – even when deliberative processes 
are used (Freudenburg 2005). In practice, structural power can be either visible or hidden (Lukes 
2005).  
Discursive power, Lukes’ third face of power, represents the ability to manipulate the wants 
and desires of others:  
...A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but 
he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very 
wants. … that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires... 
(Lukes 2005:27) 
Discursive power is far reaching in that public education, lobbying, mass media, and control over 
knowledge production and technology are used to align societal values with the goals of those 
with power over these institutions (Lukes 2005). While discursive power can be effectively used 
as a form of resistance (Gaventa 2006), those most successful in exercising relational and 
structural forms of power are often more successful in exercising discursive power because of 
control over resources, and an ability to define agendas and participants (Culley and Angelique 
2011). Because discursive power is subtle, it is difficult to study empirically (Falkner 2008; 
Fuchs 2007). 
2.3 Methods 
A systematic review was used to explore the extent to which literature addressing collaborative 
approaches to water governance accounts for issues of power. Systematic reviews are structured 
literature reviews that are useful in reviewing large bodies of material, synthesizing major 
findings and identifying knowledge gaps. In this paper, a protocol suited to social science inquiry 
is used (Petticrew and Roberts 2006).  
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Restrictions on materials and parameters searched were used to limit the range of articles 
returned to a reasonable number. This reflects a compromise between an ideally “sensitive” 
study, and a practically feasible “specific” study (Petticrew and Roberts 2006). To summarize 
inclusion criteria: 
• The search was restricted to articles published in English.  
• The study focused on journal articles rather than books, book chapters, reports and other 
kinds of literature because core research on collaboration for environmental governance is 
usually published in article format. Of the books that are published on the topic, many 
authors also choose to present their most salient findings in article form (e.g., Gunningham 
2009; Holley, et al. 2012).  
• Two journal indices (Scopus and Web of Knowledge) were used to build the database of 
articles. These two indices provided the broadest and most complete coverage of literature 
published on collaboration, environmental problem solving and governance.  
• The search was restricted to titles, abstracts and keywords. These fields were searched for a 
range of terms that broadly encompass water, governance and collaboration (see Box 2.1). 
• Searches were limited to articles published in the fields of arts, social sciences, business and 
multi-disciplinary fields – excluding only items published in purely natural science or 
engineering periodicals.  
• Finally, dates were restricted to articles published between 2009 and January, 2013. This 
captured recent literature that could potentially have incorporated advances in theory and 
practice from the power literature.  
Box 2.1: Database search terms 
Keywords, Titles and Abstracts:  
collaborat*   AND  
governance OR manag* OR plann*   AND  
water* OR catchment* OR basin* OR river* OR lake* OR stream* OR groundwater OR 
"ground water" OR flood* OR irriga* OR drainage OR hydro-electric OR hydro-power OR 
hydropower OR hydroelectric OR hydrolog* OR hydro-log* 
 
The Scopus search returned 368 articles. These were manually examined to limit articles to 
those focused on collaborative approaches to water governance. This included governance 
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processes addressing water issues and either self-identifying as collaboration, or characterized by 
broad stakeholder inclusion, face to face interaction, facilitated deliberation and negotiation, 
knowledge and resource sharing, open, equitable communication, and a desire for consensus or 
near consensus (or a majority of these factors). Application of these criteria narrowed the study 
pool from the Scopus scan to 51 relevant articles. The ISI Web of Knowledge scan returned 31 
articles of which 19 met the criteria. Accounting for overlap with the Scopus scan, the database 
for the systematic review contained 57 articles. Broken down by year, there were 20 articles in 
2009, 13 articles in 2010, 10 articles in 2011, 10 articles in 2012, and one article as of January, 
2013, when the search was completed. Thirty-two journals were represented with articles 
addressing mainly watershed or regional scales in North America, Europe, Australia and New 
Zealand. Representation was strongest in Environmental Science and Policy (n=7), Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management (n=6), and Society and Natural Resources (n=5).  
The full content of each article in the database was manually analyzed in order to answer 
the following research question: how, and to what extent, does the literature on collaborative 
approaches to water governance address issues of power as defined by the conceptual 
framework? The conceptual framework (Table 2.1) identified power proxies that were used to 
initially code each article; use of this framework satisfied the requirement for coding based on a 
rigorous analysis of multiple relevant studies (Petticrew and Roberts 2006). Proxies were 
necessary in order to ensure relevance and completeness of the review because power and power 
theory are rarely referred to directly in literature on collaborative approaches to water 
governance. For example, it was common for authors to mention the extent to which specific 
actors were included or excluded, but to not recognize that this could reflect power, let alone 
structural power (Table 2.1).  At the same time, authors of collaborative water governance articles 
did not have to specifically reference power in order to demonstrate a clear understanding of the 
ways that power affects collaborative processes. The coding scheme also allowed for different 
perspectives on power to be captured, for example, power as productive versus power as 
corrupting. Hence, the proxies in Table 2.1 allowed for the many ways in which power could be 
implicitly or explicitly addressed to be captured. Importantly, while the coding process began 
from a deductive perspective (based on insights from power literature as synthesized in Table 
2.1), emergent themes revealed during the course of coding were also incorporated. Following 
initial coding based on the initial deductively developed framework, all articles were re-coded a 
second time to account for inductively refined codes. The refined codes are presented in the next 
section.  
 45 
QSR NVivo10 was used to organize and conduct coding. There was frequently overlap 
between categories (e.g., limits of consensus can refer to issues of either structure or discourse). 
Therefore, articles were carefully read to determine context and the depth of attention to power. 
In cases where overlap between categories was unresolvable, the passages in question were coded 
for both dimensions of power. Coding in all cases required informed judgment in order to ensure 
that attention to power was noted where present, even in the absence of direct reference to power 
or power theory.  
The proxy codes were able to capture the existence of attention to specific issues but were 
unable to address the depth of attention given. For example, noting that collaboration was 
instigated and framed by a local government agency (codes “e” and “g” in Table 2.1) is quite 
different from noting these issues and then acknowledging their interrelationships with inclusion, 
development of policy options, and information used. For this reason, coded articles were 
analyzed for depth of attention and grouped into five categories according to the extent to which 
they acknowledged power concerns: None, Minimal, Partial, Strong, and Very Strong. The basis 
for placing each article in these categories is incorporated in the table that presents the results 
(below).  
Other parameters with potential explanatory value were also tracked. This was done in 
order to determine if specific variables accounted for attention to power. References to power in 
general or generic terms, and to power from a theoretically informed perspective, were tracked. 
Articles were also coded according to developed or developing country contexts, and for attention 
to Indigenous contexts. Tracking attention to Indigenous concerns allowed examination of the 
extent to which power is addressed in contexts where significant power imbalances have 
historically been acknowledged. Considerable research has been undertaken addressing 
collaborative water governance in the European Union under the Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) and in the California Delta Bay region under CALFED. Articles addressing these 
initiatives were tracked to determine if focused, situated study has led to a broader examination of 
power.  
Coding of articles, even using a well-specified coding structure such as the one presented 
above, is inherently subjective. To limit subjectivity, another researcher was asked to analyze two 
randomly selected articles from the pool of 57 using preliminary deductive codes from Table 2.1. 
Differences in interpretation of codes were resolved through discussion and negotiation, resulting 
in some adjustment. This person then applied the revised codes to 10 randomly selected articles. 
The results were compared to the coding of these same articles by the first author. While there 
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was some minor variation with respect to the exact text coded, final article classification by both 
researchers was consistent (e.g., None, Minimal, Partial, Strong, and Very Strong). 
2.4 Results 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the results of the systematic review. Power was not addressed in 32% 
of articles, addressed minimally in 39%, partially addressed in 19%, strongly addressed in 4% 
and very strongly addressed in 7% (Table 2.3). While 44% of articles mentioned “power” 
specifically, it was relatively common for authors to note power as an issue without engaging in 
any (4%), or much (19%), deeper analysis. For example, in their study of mega-region 
governance focused on water planning in California, Innes, et al. (2011:59) make reference to the 
fact that “[if] they are networked within themselves, information, social capital, and power can 
flow through the system rapidly”. Power is directly referenced, but coding for proxies revealed 
that attention to power largely addressed two issues: government retention of power and 
inclusion. Acknowledging power as an issue does not necessarily account for the many impacts 
of power on collaborative approaches to water governance and its outcomes. 
Even among articles rated as “strongly” or “very strongly” acknowledging power (Table 
2.3), it was uncommon for the word “power” to be used. This reinforces the importance of 
analyzing power through its proxy expressions rather than simply by searching documents for 
direct references to power. For example, Gambert (2010:477) “very strongly” addresses all 
dimensions of power in his study of local government involvement in WFD-related initiatives in 
France and England, but only once uses the term “power”. 
Only three of the articles analyzed explicitly addressed power using insights derived from 
power theory (e.g., Gaventa 2006; Haugaard and Clegg 2009; Lukes 2005). Two of these articles 
were classified as very strongly addressing power (Pares 2011; Shilling, et al. 2009), and another 
made reference to the fact that attention to power from a more theoretical perspective is a gap to 
be addressed (Taylor and de Loë 2012).  
Fifty two articles addressed developed country contexts, three addressed developing country 
contexts and one article addressed both. Indigenous contexts were addressed in four articles. 
Articles addressing both Indigenous and developing country perspectives all had at least 
 47 
Table 2.2:  Proxy Power Codes and Number of Articles Containing Codes (n=57 arti-
cles) 
Category and 
(%) of Articles 
Specific Codes for Each Category Number and 
(%) of Articles  
Relational 
Power 
(47%) 
a. Coercion, cooptation, diversion, manipulation, 
misinformation  
10(18%) 
b. Ensuring meaningful or equal participation through 
facilitation 
9(6%) 
c. Imbalance of financial resources 10(18%) 
d. Unequal capacities (technical, social, institutional, etc.) 
to participate 
20(35%) 
Structural 
Power 
(70%) 
e. Who instigated collaboration  11(19%) 
f. Limits of consensus  8(14%) 
g. Problem definition or framing and/or agenda setting 16(28%) 
h. Inclusion or exclusion of important actor groups  28(49%) 
i. Decision making power residing with, or being retained 
by, the state  
19(33%) 
j. Governments initiating tokenistic processes that exist to 
generate legitimacy instead of to influence decisions  
8(14%) 
k. Appropriate/inclusive use of knowledge  18(32%) 
l. Elite level relationships  12(21%) 
m. Lobbying external to the collaborative process  2(4%) 
n. Control over information production and use  1(2%) 
o. Backgrounds of representatives (e.g. evidence of 
revolving doors) 
3(5%) 
p. The structural bias of capitalism of implications thereof  12(21%) 
q. Governments favouring business interests 5(9%) 
r. Governments favouring non-business interests 7(12%) 
s. Collaboration being influenced by external political 
contexts 
18(32%) 
Discursive 
Power 
(19%) 
t. Who is, or is not, favoured by the dominant discourse  4(7%) 
u. Efforts to control discourse  1(2%) 
v. Prescription of a ‘language’ of collaboration  4(7%) 
w. Dominant, hegemonic themes or values related to 
capitalism influencing collaboration 
8(14%) 
x. Groups having to self-censor to participate 3(5%) 
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Table 2.3:  Classification Scheme for “Depth of Attention to Power” and Number of 
Articles in Each Category (n=57 articles) 
Depth of Attention 
and Number and 
(%) Recognition 
Overall 
Description – Article falls into one of the following 
categories 
Number 
and (%) 
of 
Articles 
None 
18(32%) 
No acknowledgement of power  18(32%) 
Minimal 
22(39%) 
Identification of power as an issue without further 
discussion or analysis 
2 (4%) 
Attention in some depth to at least one relational or 
easily visible structural aspect of power (e.g. resource 
imbalances) (codes “a” through “k”) 
5 (9%) 
Attention to two or more aspects of relational or easily 
visible structural power in lesser depth (codes “a” 
through “k”) 
7 (12%) 
Incomplete reference to at least one issue of hidden 
structure or discourse (codes “l” through “x”) 
8 (14%) 
Partial 
11(19%) 
Well thought out acknowledgement of power as an issue 
but incomplete attention throughout 
3 (5%) 
Attention to at least one issue of hidden structure or 
discourse but without thorough discussion or analysis 
8 (14%) 
Strong 
2(4%) 
Demonstrated recognition of relational, structural and 
discursive power, their relationship and the impact they 
have on the collaborative processes under discussion – 
significant gaps still exist 
2(4%) 
Very strong 
4(7%) 
Well thought out discussion of all aspects of power, and 
recognition of power as an issue 
4(7%) 
 
‘minimal’ attention to power and made up a proportionally large number of those articles 
“strongly” or “very strongly” addressing power (40%) given that they represented only 12% of 
articles. This supports the suggestion that power issues may be addressed more commonly in 
these settings than in others where collaborative approaches for addressing water problems are 
used. 
Concerns relating to instrumental power appeared in 47% of articles, most often in the 
context of unequal capacities to participate (35%) (Table 2.2). The most commonly identified 
type of power overall was structural power (70%) and the majority of commonly applied codes 
were structural. These included “h. inclusion or exclusion of important stakeholder groups” 
(49%),  “i. decision making power residing with, or being retained by, the state” (33%), “k. 
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appropriate/inclusive use of knowledge” (32%), and “s. collaboration being influenced by 
external political contexts” (32%) (Table 2.2). 
Because structural power is a very broad category, subcategories were identified as “easily 
visible structural power” (codes “e” through “k”, 68%) (e.g., who instigated collaboration), 
“hidden structural power” (codes “l” through “r”, 44%) (e.g., elite level relationships), and “direct 
reference to external political influence” (code “s”, 32%). External political drivers were 
distinguished from other forms of structural power because they can either be hidden or visible 
depending on context, and because of the specific ways they influence collaboration. This 
category would often appear in articles that exhibited no other attention to power. For example, 
despite not specifically addressing power in his analysis of agricultural water use in the context of 
CALFED, Fuller (2009:672) states the following in the final paragraph: 
Like any element of a long and difﬁcult policy process, the agreements made in 
consensus building processes are not the ﬁnal step. Much can change in 
implementation, as it did in CALFED, especially when an administration changes. 
Despite the strong stakeholder support for the Program, the incoming Bush 
administration and Congress never provided the ﬁnancial support promised by their 
Clinton-era predecessors.  
This statement clearly acknowledges the influence of factors operating external to the 
collaborative process at the implementation phase. However, the analysis does not consider these 
kinds of power-related issues in the context of the collaborative process itself.  
With respect to hidden structural power, the most frequently identified issues were “l. elite 
level relationships” (21%), and “p. the structural bias of capitalism of implications thereof” 
(21%), (Table 2.2). Recognizing that the implications of capitalism can be broadly defined 
depending on perspective, this code was restricted to instances that addressed situations tangibly 
shaped by economic factors. For example, 
In the context of water management, water supply infrastructure organizations, with 
their links to economic development... are traditionally viewed as the actors with the 
largest stake in the status quo and the most power to inﬂuence bargaining over the 
gains from cooperation (Lubell and Lippert 2011:78) 
Discursive power was the least frequently recognized (19%) and, as suggested earlier, 
presented coding challenges. For example, passages coded for structural bias related to 
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capitalism, discussed above, were often also coded for the most commonly identified discursive 
theme, “w. the discussion of dominant, hegemonic themes or values related to capitalism” (14%). 
This reflects the many ways that dominant economic structures can shape language, ideals, values 
and resultant tangible actions. To illustrate, the following passage was coded for both structural 
and discursive issues: 
solutions such as the [Environmental Water Account], which appear to collaboration 
scholars as innovative and consensual…are seen instead as an expansion and 
legitimization of the dominant market logic and language to the environmental realm, 
perpetuating past injustices (Kallis, et al. 2009:639). 
Discursive power was also more likely to be addressed in articles focused on either the EU WFD 
or CALFED. Of articles returned, 12 addressed either the WFD or CALFED. Of the four articles 
that very strongly addressed power, two addressed the WFD and one addressed CALFED. The 
fact that these settings have received sustained attention from collaboration scholars may account 
for this pattern – but this finding is not conclusive. 
2.5 Discussion  
The analysis revealed that many authors of studies relating to collaborative approaches to water 
governance are addressing power-related concerns in their work, and are aware of the importance 
of power for these processes. However, gaps remain related to hidden structural and discursive 
power. Furthermore, many authors are not explicitly identifying the relationships between 
different types of power, as evidenced by the fact that 71% of articles addressed power below a 
“partial” level. In some cases this appears to have been an oversight. For example, in their 
synthesis of decades of work on collaboration, Innes and Booher (2010:108-112) dedicate several 
pages to the implications of power for collaborative processes. The fact that this understanding 
was not fully captured in the article included in this review (Innes, et al. 2011) highlights the 
value of a more structured, explicit approach to the examination of power in collaboration for 
environmental governance. At the same time, findings such as this reveal opportunities for 
strengthening understanding of the role and influence of power in collaborative approaches to 
water governance.  These are discussed below. 
2.5.1 Instrumental Power 
Issues related to instrumental power were addressed relatively infrequently considering that 
they tend to be quite obvious. One possible explanation is that strategies for dealing with 
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instrumental power have been well developed, are easily implemented, and are now commonly 
reflected in process design. For example, effective facilitation and equitable participation are now 
common process characteristics adopted in order to address issues of coercion, co-optation, 
manipulation and misinformation (Ansell and Gash 2007; Parkins and Mitchell 2005).  
2.5.2 Structural Power 
Given that power is difficult to address and often hidden, it is unsurprising that the literature 
analyzed in this review focused mainly on visible expressions of power within collaborative 
processes. The prevalence of attention to visible structural power is likely due to the fact that 
many of the criteria that are emphasized as fundamental to collaborative approaches to 
environmental problem solving are issues of structure that are challenging to address in terms of 
implementation (e.g., the inclusion or exclusion of stakeholders). At the same time, the results 
indicate that, despite concern for these kinds of issues, very few authors are either implicitly or 
explicitly making the link between expressions of power and the broader ways that power shapes 
policy outcomes. For example, while a number of authors recognize the importance of ensuring 
inclusive, equitable representation (e.g., Borisova, et al. 2012; Marshall, et al. 2010; Watson, et 
al. 2009), addressing barriers to participation in collaborative processes also requires addressing 
deeper issues that broadly prevent marginalized parties from having a real voice in society. To 
illustrate, Shilling et al (2009:698), in reference to CALFED, note that “there have been various 
mechanisms for exclusion and denying access, including language, arbitrary legitimation of 
knowledge, cultural practices of interaction among those in power, and class”. These are issues 
that transcend the problem arena and are perpetuated and reinforced at multiple scales.  
The disconnect between collaborative processes and broader power patterns invokes issues 
of scale because many of the problems expressed at the process level do not necessarily have 
corresponding solutions at that level but are rather reflective of broader societal power 
imbalances. Identifying strategies to address the issues revealed by a power-based analysis thus 
demands that collaborative process researchers, designers and implementers examine scales 
beyond the immediate problem arena (Clare, et al. 2013; Cook, et al. 2013).  
The relative prevalence of articles noting the influence of external political factors indicates 
that many scholars are aware that the success of collaboration is at least partly determined by 
conditions external to the actual collaborative process. To some extent, the need to consider 
broader scales also explains why literature addressing large regional initiatives such as CALFED 
and WFD-initiated processes addressed power more effectively. Many lobbying and influence 
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efforts take place at these regional or national scales (Gambert 2010) and are thus more likely to 
be captured within analyses of these collaborative processes. As well, both CALFED and the 
WFD have been extensively studied and, as many of the possible barriers to collaboration have 
been explored and yet failed to result in markedly effective processes, it has become necessary to 
consider the broader reasons why such barriers continue to persist (e.g., Gambert 2010; Kallis, et 
al. 2009; Pares 2011; Shilling, et al. 2009).  
2.5.3 Discursive Power 
Comparatively little attention to discursive power is not surprising since identifying this 
type of power involves moving beyond easily observable expressions and digging deeply into 
how, and by whom, influence is exerted (Lukes 2005). The most common discursive issue 
identified was the influence of dominant, hegemonic themes. Pares (2011:462) provided one 
example of the way this theme arose:  
even if several civil society organizations take part in these forms of governance, there 
is a tendency to lose democratic control in these networks, while the power and 
inﬂuence of social and political-economic elites grow in a strategy to re-centre the 
regulatory force of the market as the main organizer of social relations.  
Of concern is that collaboration is espoused precisely because of its purported ability to equitably 
represent the interests, knowledge and contributions of all stakeholders. Unaddressed issues of 
power can prevent this from happening, and thus hamper our understanding of why collaboration 
may not be returning the improved social and ecosystem conditions that it is intended to achieve. 
This may explain heightened awareness of power in literature addressing developing country and 
Indigenous perspectives. These contexts have frequently been examined through the lens of 
power and scholars working in these fields commonly are already attuned to power issues and are 
more comfortable using power theory (e.g., Takeda and Ropke 2010). 
2.5.4 Strategies for a better accounting for power 
Because of the pervasive nature of power, an effective accounting will require a significant 
shift in how collaborative process analysis and design is approached. When power is considered, 
the analytical frame inevitably expands to include larger socioeconomic and political trends over 
multiple spatial, institutional and temporal scales (Clare, et al. 2013; Cook, et al. 2013). This 
introduces a number of complicating variables that must be accounted for in characterizing and 
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assessing collaborative cases. Adapting to this increased complexity may best be achieved using a 
graduated approach. 
Openly acknowledging that power-related issues exist is a first step toward establishing if 
and how they matter in terms of collaborative governance processes and outcomes. Considering 
power in the context of collaboration allows for a more realistic view of what collaborative 
processes can accomplish under existing socioeconomic and political conditions, and how best to 
approach collaboration in contested settings. For example, applying a power-based analysis may 
reveal that an industry participant has existing structural privilege and elite-level connections that 
permit this actor to effectively exercise veto power at the policy approval or implementation 
stage. In such a situation, engaging in collaboration for the purposes of making or informing 
policy will likely be ineffective (Clare, et al. 2013).  
Using a power lens also has the potential to identify ways that power relationships can be 
shifted through collaboration – a potential outcome highlighted by others (e.g., Ansell and Gash 
2007; Innes and Booher 2010). For example, Pares (2011) noted that some groups chose not to 
participate in collaborative processes under the European Water Framework Directive because 
doing so would require accepting a contested world-view and language. In such cases, designing 
processes to include collaborative agenda setting and problem definition may help include diverse 
actors, knowledge and perspectives, and could support the transformative potential of 
collaboration.  
Ultimately, the results of the review reveal that there is no standard approach for addressing 
power in collaborative approaches to governance for water. The literature will be strengthened by 
the development of frameworks that allow for easier communication through common definitions 
and measurement metrics. Frameworks that provide tangible potential expressions of power, such 
as those presented in Table 2.2, also make the complicated concept of power more accessible and 
usable (Fuchs 2007). This is especially important for researchers who are not necessarily, nor 
strive to be, power scholars. Empirical research designs will better acknowledge and address 
power-related concerns if the issues highlighted in Table 2.2, specifically with respect to 
structural and discursive power, are incorporated into case descriptions. This will make it easier 
to integrate power expressed in broader socioeconomic contexts into analyses. Existing literature 
on the application of theories of power to natural resource contexts can also provide further 
insight into the application of power theory to collaboration addressing water and environmental 
governance (e.g., Caine and Krogman 2010; Raik, et al. 2008). 
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Explicit steps for more effectively accounting for power in the study and design of 
collaborative approaches to water governance include applying, or constructing, a range of 
power-related queries (e.g., Table 2.2) that will help reveal significant power issues in cases 
under examination. Many power issues reflect conditions external to the collaborative process; 
these issues can be identified and addressed, although not necessarily resolved, at the 
collaborative group scale. Specific attention should be paid to the following concerns: 
• Determining how, and by whom, collaborative agendas are set. This will help 
reveal if actors are excluded, whether control is being exerted to shape agendas in 
favour of specific interests, and whether decisions on important issues are being 
restricted. 
• Understanding the financial, technical and institutional capacities of actors and 
how they are utilized both within, and external to, collaborative processes. This 
includes factors such as lobbying, elite political access, the ability to devote time 
and money to collaboration, and the ability to use public media as a tool. 
• Revealing the knowledge, information and perspectives that are used and valued. 
Scholars can use this information to determine if these inputs and framings 
sufficiently reflect the interests of all collaborative actors. 
• Determining the prevailing orientation of state bodies with final decision-making 
power, and dominant societal values in the context in question. For example, 
collaboration in regions governed by ideologically neoliberal governments are 
likely to favour business interests in ways that may not adequately give voice to 
environmental or social interests.  
The results of such queries can then be used to direct attention toward potentially significant 
power issues for the context in question. In the presence of such issues, such as a collaborative 
context characterized by the presence of a single powerful sector or interest, analysis should 
clearly acknowledge, and account for the impacts of, the presence of these power issues.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
Collaboration is increasingly being used to address contemporary environmental problems. 
Considering power, and the different ways it is expressed, is a useful way to make visible and 
link together many of the factors shaping collaborative processes and outcomes. The systematic 
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review reported in this paper was based on an explicit power framework grounded in a 
mainstream power theory perspective. It revealed that recent research on collaborative approaches 
to water governance is accounting for many visible consequences of power. Nonetheless, there is 
considerable room for increased understanding of hidden forms of structural and discursive 
power, and the interrelated ways these forms of power affect collaborative systems. Future 
research in this area will be useful. 
Examining power through the framework used here expands the scale of analysis from the 
collaborative group itself to include broader, socioeconomic and hegemonic factors that shape 
collaborative processes and outcomes. This addresses a challenge identified in the literature 
related to the need to identify and account for such factors across political and geographic scales 
(Emerson, et al. 2012). Meeting this challenge is important because the success or failure of 
collaborative approaches to environmental problem solving is closely linked to a host of power-
related considerations. Explicit attention to power recognizes that collaborative processes do not 
exist in isolation. Instead, they are nested within broader social, political and economic contexts 
that shape processes and outcomes in ways that are often pervasive and hidden (Lubell and 
Lippert 2011; Memon and Kirk 2012). Theorizing, designing and conducting collaboration in the 
absence of attention to power risks incomplete understanding of how and why processes progress 
and produce outcomes, successful or otherwise. This paper explored power in collaborative 
approaches to water governance. However, the issues explored here are equally relevant in other 
settings where diverse actors come together to address shared environmental problems. 
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3 Chapter 3 
 
State roles in collaborative approaches to problem solving for wa-
ter: assessing the power of the state 
3.1 Introduction  
Many of the water problems currently facing society are defined by complex causes, limited state 
resources, and seemingly intractable actor positions (Clancy 2014a; Sabatier et al. 2005). These 
situations are increasingly being addressed using collaborative approaches to environmental 
problem solving (Holley, et al. 2012; Koontz and Newig 2014). Collaborative approaches make 
use of deliberation and debate amongst an inclusive set of autonomous state, private and civil 
interests. They are designed around face-to-face interaction in order to share knowledge, foster 
relationships and emergent understanding of problems, and combine resources in the pursuit of 
better, more enforceable solutions (Ansell and Gash 2007; Holley, et al. 2012; Margerum and 
Robinson 2015). Consensus is usually sought, if not always achieved (Ansell and Gash 2007), 
and there is an expectation that collaborators will reconsider initial assumptions and attitudes 
(Fish, et al. 2010; Kallis, et al. 2009). The collaborative approach is grounded, to some degree, 
on the assumption that all actors will be able to help shape ultimate outcomes in a non-trivial way 
(Innes and Booher 2010; Tan, et al. 2012). Collaboration provides an opportunity to address 
problems that cannot be tackled by any one actor on their own (Gray 1989). However, its promise 
is balanced by limited evidence that collaboration is able produce the better, more implementable 
environmental solutions that have justified its use to date (Gunningham 2009; Koontz and 
Thomas 2006; Newig and Fritsch 2009). 
This study examines the actions and motivations of the state, itself a fragmented and 
divided actor (Cerny 2010), relative to collaborative approaches to water governance in order to 
assess the potential of such approaches to generate better social and environmental outcomes. 
Despite trends toward more inclusive governance, states persist as the dominant decision-making 
authority with respect to environmental policy (Fish, et al. 2010; Hardy 2010). State regulation 
and enforcement remain the largest motivators of meaningful change for private and civil actors 
(Holley et al 2012). Governments often play important roles in the initiation of collaboration, 
provision of institutional and financial support, and implementation of developed policies 
(Gunningham 2009; Koontz, et al. 2004).  When collaboration addresses issues of public policy, 
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states also face the challenge of integrating collaborative processes and outcomes into existing 
hierarchical governing systems (Emerson, et al. 2012).  
A number of scholars have specifically examined the roles of the state relative to 
collaborative approaches to environmental governance (e.g., Koontz et al 2014; Hardy 2010; 
Abers and Keck 2009). This study builds upon existing work by using an analytical approach 
rooted in theory on power to provide insight into the factors that shape the actions and 
motivations of the state with respect to collaborative problem solving. In doing so, it responds to 
two distinct calls in the literature. The first is for deeper investigation into the complexities of 
state structures, actions and motivations relative to collaborative approaches to environmental 
governance (e.g., Hardy 2010; Moellenkamp, et al. 2010). An interrelated second call addresses 
the fact that, despite being recognized as central to discussions of water conflict (Clancy 2014a), 
power represents an understudied area with respect to collaboration for water governance 
(Chapter Two; Taylor and de Loë 2012). While frequently acknowledged as important (e.g., 
Ansell and Gash 2007; Innes and Booher 2010), power is rarely explored from a theoretical 
perspective in the context of collaborative environmental governance (exceptions include Parkins 
2010; Takeda and Ropke 2010), This is likely due to its complicated and contested nature (as per 
Fuchs 2007). However, using a power lens it is possible to reveal causal factors and relationships 
that often remain hidden (Lukes 2005). A power approach also provides insight into another 
emerging area of exploration in literature on collaborative environmental problem solving: that 
collaborative processes and outcomes are a product of the broader socioeconomic ideas and 
institutional settings within which they are nested (Emerson, et al. 2012; Pares 2011).  
Using water as a focus for studying power in collaborative approaches is productive 
because water policy decisions take place at multiple sites and scales and are subject to often 
contested overlapping legal, institutional and social structures (Zeitoun and Allan 2008). This 
study facilitates examination of these sites and scales through the use of a policy cycle model 
(Howlett and Ramesh 1995). Power analysis is particularly useful in revealing the visible and 
invisible forces that shape political action (Lukes 2005), and examining power through a policy 
cycle model structures analysis at discrete policy stages from problem definition through to 
implementation and evaluation. Relative to the focus on water, there has also been significant 
research into collaborative approaches in the context of water governance and management and 
this provides a strong theoretical foundation upon which to build (e.g., Fish, et al. 2010; Innes 
and Booher 2010; Sabatier et al. 2005).   
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The next section examines collaboration as a specific form of participatory decision-making 
and then lays out a conceptual framework for examining the roles of the state relative to 
collaboration grounded in theory on policy-making, power, and business involvement in 
environmental policy making. This framework is then applied to two Canadian comparative 
empirical cases defined by exacerbated power imbalances chosen to clearly illustrate the 
explanatory value of a power theory-based approach. For the purposes of this study, imbalanced 
conditions are represented by situations where major, corporate natural resource industry firms 
are present as actors in regional or watershed-scale collaborative processes. Results are organized 
around the ways that power is present and expressed throughout the collaborative policy making 
cycle, and then discussed in the context of current use and practice of collaboration for 
environmental policy-making. In general, the governments examined in the study exerted power 
from agenda setting through to implementation in response to socioeconomic, political and 
cultural stimuli at multiple scales in ways that reproduced existing power structures. This 
challenges the potential of collaboration to achieve desired social and environmental outcomes. 
The paper concludes with final thoughts on state roles in collaborative processes and 
recommendations for future study. 
3.2 Collaboration, Policy-making and Power 
One of the major challenges in studying collaborative approaches is the difficulty in 
differentiating “collaboration” from other participatory approaches (Innes and Booher 2010). 
There is an increasing amount of conceptual overlap amongst different fields (e.g., adaptive co-
management, community based natural resource management, stakeholder participation) 
(Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004). Acknowledging these diverse roots, the characteristics outlined 
in the introduction – broad inclusion, face-to-face deliberation, knowledge and resource sharing, 
equitable participation, and consensus-focus – are common characteristics in literature on 
collaborative environmental problem solving. All of these characteristics are shaped by power as 
exercised throughout the policy cycle, and the following theory structures analysis of state roles 
in collaboration through a power lens. 
A neopluralist perspective is used to describe the nature and interaction of the state relative 
to other actors in collaborative processes. Neopluralism interprets policy-making as a function of 
competition and co-operation amongst nominally self-interested actors with varying priorities, 
resources, capacities, and values. Policy participants represent “a range of individual and 
collective (group) actors below, outside, surrounding, and populating the state” (Cerny 2010:3-4).  
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The state occupies a central role with respect to making policy and mediating interests, while 
simultaneously acting as an interest group with its own fragmented factions, goals, biases and 
motivations (Cerny 2010; McFarland 2004).   
Neopluralism recognizes that economic actors are able to operate from a privileged position 
with respect to environmental policy making (Brooks and Stritch 1991; McFarland 2004). This 
privileged position, while not absolute (Macdonald 2007), is a function of  interdependence 
between business and government (Brooks and Stritch 1991; Hessing, et al. 2005). While 
democratic governments have historically depended on business for economic benefits such as 
jobs and growth, they are increasingly looking to the private sector for information production, 
environmental monitoring, and mobilization of finances (Falkner 2008; Hessing, et al. 2005; 
Newell 2005). The fundamental role played by business in capitalist economies means that 
business is usually viewed as a legitimate actor insofar as firms generally follow accepted rules of 
behavior, and the broader public consent to the role that business is playing (Beetham 2013).  
Regulatory relationships between government and industry enable elite-level access to 
decision-makers and facilitate lobbying (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Significant financial resources 
facilitate lobbying, funding of scientific or policy research, and threats of legal action (Falkner 
2008). Influential firms can forestall or subvert government regulation through private rule 
setting, certification schemes or corporate social responsibility initiatives (Auld and Gulbrandsen 
2013; Clapp and Meckling 2013). For global economic interests, including the kinds of multi-
national natural resource industry firms featured in this study, this privilege includes the ability to 
operate across borders and exert substantial influence on governments, private, and civil actors at 
scales from the local to the global (Cerny 2010). For modern democratic societies, capitalist 
socioeconomic structures and neoliberal trends toward decentralization shape the degree to which 
governments are willing and able to engage in restrictive environmental policy making (Brooks 
and Stritch 1991; Hessing, et al. 2005).   
Neopluralism describes the relationship between actors influencing policy making, and the 
institutions and ideas that define the capitalist socioeconomic structure within which decision-
making takes places. However, how the state undertakes policy-making itself can be modeled in a 
number of different ways (e.g., public choice, institutional-ideological models). Howlett and 
Ramesh’s (1995) five stage policy cycle model, presented in Figure 3.1, provides a relatively 
simple framework for organizing analysis of the actions and motivations of the state relative to 
collaboration through a power lens. This framework is useful in studying highly complex policy 
contexts by disaggregating the policy process into discrete analytical stages (Hessing, et al. 
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2005). While the model has been criticized for requiring a relatively transparent decision-making 
arena for analysis, the specific focus on both visible and hidden power in this study mitigates this 
limitation. Effective use of policy cycles must also explicitly account for the ideas and institutions 
that define the policy context, in this case characterized by neopluralism and business privilege,  
in order to provide a complete analysis of empirical policy making. The use of this model by 
other studies addressing business and environmental policy making provides a basis for the 
generation of both insights and comparisons (e.g., Hessing, et al. 2005; Macdonald 2007).  
Figure 3.1: The policy cycle model (after Howlett and Ramesh 1995)  
 
 
In the first stage of the policy cycle model, the problem is defined and the agenda is set. In 
the process, the range of solutions that will be available to address the now defined problem is 
constrained (Hessing, et al. 2005). In the second stage, potential solutions, or policy options, are 
fleshed out. A particular course of action, or inaction, is selected from the range of options in the 
third stage. Policy implementation takes place fourth, followed by an evaluation phase. The 
model represents an idealized, rational cycle. However, in application, it is iterative and often 
short-circuited or interrupted by the irrational actions of policy actors (Howlett and Ramesh 
1995). As a model of political process, it is also fundamentally defined by power (as per Dahl 
1957; Lukes 2005).  
Studying power in political processes involves adopting perspectives from a diverse and 
often contested literature. This study follows Haugaard and Clegg (2009) in viewing different 
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perspectives on power not as contradictory, but as different ways of viewing social phenomena, 
dependent upon the context under study. Lukes’ (2005) three dimensions of power are often used 
to study environmental policy making processes (e.g., Falkner 2008; Fuchs 2007) because they 
are particularly effective at describing political contexts where power decides “what is known, 
what is emphasized and who prevails” (Zeitoun and Allan 2008:9).  
Lukes (2005) provides a domination-based description of power as the ability of one actor 
to prevail over others in achieving desired goals in contested political settings. Power is 
interpreted as a fluid, multi-dimensional relationships between actors or groups, not a quantity 
that can be possessed (Baldwin 1989; Lukes 2005). The framework used by Lukes (2005) 
describes power through conceptually overlapping instrumental, structural and discursive 
dimensions that reveal different ways that power can be interpreted, exerted, and addressed. 
The first dimension, instrumental power, reveals influence by examining the overt and 
measureable use of force, or of financial, technical and social resources, in competition with 
others (Dahl 1957; Lukes 2005). Instrumental power is relatively easy to study in the context of 
collaboration because it manifests as clearly observable expressions of direct influence. 
Structural power, the second dimension, reflects the socioeconomic and political context 
within which decisions and actions are embedded. It is primarily concerned with how political 
agendas are set (Lukes 2005). Emphasis is placed on those actions and decisions that constrain or 
remove certain issues from public consideration, usually to the benefit of dominant, hegemonic 
interests (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Even absent visible action by “powerful” actors, dominant 
structural conditions can privilege these interests, for example, when governments independently 
make business-friendly decisions in order to promote jobs and economic growth. Structural 
perceptions of power also highlight the absence, or effective absence, of potentially important 
actors because of a lack of capacity to effectively participate, or a lack of trust in the ability of a 
process to address their goals (Gaventa 1980; Lukes 2005). Decisions with respect to the purpose, 
problem frame and location of collaboration in the political process are frequently decided by the 
state (Koontz, et al. 2004) and thus strongly implicate governments in the mediation and exercise 
of structural power.  
 The final dimension, discursive power, focuses on the ability of actors to shape social 
norms, values and identities in ways that favour their interests (Lukes 2005). For example, access 
to financial resources can allow an actor to actively exert power by purchasing advertising that 
reinforces specific values and ideas (Fuchs 2007). Dominant cultural framings, without added 
effort on the part of the powerful, may also prevent actors from recognizing that a given outcome 
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will be harmful to their wellbeing or interest, or that they will be able to make a difference to 
outcomes (Freudenburg 2005; Gaventa 1980). Due to its subversive nature, discursive power can 
be very difficult to study empirically, requiring time-intensive discourse analysis methodologies 
(e.g., Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). However, there are some examples that are relatively 
easy to identify and these were used for identification of discursive power in the conceptual 
framework.  
Table 3.1 presents this framework, organized into a format suitable for a power theory-
based examination of state actions, decisions and motivations relative to collaborative processes 
addressing water. Lukes (2005) three dimensions of power were first used to organize analysis 
(Column 1). Theory on collaboration, neopluralism and business involvement in environmental 
policy making was then used to populate a list of indicators for identifying power in collaborative 
approaches to water governance (Column 2). These indicators were applied and refined through 
inductive coding and analysis. As noted by Lukes (2005), there is frequently overlap between 
categories and interpretation is inherently subjective. These issues are addressed throughout the 
text where appropriate. Theory on political process and policy cycles was used as an organizing 
framework for the presentation of results in Section 3.4. 
3.3 Methods 
Cross case study methods are particularly suited to examining power because the relationships 
between context, how context is interpreted, and the exertion of power are mutually constitutive 
(Flyvbjerg 1998b). Case studies allow for in depth examination of context in ways that are often 
impossible with broader studies (Gerring 2007; Yin 2009). This depth is required for effective 
power analysis (Flyvbjerg 1998b). A qualitative, cross case study analysis (Yin 2009), guided by 
an interpretivist paradigm (Guba and Lincoln 2005), was used to ground examination of power 
theory in empirical contexts in order to examine the involvement of the state in collaboration for 
water governance. The use of cases where major natural resource industries are active allowed 
potentially revelatory investigation into situations that are of broad interest and relevance (Yin 
2009). The cross case approach allowed some degree of generalizability (Gerring 2007) while 
isolating a small number of independent variables and minimizing variability in order to support 
the development of inferences about causal patterns (Druckman 2005). 
3.3.1 Cases 
Four criteria were used to select two cases with analytical levels at both provincial and regional, 
watershed scales. First, situations were sought where a state body had instigated regional or  
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Table 3.1:  A conceptual framework for the examination of power in collaborative envi-
ronmental policy making 
Key Dimension from Power Theory Specific Concern for Collaborative Water Governance 
Instrumental Power: 
Behaviour, decision-making, key issues, 
observable conflict, subjective interests 
(seen as policy preferences revealed by 
political participation) (Lukes 2005:29) 
Coercion, co-optation, diversion, manipulation, 
misinformation  
Facilitation or bridging actors who mediate power  
Imbalance of financial resources  
Unequal capacities (technical, social, institutional, etc.) to 
participate  
Structural Power: 
Decision-making and non decision-
making, issues and potential issues, 
observable (overt or covert) conflict, 
subjective interests (seen as policy 
preferences or grievances) (Lukes 
2005:29) 
Who instigated collaboration? 
Problem definition or framing and/or agenda setting 
Background of representatives (e.g., evidence of revolving 
doors) 
Decision making power residing with, or being retained by, 
the state 
Governments initiating tokenistic processes that exist to 
generate legitimacy instead of to influence decisions 
Limits of consensus 
Inclusion or exclusion of important actor groups 
Appropriate/inclusive use of knowledge 
Elite level relationships 
Lobbying external to the collaborative process 
Control over information production and use 
The structural bias of capitalism or implications thereof 
Governments favouring business interests 
Governments favouring non-business interests 
Collaboration being influenced by external political contexts 
Discursive Power: 
Decision-making and control over 
political agenda (not necessarily through 
decisions), issues and potential issues, 
observable (overt or covert) and latent 
conflict, subjective and real interests 
(Lukes 2005:29) 
Efforts to control discourse 
Prescription of a “language” of collaboration 
Groups having to self-censor to participate 
Dominant, hegemonic themes or values related to capitalism 
influencing collaboration 
Who is, or is not, favoured by the dominant discourse 
 
watershed level collaborative processes under a provincial or territorial framework in order to 
address issues of water governance. The nested approach was used to ensure that analysis 
captured both the dynamics of on-the-ground instances of collaboration, and the broader 
socioeconomic and political context within which collaboration was taking place. Second, the 
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presence of one or more major, publically traded, natural resource industries as process 
participants at the watershed level was required. Third, the presence of the state at the provincial, 
territorial or federal level as a major actor at the watershed or regional level was also required. 
Finally, cases were sought that enabled some degree of geographical diversity in order to enrich 
the cross case analysis. The two cases selected are described below and summarized in Table 3.2. 
Figure 3.2: Athabasca River Watershed, Alberta, Canada 
 
 
The Athabasca Watershed Council (AWC) in the Canadian province of Alberta was 
selected as the first case (Figure 3.2). The AWC is one of eleven Watershed Planning and 
Advisory Councils (WPACs) in the province, mandated under the 2003 Water For Life (WFL) 
strategy. Water For Life is a broad, strategic document aimed at achieving “safe, secure drinking 
water; healthy aquatic ecosystems; and, reliable, quality water supplies for a sustainable 
economy” through Government of Alberta actions and policies (Alberta Environment 2003:7). 
All WPACs are intended to be broadly representative of watershed interests and to “engage 
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watershed residents in their work and seek consensus on solutions to watershed issues” (Alberta 
Environment and Sustainable Resource Development 2014). Their responsibilities include the 
development of State of the Watershed Reports that characterize environmental conditions, the 
creation of a Watershed Management Plan for the basin, and promotion of public education and 
awareness. These committees are advisory in nature, although they are encouraged to “[s]eek 
adoption of these plans by the jurisdictions (municipal, provincial and federal) and stakeholders 
with the appropriate legislated authority to implement recommendations” (Alberta Environment 
2005:10). They function according to the principles of collaboration outlined above including 
broad representation, consensus focus, deliberation, and knowledge integration (Alberta Water 
Council 2008c). The AWC was created in 2009 and was the last WPAC in the province to be 
officially designated.  
The Athabasca River watershed is notable as the home of the Athabasca oil sands. This area 
of intensive oil and gas extraction is economically lucrative for the Governments of Alberta and 
Canada, but also highly controversial due to its environmental impacts (Jordaan 2012). The 
province of Alberta has a history of dependence upon agriculture, forestry and energy resources; 
it is defined by a strongly neoliberal political economy. This economic philosophy is apparent in 
the decisions and actions of the provincial government, particularly with respect to promotion of 
the oil and gas industry (Clancy 2014b; Cohen and Bakker 2014; Smith and Barr 1984). 
The second case, the Thames-Sydenham Source Protection Region, is located in the 
Canadian province of Ontario (Figure 3.3). In 2006, Ontario enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
in response to fatal contamination of a public water supply in Walkerton, ON (Government of 
Ontario 2006; O'Connor 2002b). The CWA made recommendations based on an inquiry into the 
conditions that allowed the contamination incident to occur. It included a recommendation for the 
creation of locally organized Source Protection Committees (SPCs). The 19 SPCs in the province 
function according to collaborative principles of deliberation, inclusion, knowledge sharing, 
learning and consensus focus. They are populated by a mix of provincial, municipal, and civil 
government representatives, and commercial, industrial, agricultural and non-voting First Nations 
members. These committees are mandated to develop Terms of Reference, conduct Technical 
Assessment Reports of municipal drinking water sources, and to create Source Protection Plans 
that address vulnerabilities and ensure source water protection. These plans, following 
negotiation with the Ministry of Environment, receive regulatory approval and become law 
(Government of Ontario 2006).  
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Figure 3.3: Thames-Sydenham and Region Source Protection Region, Ontario, Canada 
 
 
In addition to intensive agricultural development, the Thames-Sydenham Source Protection 
Region is home to a dense concentration of petrochemical industries, informally referred to as 
“Chemical Valley”, located at the lower end of the watershed in Sarnia, ON. Significant water 
contamination issues have been documented with respect to Chemical Valley (International Joint 
Commission 2006). Attention to water and other environmental concerns has largely been a 
function of the ideological stance of the governing party. Left-leaning ruling parties have tended 
to make and enforce more stringent regulations. Ontario has had a rotation of right, centre and left 
leaning ruling parties and the province has been the subject, by turns, of both praise and 
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condemnation for its position on various environmental issues (Winfield 2012). The Liberal party 
presiding over the development and implementation of the CWA represents a centrist ideology. 
Table 3.2:  Case study characteristics 
Case Characteristics Thames-Sydenham Source 
Protection Committee, Ontario 
Athabasca Watershed Council, 
Alberta 
Provincial legal or policy 
framework 
Clean Water Act (2006) Water For Life (2003) 
Regional case size 10,826 km2 159,000 km2 
Regional population 717,000 152,097 
Collaborative group history Committee appointed in 2007, 
Mission Statement and Guiding 
Principles confirmed in 2008 
Council created in 2009  
Group size 22 voting members – 7 
municipal, 7 business and 
industry, 7 “other”, 1 Chair – as 
well as 3 First Nations and 3 
non-voting government liaisons 
18 elected directors – 3 from 
each of 5 sectors: government, 
non-governmental organizations, 
Aboriginal, industry, and other – 
as well as the past President 
Outputs to date Terms of Reference; State of the 
Watershed report: 3 phases 
Terms of Reference; Four 
technical and assessment reports; 
Draft Source Water Protection 
Plan 
Decision-making structure Consensus-focused Consensus-focused 
Major natural resource 
industries present in regional 
case 
Agriculture, oil and gas and 
petrochemical industry  
Oil and gas and related industry, 
forestry, agriculture, coal mining, 
pulp and paper, sand and gravel 
extraction 
1http://www.sourcewaterprotection.on.ca/downloads/sp_plan/SupDocs/AR/ST.%20Clair%20App
roved%20AR/Appendices/A5-WC_Summary/StClair-Summary.pdf 
2http://awc-wpac.ca/content/athabasca-watershed 
 
3.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis  
The conceptual framework (Table 3.1) guided data collection and analysis of semi-structured 
interviews, documents and personal observations over a period from July 2013 to December 
2014. Analytic induction was used throughout the entire process to reflexively refine the 
conceptual framework and methodological approach in response to emergent findings (Bloor and 
Wood 2006). Purposeful and snowball sampling techniques were used to recruit 41 individuals 
for interviews from a pool of current and former government officials at provincial and municipal 
levels, collaborative process staff and actors, industry actors, and key political informants with 
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insights on both collaboration and the cases studied. Twenty interviews were conducted in 
Alberta and 21 in Ontario. Ten Alberta interviewees were selected from the local level and ten 
from the provincial level. In Ontario, 12 interviews occurred at the local level and nine at the 
provincial level. In both provinces, many local actors had experience or insights at the provincial 
level and vice versa.  
Interviews questions explored the relationship between concerns identified in Table 3.1 and 
the empirical contexts in question. For example, interviewees who were collaborative participants 
were asked to define the full range of policy influence options available to them. Responses 
revealed a range of methods from attempts to apply media pressure for many civil society 
interviewees, to elite access through direct lines to provincial premiers for some industry 
interviewees. Although interviews were semi-structured, participants were free to address topics 
they considered relevant. This was done in order to ensure that results were not unduly 
constrained by the conceptual framework or researcher bias (Bloor and Wood 2006). Following 
accepted conventions in qualitative research (Carlson 2010), interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and returned to interviewees for review. Where necessary, follow-up interviews were 
conducted to clarify or expand upon key issues.  
Documents provided a second key source of data and 92 documents were collected for 
analysis. These included government policy documents, policy intervention records, promotional 
materials, draft and finalized plans, emails, interpersonal communications, collaborative group 
publications, websites, industry reports, and industry promotional materials. Personal 
observations provided a third source of data. Observations were collected during participation at 
one collaborative organization board meeting in each province, during interviews, and during site 
visits in each watershed.  
Interview transcripts, documents and observations were coded and analyzed using QSR 
NVivo 10. Analysis reflected a combination of both inductive and deductive approaches (Berg 
2009). While the conceptual framework focused on specific themes, data sources were also coded 
openly to reveal insights not predicted by the framework. Successive rounds of axial coding 
identified emergent themes, patterns and relationships (Berg 2009; Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
Triangulation amongst data sources was used to construct validity of findings and helped 
determine subject saturation (Yin 2009).   
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3.4 Results 
Results are organized around the stages of Howlett and Ramesh’s (1995) policy cycle (Figure 
3.1). Within each policy cycle stage, the results presented reflect those instrumental, structural 
and discursive power considerations noted in the conceptual framework that emerged as relevant 
to the analysis of power in the cases examined. Not all concerns identified in the conceptual 
framework were apparent in the cases examined. Where appropriate, emergent findings revealed 
through open coding that were not predicted or explained by the conceptual framework are also 
presented. When cited for quotations, interviewees are referred to by codes in order to preserve 
confidentiality (e.g., AB1, ON3). Key findings, organized by case and policy-cycle stage, are 
presented at the end of this section in Table 3.3. 
3.4.1 Stage One: Agenda Setting 
Agenda setting is the first stage of the policy cycle and shapes the range of options available to 
address a given situation. It is the primary focus of structural views on power but also reflects 
instrumental and discursive dimensions. Interviews, documents and observations revealed how a 
number of power issues shaped this policy stage. Specific power concerns, identified in Table 3.1, 
included government control over agenda setting, and preferential patterns of influence that 
reflect structural privileging of organized economic actors.     
In Ontario, the agenda was set at the provincial level, prior to the initiation of collaboration. 
The provincial government’s framing of the problem restricted the scope of Source Water 
Protection to only municipal drinking water supplies. Early CWA documents had recommended a 
broad approach to source water protection that would include non-municipal water sources. 
Interviews and documents did not provide insight into the internal Ministry decision to restrict the 
focus although the restricted scope was problematized by many interviewees and by reviewers of 
the draft and final CWA (e.g., Canadian Environmental Law Asssociation 2004; Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario 2007; Legislative Assembly of Ontario  2006). These sources indicated 
that the way vulnerable areas were defined meant that the zones within which committees had 
legal power to restrict activities did not encompass many significant threats to drinking water. In 
effect, by only protecting municipal drinking water supplies, drinking water quality impacts that 
were controversial in nature, such as those cause by natural resource industry firms, were very 
rarely affected because they lay outside the most vulnerable municipal supply areas. For example, 
four provincial government, industry and environmental group interviewees identified gaps 
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related to drinking water threats that they believed were deliberately created by the province to 
protect industry:   
the way the Ministry structured how you assess the vulnerability of a Great Lakes 
water intake, you could never, ever, find a threat to be significant. So it really didn't 
matter. You could have 100,000,000 tons of methyl ethyl death stored on the shore 
line right beside an intake and it could never be classified as a significant drinking 
water threat which meant we didn't have any mandatory powers to deal with it…it 
wasn’t an oversight. It was deliberately done. (ON19) 
In the case of threats on the Great Lakes, committees were able to make recommendations for 
addressing threats but could not create requirements that were legally binding. The Auditor 
General of Ontario problematized this in her December (2014:411-412) report: “There is a high 
likelihood that spills from industrial and commercial facilities may also pose a significant threat 
to intakes in the Great Lakes, but plans do not currently address them”.  
The Ministry also pre-defined 21 possible threats to drinking water that could be identified 
by committees. Eleven Ontario interviewees were concerned that the designation of these 
“prescribed threats” prevented committees from addressing some water issues that had potentially 
significant impacts but were more political in nature. As one interviewee noted, “If we had a 
public meeting or something and citizens brought issues forward, most often we would be stuck 
saying we really can't do anything about it because it's out of our area” (ON16). For example, 
four interviewees and several other Source Protection Committees across the province 
specifically stated that many people would have liked to have addressed aggregate quarries as 
potential threats to drinking water. However, by actively restricting what activities could be 
identified as “threats”, the Ministry prevented committees from using regulatory tools to limit 
aggregate activities (e.g., Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee 2014). Although 
mechanisms did exist within the CWA for committees to petition for the inclusion of “local 
threats”, these petitions were often not successful. In the case of aggregate, petitions were 
repeatedly denied.  
Provincial control also extended to restricting the use of specific words that were considered 
problematic due to their political nature. For example, committees were ordered to omit words 
such as “compensation” from their Terms of Reference (e.g., Ontario Soil and Crop Improvement 
Association 2007; Smith 2009). In an letter from the Ministry to committees attempting to 
address financial compensation for actors making changes required by Source Protection Plans, 
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“the Minister has directed amendments to the language specific to compensation” (Smith 2009). 
Seven interviewees, and the Ontario Auditor General in her 2014 report, expressed concern that 
the scope of the CWA has been restricted such that it will not affect very many people or 
significant issues, and that the province has resisted influence on policies (Office of the Auditor 
General of Ontario 2014). The specific power concern with respect to both municipal supplies 
and prescribed threats relates to non-transparent control over the agenda setting process by the 
Ministry. Decisions that protected the interests of industry also point to potential structural bias is 
favour of economic interests.  
Because data on high level lobbying are difficult to obtain, it was not possible to determine 
if the province’s agenda setting decisions were the product of specific industry interventions, of 
proactive government decisions to protect industry interests, or of both. In the first example, 
power would have been actively exerted by industry. In the second, government actions to protect 
industry, even absent action on the part of industry, would reflect structural power resulting from 
broader hegemonic socioeconomic contexts. Providing evidence to support the structural 
argument, documents and all provincial government interviews revealed that the Source Water 
Protection agenda, consistent with current government philosophy, was defined by the need to 
retain jobs and promote industrial development, and by threats from industry to move to another 
jurisdiction if the regulatory regime became too restrictive.  
The inputs, process and outcomes of the agenda setting process also provide insight into 
power exerted by the state and industry. For example, hearings on the CWA, used to facilitate 
consultation on a draft White Paper for the CWA (Ontario Ministry of Environment 2004), 
highlighted concern on the part of industry with respect to the prohibitionary powers to be 
granted to non-elected Source Protection Committees, the potential for inconsistent regulations 
across the province, and potential restrictions on growth. While data are not available for the 
internal Ministry justifications used to ultimately refine the agenda, industry concerns were 
largely addressed in the final CWA (Government of Ontario 2006; Legislative Assembly of 
Ontario  2006). In Alberta, issues of power affecting the agenda setting stage were a product of 
underlying structural bias in favour of the energy industry, and of non-decisions and inaction at 
the provincial level – both reflective of the second dimension of power. Contrary to the situation 
in Ontario, almost all interviewees in Alberta commented that the government did not provide 
enough support and direction. Most interviewees inside and outside government, reinforced 
through observations and a 2008 Ministry review (Alberta Water Council 2008a), noted that 
WPACs were unable to operate effectively without clearer definition, boundaries, direction, focus 
 72 
and feedback from the province. The hands-off approach to WPACs was a product of the broader 
government agenda setting strategy for water policy creation. Interview, document and 
observational evidence provide support for the position that the Alberta government’s lack of 
support for WPACs reflects a broader structural strategy whereby, as noted by a WPAC 
participant, government actions and decisions are taken to  
aligns its decision-making, its policies, its activities, its budget, to protect the energy 
sector in Alberta, and to enhance it, and to promote it, and to ensure that that activity 
is carried out and profits are made. (AB5) 
All 20 Alberta interviews identified the significant impact of the energy industry on 
provincial politics. One government interviewee noted preferential access for industry actors in 
setting water policy agendas: “there are certain key stakeholders that we will brief on the side, 
before the public opportunity for engagement and feedback is entertained” (AB1). Since the 
Alberta WPACs produce voluntary watershed management plans, allowing WPACs relative 
freedom on collaborative agenda definition did not create a danger that the WPACs would 
produce plans requiring changes to broader government policy trends. This position was 
reinforced by an industry interviewee who noted that “you still need to be able to say, 'Okay, 
you've made your decision but we're going to overrule it because we're the government and we 
get to do that.’” (AB3). 
Coding for themes related to discursive power revealed further support for the structural 
bias of the provincial government. Strongly business-focused language was internally used to 
describe government operations in both interview and documents. Government officials referred 
to their “larger corporate priority plan”, the “value proposition” of WPACs, and the “business 
planning process” of the Ministry. One government interviewee, and various Government of 
Alberta documents (e.g., Alberta Energy 2014; Alberta Innovates 2014), made specific reference 
to the fact that the Government of Alberta needs to build and maintain its social license to operate 
(AB1). This type of language was not evident in Ontario. 
Provincial non-decisions and inaction also allowed more visible manifestations of 
instrumental and structural power to play out at the watershed scale in ways not apparent in the 
highly facilitated Ontario process. Specifically, a lack of formal state structure and support 
allowed opportunities for intimidation, action defined by resource constraints, and structural bias 
reflecting the dominance of the energy industry in Alberta. For example, weak provincial 
involvement resulted in visible contestation over agenda setting at the watershed level. One 
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interviewee identified both watershed scale conflict, reflective of instrumental power, and 
structural constraint over issue definition at this stage:   
Members of the board would say that that [issue is] against their sector or they’re 
afraid that the government will be displeased and actually you have to be careful what 
you say because they are our funders. (AB19) 
A provincial government interviewee (AB15) reinforced this sentiment, noting that the 
willingness to fund WPACs is dependent upon the performance of resource industries, and that 
this constrains the ability of WPACs to address issues that will harm the profitability of industry. 
3.4.2 Stage Two: Policy Development 
Policy options are developed and refined in the second policy cycle stage. Across the two cases, 
issues of instrumental and structural power that reflect concerns noted in the conceptual 
framework dominated. In Ontario, issues of power were relatively easy to identify because the 
government actively shaped proposed policies by exerting  instrumental and structural control 
over rules of operation and Source Protection Plan content, controlling language, and restricting 
knowledge production and use.  
The province actively exerted instrumental power through “Liaison Officers” on 
committees in order to retain control over the content of Source Protection Plans. These 
individuals acted as resources and would intervene – sometimes using aggressive methods – if 
committees attempted to operate outside their approved Terms of Reference. Interviews and 
documents also revealed provincial exertion of structural power through attempts to control 
representation by selecting sector representatives that the government felt would be easier to 
work with (Ontario Farm Environmental Coalition 2013).  
Throughout the process, the Ontario Ministry of the Environment continued to exert 
influence by issuing evolving Director’s Technical Rules that shaped operations and topics of 
focus at the watershed level, and ultimately in the approved Source Protection Plans (Ontario 
Ministry of Environment 2009). According to five interviewees, the justification for these rules 
was not necessarily transparent and “the net result of some of these rules were [sic] to, I think, 
circumscribe what we wanted to do at the local level” (ON19). A template was provided to 
structure plans, and there were specific mandatory prescribed methodologies for the production 
and presentation of scientific information (Ontario Ministry of Environment 2009). These 
structures significantly shaped the format and content of the information used to make final 
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policy decisions and plans. Eleven interviewees expressed concern over the use of set rules for 
assessing vulnerability of water supplies, and the mandatory use of designated tools to address 
threats. The prescriptive nature of the process was also concerning for other committees (e.g., 
Casgrain-Robertson 2013). As a result of this active exertion of power by the provincial 
government in controlling plan structure and content, the final Ontario plans appear quite similar 
across the province, consistent with industry and government actors’ stated desires to avoid a 
patchwork of regulations. 
In Alberta, in-process involvement of the government in policy development was relatively 
passive, consistent with the province’s broader hands-off approach. There were interventions at 
the watershed scale through provincial government representatives to inform, but not necessarily 
restrict, WPAC operations. Fourteen interviewees, along with documents critical of the WPAC 
process, problematized the lack of provincial support (e.g., Alberta Water Council 2008c; Unger 
2009). For example, interviewees, corroborated through observations, noted that the lack of 
government oversight has made it possible for committees and processes to be co-opted by higher 
capacity interests through the exercise of instrumental and structural power. These concerns have 
played out in the AWC through particularly vitriolic interpersonal and professional conflict, as 
evidenced by email and interpersonal communication records gathered from interviewees. 
3.4.3 Stage Three: Policy Selection 
In both cases, the policy selection stage reflected activities occurring largely at the provincial 
level and was characterized by structural power issues described in the conceptual framework. 
Open coding also revealed a number of emergent themes not directly predicted by the conceptual 
framework but nonetheless relevant to the examination of state actions and motivations.  
In Ontario, although provincial government interviewees were reluctant to speak of 
examples of direct influence on Source Protection Planning, they were willing to speak of broader 
government trends. All these interviewees acknowledged that, despite the apparent commitment 
to collaborative Source Protection Planning, important water policy decisions are usually made 
through established patterns of elite-level access with economic interests,. As one interviewee, 
referencing Source Protection Planning, stated:   
in many instances industry reserves the right to go behind the conversation and have a 
follow up conversation. Just as key stakeholders will reserve the right to phone the 
premier and say, 'Well, that was all great. But, here is my bottom line.' So if you're all 
into a [collaborative] process, you have to turn off that backdoor because otherwise 
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you're not really into it, right? You're just into a token, consultative or joint decision-
making and I think rarely do governments turn off that backdoor (ON7) 
For watershed scale interviewees, this provincial stance was reflected in a widespread sense that 
Source Protection Committees have been able to influence a number of policies, but that it is 
unlikely that Source Protection Plans will produce substantive changes in either provincial 
policies or environmental conditions. 
This position also reflects a theme not directly identified in the conceptual framework that 
emerged through open coding: that of a persistent command-and-control decision-making culture 
at the provincial level. According to one Ontario participant, government officials have been 
“raised in an era where: ‘I am the keeper of the water and if I want the water to improve, I’ll 
make a regulation’” (ON1). Consistent with this approach, and reflecting the ongoing structural 
theme of government control over decision-making, all Source Protection Plans require the final 
signature of the Minister of Environment. Plans were submitted by committees, reviewed by the 
province, and then returned to committees with required changes identified (e.g., Thames, 
Sydenham and Region Source Protection Committee 2014a). Committees were required to either 
agree to changes, or to attempt to achieve the same outcome through other approved mechanisms. 
Throughout this process, the province actively exerted power over the final policy despite a 
commitment to collaborative policy making embodied by statements such as the following from 
Conservation Ontario ( 2013), the provincial institution rolling out the CWA, “communities will 
be required to create and carry out a plan to protect the sources of their [municipal] drinking 
water supplies”. 
Amongst three provincial government interviewees, there was also acknowledgement that 
the high costs of collaboration make it easier to revert to traditional command-and-control 
decision-making patterns, which also allow them to respect their perceived obligations to 
economic interests. One senior provincial interviewee noted that, “ 
[we] don't have the resources or the forum to have this truly consultative, so it's 
comfortable to go back to that current model of, 'we'll post it on [the government 
comment website]. We'll take phone calls and comments from people, and we'll make 
the best decision we can. And, oh by the way, because we care about the jobs, we'll 
keep the back door open.' Moving to that consultative [process], it requires care and 
feeding, and people have expectations of actually having real power. And to do that 
takes a lot more of our energy. (ON7) 
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State retention of control over water policies was also a dominant theme in interviews and 
documents in Alberta. However, a lack of effective communication resulted in considerable 
confusion amongst both government and non-governmental interviewees over the degree to 
which the province would allow influence on water policies. As one government interviewee 
noted, “we used the word ‘advisory’ from a departmental perspective without maybe being as 
clear to the organizations themselves that advisory simply was that” (AB15). This directly relates 
to concerns identified in the conceptual framework that collaboration has the potential to be used 
as a “token” process. To illustrate, government interviewees and email records revealed a lack of 
process for receiving and reviewing the State of the Watershed Reports and Watershed 
Management Plans. A government interviewee revealed particular confusion upon receiving one 
plan: “What do I do with this [watershed] plan? What's my obligation as a Ministry to respond to 
this plan?” (AB1). This position indicates a lack of provincial commitment to honouring WPAC 
policy inputs, contrary to the stated expectations of WPAC participants. As an example of those 
expectations, one Athabasca WPAC participant stated that “the [province is] spending a quarter 
of a million dollars a year, or a little more, to get the information to get us to do this, so it has to 
go somewhere” (AB20). Individuals with experience on other WPACs expressed frustration with 
the response they had received from the province:  
It took a year. [The Ministry] came back and said, 'Well, we've looked at this [plan] 
and we don't want you to construe that anything in our response constitutes a 
commitment to do anything that you've recommended.' (AB8) 
The consequence of the province’s exertion of control over water policies, and subsequent 
failure to effectively communicate with WPACs regarding potential policy influence, shaped 
WPAC participant perceptions of the process at the watershed scale. From nine non-government 
interviewees, there was worry that the collaborative process was “just window dressing” (AB9). 
Participants were clearly frustrated with the process: 
I think the [committee] become jaded because they’ll say, “the water is blue” but by 
the time it gets rolled into the big policy, well, “the water could be blue”… So the 
substance of what they were saying is either watered down or diluted to the point 
where it's ambiguous…there's no transparency. There's no discussion on that. There is 
not that accountability where, okay, you've mandated us to make all these 
recommendations, we've made all them, where are they and if they are in there, why 
are they watered down or why are they construed into a different format than when we 
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told you, very clearly and concisely, what we wanted and recommended to you based 
on the science? (AB14) 
Consistent with findings in Ontario, data from Alberta also supported the position that the 
province exerted power through decisions and non-decisions in response to a perceived need to 
protect interests of industry. Civil, industry and government interviewees all referred to the need 
for the government to make policy decisions in the interests of the energy sector because of their 
dependence on industry taxes and royalties for social programs. This was expressed in a comment 
from a staff member, who explained that,  
if you are an elected official you have social programs to worry about, you have 
education, you have healthcare off the top. You've got all these issues and they're big 
buck issues and they've got the money.  The elected people have to go after the 
money. (AB4) 
Six government and civil actors indicated that elite industry interests are able to shape decisions 
at the upper levels of government where WPACs have very little influence. The end result of the 
exertion of state power in Alberta was to prevent WPACs from meaningfully impacting water 
policy, while maintaining a position that allowed WPAC participants to believe they would be 
afforded influence. 
3.4.4 Stages Four and Five: Policy Implementation and Evaluation 
At the time the research was completed, neither the Thames-Sydenham nor the Athabasca plan 
had reached the implementation or evaluation stages. However, interviewees did have 
expectations for these stages that largely reflect structural power concerns identified in the 
conceptual framework. Most Ontario interviewees at the watershed scale highlighted the 
moderate changes to municipal source water protection and positive community and relationship-
building experiences they have experienced through the process. There were ongoing concerns 
about capacity for implementation (e.g., Thames, Sydenham and Region Source Protection 
Committee 2014b) but these concerns were at least partially being addressed by the province (i.e., 
Ontario Ministry of the Environment 2013).   
In Alberta, interviewees expressed concern that WPACs have no established accountability 
mechanisms that formalize the relationship between WPACs and the province with respect to 
input into provincial water policies. The Alberta Water Council’s Strengthening Partnerships 
(2008c) document states that “a formal, hierarchical reporting relationship is not required”. This  
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Table 3.3 Key results organized by case, policy cycle stage and type of power 
Policy Cycle Stage Case 
Ontario Alberta 
Agenda Setting Structural Power 
• Control of the agenda and 
consequent restriction of ultimate 
outcomes and affected actors by 
the Ministry of Environment  
• Perception, supported by 
evidence, that structural control 
restricted impacts on resource 
industry firms  
Discursive Power 
• Exercise of control over specific 
words or topics 
Instrumental Power 
• Significant conflict at the watershed 
level due to a lack of state 
participation (see below) 
Structural Power 
• Lack of state direction and support 
(e.g., funding allocation, inability to 
effectively address issues with 
potential negative economic 
consequences, lack of facilitation) 
Discursive Power 
• Evidence of discursive bias as 
revealed through language 
Policy Formulation Instrumental Power 
• State control over processes 
through Liaison Officers 
Structural Power 
• State control through issuance of 
evolving Director’s Technical 
Rules, use of prescribed tools, 
methodologies, and knowledge 
types and formats 
Instrumental Power 
• Significant conflict at the watershed 
level due to a lack of state 
participation (see below) 
Structural Power 
• Lack of state involvement (e.g., lack 
of facilitation) 
Decision Making Structural Power 
• Some evidence of positive 
environmental outputs  
• Ongoing state control over 
decisions and evidence of 
accommodation of economic 
interests 
Emergent Findings 
• Retention of state control is also 
a function of command-and-
control culture 
Structural Power 
• Provincial retention of control leading 
to disempowerment and perceptions 
of WPACs as token participatory 
processes under a government that 
structurally favours the energy sector  
Emergent Findings 
• Prevailing institutional confusion at 
the provincial level 
Implementation and 
Policy Evaluation 
Structural Power 
• Expectations of moderate 
impacts based on the defined 
agenda 
 
Structural Power 
• Limited expectations of impact at the 
watershed scale due to a lack of 
provincial support for implementation 
Emergent Findings 
• Prevailing themes of “hope” in 
response to perceptions that processes 
won’t make a difference 
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reflects a broad perception, related once again to the structural theme of state retention of control, 
that WPACs will not be “listened to”. Of all the government officials interviewed, none were 
willing to acknowledge any provincial responsibility for achieving outcomes. Three government 
interviewees emphasized that they were extremely open to WPACs coming up with their own 
funding, and that they hoped that municipal and industry actors would step up and voluntarily 
implement the recommendations made for them. More positive hopes for policy influence 
through the AWC were based on expectations of long-term change as a result of relationship 
building, and influence and education of voters. However, these outcomes, should they occur, are 
more likely to reflect an abdication of state responsibility toward WPACs rather than active 
support of collaboratively developed water policies – a result that is consistent with the 
predominantly neoliberal orientation of the province, if not with its stated intentions to WPAC 
participants.  
A final emergent theme in Alberta at the watershed scale was that of “hope”. In general 
people kept participating, “I guess because you have to hope. I mean, at least there’s a 
conversation going on but several of us were saying… is this worth our time or not?” (AB9). 
Participants also “hope” that the government is going to listen (AB12), “hope” that they will be 
able to sit at some tables with real influence (AB11), and “hope” that someone will pick up their 
recommendations down the line when pro-energy political conditions change (AB19). The same 
theme was not present in Ontario where interviewees tended to focus on the changes to municipal 
drinking water protection that are legislated to occur through collaboration. Key results are 
summarized in Table 3.3. 
3.5 Cross Case Analysis and Discussion 
This study investigated the roles, actions and motivations of the state in achieving, or failing to 
achieve, desired outcomes from collaborative approaches to water governance at the watershed 
scale. The following section analyzes and discusses the ways that the governments of both 
Ontario and Alberta exerted control over the collaborative policy cycle, albeit through different 
mechanisms, in ways that had significant impacts on collaborative processes and outcomes – both 
environmental and social. Mechanisms of control are then examined as a function of both 
conditions predicted by the conceptual framework and emergent findings. This is followed by a 
summary of implications, and a series of recommendations for governments. 
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3.5.1 The collaborative policy cycle 
The importance of issue definition arose frequently in both cases despite the fact that the two 
provinces adopted different approaches. Exerting power over agenda setting, as the Province of 
Ontario did, tightly controls the scope of the problem, the range of actors to be affected and 
included, the tools that can be used and, ultimately, the range of outcomes that can be produced 
(Howlett and Ramesh 1995). Issues related to structural power, namely elite level access, non-
transparent Ministry decisions, a command and control culture, and neopluralist government 
positioning, controlled the scope of issue definition. The end result was a process that impacted 
few influential actors and was perceived to have avoided politically contentious but critical 
issues. These restrictions have been problematized in other research on Ontario’s Source Water 
Protection process (Baird, et al. 2014; Hania 2013). 
In the case of Alberta, the interplay of power at the agenda setting stage was more complex. 
Through more open agenda setting, the provincial government both allowed WPACs more 
flexibility and set the stage for the interplay of divisive instrumental power amongst actors at the 
watershed scale. Structural and discursive issues of implicit agenda control also arose in 
situations where participants did not feel comfortable or able to introduce issues. These illustrate 
Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970:42-46) “rule of anticipated reactions” whereby a less powerful actor 
“decides not to make a demand upon [a more powerful actor], for fear that the latter will invoke 
sanctions against him”. Other studies into collaboration in Alberta have reported problems in 
bringing contentious issues into the problem frame (Clare, et al. 2013; Schmidt 2014).  
Reinforcing these findings, Lockwood et al (2009), studying community-based natural resource 
management in Australia, found that processes were most effective when states were supportive 
rather than either controlling or absent.  
The hands-off approach adopted by the Alberta government contrasts with the highly 
involved role assumed by the Ontario government. Careful attention to the facilitation of policy 
development and both financial and technical resources in Ontario avoided much of the blatant 
power imbalance, conflict and exertion of instrumental power that was present in the Athabasca 
during policy development and selection. The emphasis on facilitation and resourcing in Ontario 
reflects current best practices for dealing with power in the literature on collaboration (e.g., 
Ansell and Gash 2007) but was unable to address structural and discursive power issues that 
transcended the watershed scale and remain unaddressed in current literature on collaborative 
approaches to water governance (see Chapter Two).  
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In both provinces, the provincial government asked for, but did not adequately and 
transparently integrate, input and feedback from committees. There was a widespread feeling in 
Ontario that committees have been able to affect policy but that the actual impact of the process 
was quite limited in scope. The moderate expectations for outcomes in Ontario reflect structural 
power exerted by the government at the agenda setting and policy development stages. While 
those interviewed felt satisfied they have influenced policy selection, they have also accepted that 
the process will have limited impact through implementation because it has been so tightly 
scoped and controlled. Acceptance of outcomes that do not necessarily coincide with the wishes 
or interests of those impacted can occur because affected actors either recognize the body in 
power as a legitimate authority (Lukes 2005), or because the political costs of pushing for a 
different outcome outweigh the benefits that have been achieved (Clegg 1989).  
Amongst non-government actors in Alberta, there was little expectation of policy influence, 
along with a mix of despair and hope that the efforts put into WPAC processes would generate 
change based on the time, effort and money that had been put into the process. The emphasis on 
“hope” potentially reflects a cognitive bias observed by other researchers. In these cases, 
participants are disproportionately positive about the outcomes of collaborative processes in order 
to justify the time and resources they have committed (Benson, et al. 2014; Koontz and Thomas 
2006).  
The Government of Alberta exerted the most obvious structural power at the policy 
selection stage by refusing WPACs input into policy decisions. The lack of government 
commitment to effective integration of WPAC outputs, contrary to the stated expectations of 
those putting time and effort into collaboration, resulted in widespread concern that processes 
represented token consultation and that the WPAC process is simply, “a way of balancing but 
also quieting your skeptics while just doing what you always do” (AB14). This coincides with 
Foucault’s notion of “shallow conflict” whereby forms of resistance that are promoted by existing 
power structures often have the effect of preventing other, more effective forms of resistance to 
manifest (Foucault and Gordon 1980; Haugaard 2006). Concern about WPACs as token 
processes – an issue identified in the conceptual framework – emerged directly from this study 
and is consistent with other research on WPAC processes (Cohen and Bakker 2014; Schmidt 
2014). The issue of token participation did not emerge as a concern in Ontario. 
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3.5.2 Motivations of state actions 
There appear to be two main reasons why the governments examined in this study felt the need to 
retain control over processes. The first, an emergent finding not captured by the conceptual 
framework, was cultural path dependency tilted towards traditional command-and-control models 
within rigid bureaucratic structures. These issues of state organization and culture, reflected in the 
empirical case descriptions, can themselves be examined as a function of historical 
socioeconomic and political influence over time. For example, Howlett and Brownsey (2008) 
examine the influence of colonization, and the nation’s historical focus on resource extraction, on 
the modern political economy of Canada. As such, political culture, observed through a broader 
problem frame than is used in this study, is a product of power relations over time (Engelstad 
2009). Regardless, bureaucratic states tend to change slowly and the meaningful and transparent 
inclusion of non-government actors into decision-making processes represents a significant shift 
in cultural practice (O'Leary and Bingham 2009). The study also revealed constraints, such as 
democratic accountability and legal responsibility, which partly explain why the inclusion of 
collaborative processes into existing governance systems has been challenging. The challenge of 
meaningful inclusion of deliberative processes and outcomes into larger representative 
democratic systems is an ongoing theme in literature on both collaborative environmental 
governance (e.g., Koontz, et al. 2004), and deliberative democracy (e.g., Goodin and Dryzek 
2006). As such, retention of ultimate decision-making authority is often viewed as justified (Fish, 
et al. 2010; Gunningham 2009).  
While the formal justification for retaining decision-making power is clear, state control 
over collaborative processes went beyond ensuring that democratic accountability and fiduciary 
responsibility were met. Both governments acted through autonomous, neopluralist positions with 
respect to collaboration, reproducing the type of domination-based power described by Lukes 
(2005) and largely exercised through the structural dimension. State actions and decisions were 
strongly influenced by dependence upon economic actors for jobs, growth, royalties, and support 
for social programs.  
In both cases, the state responded to pressures exerted sometimes far beyond the regional, 
watershed level. In many collaborative processes, powerful actors are able to mobilize resources 
and exert power at scales transcending the individual, watershed and global (Holley, et al. 2012; 
Pares 2011). In both provinces, there was evidence of elite-level influence at the provincial level, 
apparent through control over agendas and information, and decision-making consistent with the 
structural privileging of economic interests (as discussed by Brooks and Stritch 1991; Hessing, et 
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al. 2005). At the same time, in order to produce better, more enforceable local solutions, 
collaborative processes require a balancing of interests at the watershed scale (Ansell and Gash 
2007). In the cases examined, civil and environmentally focused collaborative actors were unable 
to exert equivalent countervailing influence upon the state at the scale where decisions were 
made. Civil and environmental groups with the capacity to influence at higher scales do exist in 
other contexts but were not present in this study and generally do not occupy the same privileged 
position as business interests. While countervailing power is enhanced when the issues in 
question have broad public salience, powerful civil and environmental groups tend to be the 
exception rather than the rule (as per Cerny 2010). This means that governments using 
collaborative processes to address environmental issues face a potentially fundamental issue in 
committing to honour collaboratively made watershed-scale decisions that must be nested in the 
broader provincial political and socioeconomic context. There is a significant likelihood that 
watershed scale recommendations will reflect priorities that conflict with the powerful interests 
normally involved in elite-level policy making. The local appetite for addressing aggregate 
operations, evidenced by the attempts of committees to include aggregate as a threat to drinking 
water, is one example of this.  
3.5.3 Implications 
The nature of state participation in collaboration has a number of implications for 
collaborative processes and outcomes. Control over issue definition is fundamental to the study of 
both power and policy cycles. Power theory in particular emphasizes that the party with control 
over problem definition also has the ability to keep other issues off the table, thereby achieving at 
least superficial quiescence (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Gaventa 1980; Lukes 2005). A 
collaborative process that truly aims at equitable representation of interests should thus seek to 
collaboratively define issues in order to avoid the privileging of certain interests (Pares 2011; 
Shilling, et al. 2009). However, collaborative agenda setting faces practical constraints. It can be 
difficult for democratically and legally accountable governments to justify resource expenditures 
on processes with uncertain outcomes (Irvin and Stansbury 2004). Committees in both Ontario 
and Alberta tried to address issues that were beyond the jurisdiction of the lead Ministry or 
Department; in neither case were they successful. Collaborative issue definition thus has the 
potential to introduce challenges to existing institutionalized government structures, especially in 
Canada where jurisdictional responsibilities for water are split between the provincial and federal 
governments (Nowlan and Bakker 2010). Also, not all collaborative committees want the 
responsibility of agenda setting. For example, participants in a study of collaboration in British 
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Columbia preferred process pre-design in order to expedite the collaborative process (Frame, et 
al. 2004). While stated preferences with respect to agenda setting can mask hidden structural or 
discursive issues, addressing power operating at the agenda setting stage thus requires careful 
consideration of context and constraints.  
In both provinces, but especially in Alberta, many interviewees felt that their concerns were 
not adequately represented or taken seriously. Collaborative governance scholars frequently 
highlight the social benefits of collaboration in situations where the achievement of 
environmental outcomes has failed (e.g., Innes and Booher 2010; Leach and Sabatier 2005). 
However, findings revealing participant frustration, anger and hopelessness provide evidence that 
the lack of state commitment to collaborative process and integration in Alberta is actually 
serving to disempower civil and environmental actors. Regardless of whether or not collaboration 
is used, strong civil and environmental advocates are essential to a healthy democracy. In 
situations where there are significant power imbalances, collaboration that does not adequately 
account for power can represent an exercise with disproportionately high social and financial 
costs relative to the benefits achieved (Kallis, et al. 2009) .  
For many scholars, collaborative processes represent a way to address unproductive societal 
power imbalances while moving toward a healthier environment (Emerson, et al. 2012). From 
this perspective, it is important to note that, in the cases examined, collaboration seems to be 
largely reproducing entrenched power structures (as in Fish, et al. 2010; Kallis, et al. 2009; Pares 
2011). Controlled participation, processes and outcomes in Ontario have done very little to shift 
decision-making patterns with respect to many of the most significant environmental impacts in 
the province. Decision-making remains similarly unchanged in Alberta. Schmidt (2014:1138), in 
his examination of norms and transitions in WPAC processes, emphasizes that “the ‘procedural 
turn’ can further entrench inequities if the existing practices of democratic institutions 
insufficiently address inequity”. The implication is that the government of Alberta will need to 
address real and perceived bias toward the energy industry at a provincial level in order to ensure 
that WPACs generate positive social outcomes. While the exercise of power was relatively visible 
and obvious in Alberta, the much more subtle exercise of power in Ontario was perhaps just as 
concerning by virtue of the fact that it was hidden and therefore harder to identify, oppose and 
address.  
Finally, collaboration in other settings has demonstrated significant value in terms of 
integrating different types and forms of knowledge, and allowing shared learning to occur 
(Emerson, et al. 2012; Taylor and de Loë 2012). While actors in both provinces did point to some 
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forms of knowledge integration and learning, control over policy development affected the 
emergence of these benefits. Tight process control in Ontario resulted in initiatives that failed to 
address politically difficult issues. This meant that one of the major potential benefits of 
collaboration, the opportunity to enable participants to re-examine deep-seated values and beliefs 
through the deliberative process, was undermined because those values and beliefs were never 
challenged. In Alberta, shared learning was hampered by the degree of instrumental power and 
visible conflict at the WPAC level. Any shared knowledge and learning that were able to manifest 
under existing conflict conditions were unlikely to be effectively utilized because of a lack of 
formalized integration of WPAC products. In both cases, the potentially significant benefits from 
collaboration were not fully realized because of actions and control by the state. 
3.6 Conclusion 
While the governments of both Alberta and Ontario exerted significant control over collaboration, 
they did so through different mechanisms, using different forms of power, and at different stages 
in the policy cycle. The contrast between strict agenda control in Ontario and a lack of support in 
Alberta indicates that realistically accounting for power under current socioeconomic conditions 
requires striking a balance between transparent agenda setting and pre-design. Defining the 
middle ground in this terrain can become complicated because interpreting the expectations and 
interests of the public is inextricably linked to hegemonic norms that are continually reproduced 
by those in power (Clegg 1989; Haugaard 2006). Nonetheless, the study suggests that states can 
begin by being transparent about which interests are included, and which excluded, through 
decisions made by the state at agenda setting, problem definition and implementation stages of 
the policy cycle. 
In both cases, the examination of state involvement and use of collaboration through a 
power lens revealed that current state positions with respect to collaboration are not necessarily 
allowing those processes to achieve purported collaborative benefits including better, more 
enforceable environmental policies, empowered citizens, and shared learning and knowledge. In 
both cases, collaboration appears to be exacerbating the conditions of exclusion and inequity they 
were designed to address. These findings have been disparately addressed by other scholars on 
collaborative environmental problem solving (e.g., Holley, et al. 2012; Innes and Booher 2010; 
Taylor and de Loë 2012). This study builds upon their work by linking together the factors 
potentially affecting the success of collaborative outcomes through a power framework. Given 
that power can be lessened, or at least henceforth require continual justification, through exposure 
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(Zeitoun and Allan 2008), examining power sheds light upon potential areas of focus for entities 
attempting to improve the collaborative efforts of states.  
The Province of Ontario did attempt to design a collaborative process based on best 
practices in the literature to date. However, the literature on collaboration itself has not 
adequately addressed the issue of power, especially when power operates at scales beyond the 
regional, watershed level. It is perhaps unsurprising then that even the highly scripted Ontario 
process largely failed to address issues of power beyond instrumental or visible structural 
dimensions.  It is thus clear that examining power with respect to collaboration is a theoretical 
gap to be addressed. Studies of the ways that actors and institutions with influence at provincial, 
national, and global scales affect collaboration will go a long way toward ensuring more effective 
processes and outcomes in the future.  
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4 Chapter 4 
 
Natural resource industry involvement in collaboration for water 
governance: influence on processes and outcomes 
4.1 Introduction 
Private interests and corporations are increasingly significant actors in environmental decision-
making. Often possessing vast institutional and technical capacity, the private sector has an 
important role to play in “new” governance strategies such as public-private partnerships, private-
social partnerships and collaboration (Holley, et al. 2012). Such new governance strategies are 
increasingly being employed to address complicated and intractable environmental problems 
(Ansell and Gash 2007; Lubell and Lippert 2011). This paper addresses a theoretical gap related 
to the nature of natural resource industry firm participation in collaborative approaches to water 
governance, and the potential consequences of that participation. The purpose is to examine the 
implications of major resource industry participation for watershed scale collaborative processes 
addressing water by revealing power dynamics.  
Collaborative approaches to environmental problem solving are characterized differently in 
different disciplines from public administration (Sabatier, et al. 2005a) to collaborative planning 
(e.g., Innes and Booher 2010) to environmental management (e.g., Campbell, et al. 2011). 
Addressing commonalities across disciplines, collaboration can be characterized as the sharing of 
resources among interdependent actors to address problems that cannot be solved individually 
(Gray 1985). Collaborative processes addressing water are often, but not always, designed to be 
broadly inclusive of all actors with an interest in the issue at hand. Problem solving is typically 
based on respectful, often facilitated, deliberation and debate amongst actors who are treated as 
relative equals (Ansell and Gash 2007). Consideration of all interests is intended to allow joint 
learning and understanding to develop as actors commit to share knowledge and examine their 
own assumptions (Kallis, et al. 2009). Participants often strive for consensus or near-consensus 
(Emerson, et al. 2012). The decisions that result from collaboration are supposedly representative 
of different knowledge and information types, and are more implementable by virtue of being 
agreed to by the affected parties ahead of time (Lubell and Lippert 2011; Margerum 2008).  
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Collaboration that involves natural resource industry firms is complicated by overlapping 
social, political and economic variables operating at multiple scales. The current global economic 
system is based on capitalism and depends on the extraction and distribution of natural resources 
(Hessing, et al. 2005). This means that those countries possessing abundant resources are faced 
with the challenge of facilitating resource extraction to maintain economic growth while 
simultaneously protecting the environment. As a result, natural resource industries are typically 
privileged actors with respect to environmental decision-making (Falkner 2012; Fuchs 2007) – a 
position supported by this research. Environmental regulations in countries built upon resource 
economies often reflect a desire to enable resource extraction rather than to restrict it; this has 
created a legacy with lasting impacts on modern environmental regulations (Hessing, et al. 2005). 
Dependence on the economic benefits of resource extraction means that governments often 
favour resource industry interests in order to protect jobs, growth, royalties, and tax revenues 
(Falkner 2012). Collaborative governance models that are mediated by the state and depend on 
the relative equality of actors in contributing to, and accepting, solutions can be challenged by the 
presence of resource industry actors (Holley, et al. 2012). 
Many collaborative processes take place at local or regional watershed scales, where diverse 
mixes of actors exist (Ansell and Gash 2007). This study specifically focused on watershed scale 
collaboration in the context of large, publically traded, natural resource industries. While 
systemic privileging of resource industries with respect to environmental policy is not restricted 
to publically traded companies, these companies are usually able to operate at scales far beyond 
the watershed level (Falkner 2008), and are primarily oriented toward generating profits of behalf 
of their shareholders (Levy and Newell 2005b). Firms are also motivated to undertake actions, 
such as collaboration, that legitimize their behaviour, bolster their reputation, and facilitate 
further profit maximization (MacDonald 2007). These characteristics have potentially important 
implications for local or regional collaborative processes.  
Many of the ways in which privilege is expressed occur behind closed doors through 
lobbying or elite connections, or implicitly, through actions and decisions taken by governments 
(Fuchs 2007; Macdonald 2007). Hence, an analytical approach rooted in power theory was used 
to unpack the visible and invisible ways in which resource industries both shape, and are shaped 
by, collaborative processes and outcomes. This approach revealed that resource industries were 
able to shape collaboration, and the issues collaborated upon, at multiple analytical levels both 
internal and external to the collaborative process in ways usually not available to other actors. 
Analysis also revealed that resource industry participation in collaboration did not reflect a 
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commitment to engage in shared learning and the reexamination of values and interests as 
presupposed by collaborative theory.   
The next section develops a conceptual framework based on power. The framework was 
used to guide two empirical case studies designed to investigate if, how, and in what ways, major 
natural resource industries affect collaboration for water problem solving occurring at regional 
scales. A comparative case study approach is outlined and results are presented, analyzed and 
discussed.  
4.2 Power Theory, Collaboration and Natural Resource Industries 
In presenting a conceptual framework for the analysis of resource industry firm involvement in 
collaborative approaches to water governance, a clear definition of “power” is required. This 
section establishes the definition used and presents relevant theory related to power and business 
involvement in environmental policy making. Table 4.1, iteratively constructed through both 
inductive and deductive insights (Bloor and Wood 2006), organizes this theory into a coherent 
framework that guided the data collection and analysis process.  
Power can be defined in multiple ways and the interpretation best used depends upon study 
context (Haugaard and Clegg 2009). This study draws primarily on Lukes’ (2005) three 
dimensions of power. Many other definitions and power frameworks exist, but Lukes’ is 
particularly suited to researching policy contexts where power decides “what is known, what is 
emphasized and who prevails” (Zeitoun and Allan 2008:9). According to Lukes (2005:25), “A 
exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests”. Power is not a 
discrete quantity but rather a multi-dimensional, fluid relationship between actors (Baldwin 1989; 
Lukes 2005).  
The first dimension, instrumental power, focuses on overt, observable power, use of force 
and obvious resource imbalances (Fuchs 2007; Lukes 2005). In the context of collaboration, 
strategies such as intimidation, coercion and manipulation reflect the exertion of instrumental 
power (Culley and Hughey 2008). These influence strategies are easily observable and can often 
be effectively addressed through careful process design and facilitation (Innes and Booher 2003).  
Structural power, Lukes’ second dimension, reflects the ability to set and control policy-
making agendas. It is concerned with who has influence over decision-making, control over 
conversations, and the ability to block issues from the policy arena by either making, or failing to 
make, decisions. Of fundamental concern are the socioeconomic and political contexts that define 
who is able to participate in decision-making (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes 2005). Structural 
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approaches highlight that conflicts of interest may never become visible if marginalized actors do 
not possess sufficient financial, technical or institutional resources to effectively defend their 
interests, or if they decline participation because they do not trust a given process to fairly and 
effectively address their interests (Gaventa 1980). Structural power may be a function of actions 
taken by actors to exert power, or of dominant ideological contexts that mean privileged actors 
often see their interests realized without a need to directly take action. As such, examining the 
second face of power seeks to bring hidden power to light (Fuchs 2007). 
Under the capitalist socioeconomic institutional structure present in many nations, control 
over political agendas is profoundly shaped by the interdependence of business and government. 
Because of the dominant ideological and institutional contexts that legitimize the profit seeking 
interests of business, governments often privilege economic actors in pursuit of economic well-
being (Falkner 2012; Macdonald 2007). Neoliberal trends toward decentralization enhance this 
privilege as governments increasingly rely on business and industry for essential baseline 
monitoring and reporting, mobilization of capital, and institutional resources (Gunningham 2009; 
Hessing, et al. 2005). Access to substantial financial resources means that economic actors can 
disproportionately fund influence strategies such lobbying, legal action, and scientific or policy 
research (Finger and Svarin 2012; Levy 2012). Social and institutional connections between 
business and political elites, and the existence of regulatory relationships between government 
agencies and industries, further enhance lobbying efforts (Falkner 2008; Macdonald 2007). 
Industries, or industry coalitions that are sufficiently influential, are able to set their own rules 
and standards in order to avoid or subvert government regulation (Auld and Gulbrandsen 2013; 
Clapp and Meckling 2013). Threats to relocate if faced with restrictive environmental regulations 
provide additional leverage (Newell 2012b). Combined, these factors present a challenge to the 
equitable representation and consensus pursued in collaboration.  
Lukes’ (2005) third dimension, characterized by discursive power, speaks to the ability of 
some actors to frame political contests by actively shaping societal values, norms and identities. 
This can take place through the reinforcement of specific values in the media and popular 
discourse, preferential use of value-laden language that favours specific, hegemonic ideals, and 
the requirement to use specific language to be viewed as legitimate (Pares 2011). Financial 
resources can enhance discursive influence because money enables access to the public 
consciousness through the purchase of media and advertising (Fuchs 2007). Dominant ideological 
conditions can also privilege some actors even absent direct action once hegemonic structures 
become entrenched. The exercise of this type of power can prevent some actors from recognizing  
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Table 4.1: A framework for the analysis of power in collaboration for water govern-
ance in the context of natural resource industry involvement 
Key Parameter 
from Power 
Theory 
Key Concern Related to Business 
Involvement in Environmental 
Policy Making 
Specific Concern for 
Collaborative Water Governance 
Instrumental Power: 
Behaviour, decision-
making, key issues, 
observable conflict, 
subjective interests 
(seen as policy 
preferences revealed 
by political 
participation) 
(Lukes 2005:29) 
 
Evidence of, or attention to, 
coercion, co-optation, diversion, 
manipulation, misinformation 
(Falkner 2008; Lindblom 1977; 
Newell 2005) 
Coercion, co-optation, diversion, 
manipulation, misinformation  
Facilitation or bridging actors who 
mediate power  
Unbalanced resources (Falkner 
2008; Fuchs 2007; Levy and Newell 
2005a; Macdonald 2007)  
Imbalance of financial resources  
Unequal capacities (technical, 
social, institutional, etc.) to 
participate  
Structural Power: 
Decision-making 
and non decision-
making, issues and 
potential issues, 
observable (overt or 
covert) conflict, 
subjective interests 
(seen as policy 
preferences or 
grievances) (Lukes 
2005:29) 
Influence over agenda setting and 
problem framing (Hessing et al; 
Guber and Bosso 2007) 
Who instigated collaboration? 
Problem definition or framing 
and/or agenda setting 
Governments initiating token 
processes that exist to generate 
legitimacy instead of to influence 
decisions 
Inclusion or exclusion of important 
actor groups 
Knowledge production, control and 
use (Dür and De Bièvre 2007; 
Falkner 2008; Macdonald 2007; 
Levy 2012; Williams 2012) 
Appropriate/inclusive use of 
knowledge 
Control over information 
production and use (Levy 2012) 
Preferential access to decision-
makers (Falkner 2012; Fuchs 2007; 
MacDonald 2007) 
Lobbying external to the 
collaborative process (Falkner 
2012;  
Elite level relationships (Falkner 
2012; Fuchs 2007) 
Constraints on actions and decisions 
broadly resulting from socio-
political and economic factors 
(Falkner 2008; Fuchs 2007; Kraft 
and Kamieniecki 2007; Levy and 
Newell 2005a; Macdonald 2007) 
Limits of consensus 
Decision making power residing 
with, or being retained by, the state 
The structural bias of capitalism or 
implications thereof 
Governments favouring specific 
interests 
Collaboration being influenced by 
external political contexts 
Discursive Power: Restrictions on participation or Who is, or is not, favoured by the 
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Decision-making 
and control over 
political agenda (not 
necessarily through 
decisions), issues 
and potential issues, 
observable (overt or 
covert) and latent 
conflict, subjective 
and real interests 
(Lukes 2005:29) 
allowable views as a result of 
discursive control (Kraft and 
Kamienecki; Falkner 2008; 
Torgerson 2005; Newell 2005) 
dominant discourse 
Implications for consensus 
Efforts to control discourse 
Prescription of a “language” of 
collaboration 
Groups having to self-censor to 
participate  
Dominant, hegemonic themes or 
values related to capitalism 
influencing collaboration 
 
that a given situation or outcome is contrary to their interests, thus preventing visible conflict 
from manifesting (Gaventa 1980).  
Empirical study of discursive power can be challenging because it is often subversive. 
Researchers often use intensive discourse analysis methodologies that are beyond the scope of 
this study (e.g., Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Nevertheless, it is possible to reveal some 
discursive issues through empirical analysis, as highlighted in Table 4.1.  
In constructing Table 4.1, Lukes (2005) three dimensions of power were first used to 
provide structure (Column 1). Theory on business involvement in environmental policy making, 
power and political process was then used to identify potential ways that power is present or can 
be expressed in environmental policy making processes (Column 2). Column 3 represents 
integration of the theory present in Column 2 with theory on collaboration to determine a set of 
potential indicators for the identification of power in collaborative approaches to water 
governance.    
4.3 Methods 
Interpreting power is inherently subjective and dependent upon context (Flyvbjerg 1998a; 
Lukes 2005). A cross-case study approach, appropriate when understanding depends on context, 
was used to provide enough situated depth for power analysis, and to facilitate generalizability 
(Stake 2005; Yin 2009). Cases were selected, using criteria outlined below, in order to facilitate 
the examination of industry actions, roles and motivations as independent variables. This allowed 
the establishment of causal patterns and the development of study findings (Druckman 2005). 
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4.3.1 Cases 
Two Canadian examples of collaboration addressing water were investigated: the Athabasca 
Watershed Council (AWC) in Northern Alberta, Canada (Figure 4.1), and the Thames-Sydenham 
and Region Source Protection Committee in Southwestern Ontario, Canada (Figure 4.2).  Both 
cases represent state-led, collaborative processes organized at the watershed scale. This nested 
approach captured both state-level political and socioeconomic contexts, and on-the-ground 
analyses of power. Both cases are characterized by the active participation of both provincial 
government representatives, and of at least one major natural resource industry actor. State-led 
collaborative processes characterized by resource industry involvement are relatively common in 
other geographical settings (e.g., Baird, et al. 2014; Holley, et al. 2012; Sabatier et al. 2005) and 
application of these criteria allows increased generalizability.  The two cases chosen are described 
below and summarized in Table 4.2.    
4.3.1.1 Athabasca Watershed Council 
The Athabasca River Watershed is home to diverse industrial interests, the most significant of 
which is oil sands development north of Fort McMurray, Alberta. Oil sands activity is extremely 
profitable but also highly controversial because of its vast environmental impacts (Jordaan 2012). 
Many of the companies operating in the oil sands have significant international reach and are 
regularly listed as some of the largest and most profitable in the world (e.g., Exxon Mobil, 
Chevron, BP) (Fortune Magazine 2013). The population of the Athabasca River watershed is 
largely concentrated upstream of oil sands activity. The downstream area is sparsely populated, 
mainly by Indigenous communities (Athabasca Watershed Council 2014). 
The province of Alberta has been historically defined by the exploitation of natural 
resources and a neoliberal political economy. The province has faced significant domestic and 
international criticism for this political philosophy, particularly with respect to the facilitation and 
promotion of energy industry activities (Clancy 2014b; Cohen and Bakker 2014; Smith and Barr 
1984). In 2003, the Alberta Water For Life strategy mandated the creation of collaborative bodies 
known as Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils (WPACs). Water For Life (2003:7) 
established goals of achieving “safe, secure drinking water; healthy aquatic ecosystems; and, 
reliable, quality water supplies for a sustainable economy”. The Government of Alberta assigned 
multi-actor WPACs the task of characterizing watershed health through State of the Watershed 
Reports, producing non-regulatory Watershed Management Plans, and fostering public  
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Table 4.2: Case study characteristics 
 Thames-Sydenham and 
Region Source Protection 
Committee1 
Athabasca Watershed 
Council2 
Major Basins Upper Thames River 
Watershed, Lower Thames 
River Watershed, Sydenham 
River Watershed including 
Canadian portions of the St. 
Clair River Watershed 
Athabasca River Watershed 
Size 10,826 km1 159,000 km2 
Regional population  
(All data from the 2001 
census) 
 
107,000 (Lower Thames), 
472,000 (Upper Thames), 
167,000 (Sydenham and St. 
Clair) 
152,097  
Primary regional resource 
industry activity 
Agriculture, petrochemical, oil 
and gas 
Oil and gas, forestry, pulp and 
paper, agriculture, coal 
mining, sand and gravel 
extraction 
Provincial policy on 
collaboration 
Clean Water Act (2006)  Water For Life (2003) 
Committee milestones Appointed in 2007, 
Declaration of Guiding 
Principles, Mission Statement 
and Terms of Reference in 
2008  
Appointed in 2009, 
Declaration of Terms of 
Reference in 2009 
 
Size and composition of 
collaborative group 
1 Chair, 7 municipal 
government, 7 business and 
industry, 7 “other”, 3 non-
voting government liaisons, 3 
First Nations 
1 past-president, 3 municipal 
government, 3 non-
government, 3 industry, 3 
Aboriginal, 3 other  
Output to date Terms of Reference 
3 State of the Watershed 
Report phases (1 of which has 
been withheld)  
Terms of Reference 
 3 Technical Assessment and 
Vulnerability Reports 
 Draft Source Water 
Protection Plan 
Decision-making format Consensus focused Consensus focused 
1Thames-Sydenham Source Protection Region. (n.d.). Retrieved December 16, 2014, from 
http://www.sourcewaterprotection.on.ca 
2Athabasca Watershed Council. (n.d.). Retrieved December 16, 2014, from http://www.awc-
wpac.ca 
 
engagement and education (Alberta Environment 2005). Some broad guidelines were provided 
for the process (Alberta Environment 2008a; Alberta Water Council 2008b). Although WPACs 
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are advisory in nature, the Government of Alberta formally acknowledges a responsibility to 
“review and take into consideration the recommendations put forward in a water management 
plan” (Alberta Environment 2005:10).  
WPACs were intended to be broadly representative of watershed interests including 
government, non-governmental organizations, industry, Indigenous actors and other civil society 
representatives. They meet the general criteria for collaborative governance outlined above, 
including a focus on consensus, broad inclusion, deliberation, shared knowledge, emergent 
learning, and pooling of resources (Alberta Water Council 2008c). The AWC is one of 11 
WPACs in the province.  
Figure 4.1: Athabasca River Watershed, Alberta, Canada 
 
4.3.1.2 Thames-Sydenham Source Protection Committee 
The Thames-Sydenham and Region Source Protection Committee operates in a region that is 
largely agricultural, but is also home to several population centres, and an intensive concentration  
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Figure 4.2: Thames Sydenham and Region Source Protection Region, Ontario, Canada 
 
of petrochemical industries in Sarnia, Ontario. This area is informally known as “Chemical  
Valley” and is an ongoing area of significant environmental concern (International Joint 
Commission 2006; Luginaah, et al. 2010). Petrochemical industries in Ontario are heavily 
regulated; nonetheless, serious, well-documented problems with regulatory enforcement and 
compliance exist (Environmental SWAT Team 2005). The severity of regulation and 
enforcement has historically reflected the political ideology of the ruling political party. These 
parties have been, by turns, right, centrist and left with left leaning parties tending to be more 
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enthusiastic with respect to environmental regulation (Winfield 2012). The ruling party presiding 
over collaboration examined in this paper is a centrist Liberal government. 
The Thames-Sydenham Source Protection Committee is one of 19 Source Protection 
Committees created under the (2006) Ontario Clean Water Act (CWA). This legislation was 
enacted as a response to an inquiry into thousands of illnesses and 7 deaths in 2000 resulting from 
contamination of a public water supply in Walkerton, Ontario (O'Connor 2002a). Following the 
inquiry, the provincial government convened expert committees to provide recommendations on 
how collaboratively developed, watershed scale Source Protection Plans could be created to 
contribute to the safety of drinking water supplies (Government of Ontario 2004; Ontario 2004). 
Pre-existing, watershed-based Conservation Authorities led the collaborative processes. All 
Source Protection Committees were required by the CWA to establish rules of procedure to be 
approved by the lead Conservation Authority in their region. These rules reflected best practices 
identified in theory on collaboration and include consensus-focus and deliberation with an 
emphasis on knowledge sharing and learning (Thames-Sydenham and Region Source Protection 
Committee 2008). Collaboration was intended to be broadly inclusive of commercial, industrial, 
agricultural, municipal, civil, provincial and Indigenous actors. Committees were required to 
produce Terms of Reference, assess and map threats and vulnerability of municipal drinking 
waters supplies, and develop Source Protection Plans to be submitted to the Minister of 
Environment, run through an approvals process, and eventually signed into law (Government of 
Ontario 2006).  
4.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
Data were collected between July 2013 and December 2014 using document analysis, personal 
observations and semi-structured interviews. Documents were collected from a wide range of 
sources for analysis. The 92 documents analyzed included collaborative group policy documents 
and technical reports, educational materials, websites, draft and final watershed plans, 
government policy documents, government publications, policy intervention records, records of 
interpersonal communications, email records forwarded by interviewees, relevant media articles, 
and industry technical, policy and promotional materials. Observations were gathered at two 
board meetings and during interviews and site visits. 
Interviewees were recruited through purposeful and snowball sampling techniques. Forty-
one participants were drawn from municipal and provincial government, collaborative group staff 
and participants, industry, and individuals with relevant insights on the collaborative process. In 
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Ontario, 12 interviews addressed the local level and nine addressed the provincial level. In 
Alberta, 10 interviewees addressed the local level and 10 addressed the provincial level. In both 
cases, interviewees at the provincial scale were often involved with or well informed of activities 
at the local scale, and vice versa.  
The conceptual framework (Table 4.1) was used to guide development of interview 
questions in order to investigate the consequences of resource industry involvement in 
collaborative processes for water governance. For example, interviewees were asked if they felt 
that all relevant topics were “on the table” in the collaborative process. Interview results 
highlighted issues of agenda setting, control over discourse, information control, intimidation and 
elite access.    
Data collection was initiated using deductive insights from theory. Throughout the process, 
analytic induction was used to iteratively refine the conceptual framework and interview 
questions by incorporating inductive findings (Bloor and Wood 2006). Throughout interviews, 
participants were encouraged to address any issues they thought relevant to the study and its 
objectives. This was done in order to address bias built into the framework and interviewer 
worldview. Following verbatim transcription, interview transcripts were returned to interviewees 
for clarification and validation (Carlson 2010). Where required, follow-up interviews were used 
for clarification or further investigation. 
QSR NVivo 10 was used to code and analyze all observations, documents and interview 
transcripts. Data collection was guided by the major themes identified in the conceptual 
framework. Resulting data were then analyzed using open coding followed by several round of 
axial coding in order to identify patterns, emergent themes, and relationships (Strauss and Corbin 
1998). The resultant data set reflects a combination of both deductive and inductive findings. 
Validity and subject saturation were determined using triangulation among the three data sources 
(Yin 2009).  
4.4 Results 
Findings are organized around themes of access to decision-makers; resources and capacity; 
industry motivations for participation; and, the impact of collaboration on industry and their 
commitment to the process. These themes emerged inductively through the coding process and 
reveal the most significant ways that resource interests both shape, and are shaped by, 
participation in collaborative processes. Where quotations are used, codes identify individuals in 
order to ensure confidentiality. Key results are summarized at the end of the section. 
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4.4.1 Access to decision-makers 
The means available to actors to pursue their policy goals outside of collaboration were 
investigated in order to determine the potential for influence on both agenda setting and on 
ultimate outcomes. In both Ontario and Alberta, the resource industries present in the Oil Sands 
and in Chemical Valley have strong working relationships with government departments because 
they are heavily regulated entities and are often legally entitled to consultation on water issues 
(e.g., Province of Alberta 2000a; Province of Ontario 2001). These relationships both enable the 
exertion of power by industry, and demonstrate structural relationships whereby governments 
often act in the interests of industry even absent specific industry actions. Government and 
industry interviewees in both provinces highlighted the existing lobbying activities of firms at 
multiple levels, and use of elite level access to exert pressure on government in ways that are not 
usually available to civil or environmental actors. To illustrate, an Ontario government official, in 
reference to the CWA, noted that, 
you're going to jump a little higher, and a little faster, and a little farther when some 
industry association comes pounding on the Minister's door saying, 'What the hell?' 
As opposed to three members of the public that show up, and as much as they might 
be impacted, [the three members of the public] might be impacted even more (ON4) 
Similarly, all interviewees in Alberta, except those in the energy sector and one government 
actor, identified the long-standing preferential access to policy makers that is available to 
resource industries. Illustrating this perspective, a watershed level interviewee, referring to the 
WPAC process, stated that, 
They don't have to work here at this level. They just go the back door, straight through 
the cocktail party shmooze circuit. And they talk to all the decision makers at [that] 
level. They don't need to function down here with us, the great unwashed. There's 
always been this open door policy to corporate power (AB16) 
All government interviewees in both cases suggested that government will almost always favour 
big industries over smaller civil or public actors in the Athabasca watershed whether the issues in 
question are subject to collaboration or not.  
In contrast, avenues of influence for civil society interviewees engaged in collaborative 
water governance processes were much more limited. In Alberta, three interviewees referred to 
media pressure as the most effective way to address their concerns and discussed using media 
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pressure to motivate provincial action on a recent mine tailings pond breach in the watershed 
despite their concurrent positions on the AWC (The Canadian Press 2014).  One government 
interviewee noted that, “the strongest advocates of Alberta are often the most poorly resourced to 
really do a job of effective management. So they may be limited to providing that critical 
commentary – the media pressure” (AB20). In Ontario, civil society interviewees explained that 
they relied on writing letters to Ministers or trying to lobby through environmental groups. One 
provincial government interviewee in Ontario (ON4) noted that collaboration may have “leveled 
the playing field” a little bit by granting more people direct access to government employees and 
policy advisors who regularly attended Source Protection Committee meetings.  
4.4.2 Technical, financial and institutional capacity 
Issues of capacity in the context of collaboration were most likely to play out with respect to 
differences between individual collaborative actors at the watershed scale rather than at the 
provincial level. Differences in financial capacity amongst actors are usually relatively easy to 
assess. Related issues of technical and institutional capacity can be less obvious. In Ontario, the 
Source Water Protection process was designed to level in-process imbalances in financial and 
technical capacity, especially as related to poorly resourced citizens as opposed to actors backed 
by organizational resources. For example, board members received honoraria to subsidize 
participation at meetings and there were significant efforts to provide education on technical 
issues and present technical information in plain language formats (Ontario Ministry of the 
Environment 2009). This enabled these members to make more substantive contributions to the 
final policy plans. However, interviewees without technical expertise still expressed reservations 
about capacity.  
In Alberta, board member participation was also subsidized (Alberta Water Council 2008b) 
but there was less focus on the technical training of participants. Resource imbalances were 
prominent and contentious and resulted in a process that was marked by tension and overt 
conflict. As a result, power issues within the collaborative process, rather than in the context of 
integrating general collaborative group output into provincial policy, became a significant focus. 
Interviewees from across all sectors, and personal observations during meetings attended, 
indicated that better resourced actors were able to exert instrumental power in this setting in ways 
that facilitated representation of their interests in developing watershed management plans. This 
was often directly attributed to financial resources. For instance, interviewees referred to the fact 
that organized interests are paid to be there: “they’re working for Suncor or Alpac or whatever 
and they’re getting a big salary …and then you’ve got volunteers like us who are on our own time 
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and we have very little resources backing us up” (AB10). In another example demonstrative of 
technical capacity, participation at a technical committee meeting directing State of the 
Watershed reporting – the information used to inform watershed management plans – included 
two resource industry representatives, a staff member, and a civil society member with limited 
technical knowledge. Clear imbalances in facility with technical content were present. This is 
especially important given that discussion addressed the scientific data to be included in the 
reports, as well as what industry considered to be an inappropriate “anti-industry” tone in 
information presented to date.  
Interviews and observations in Alberta also revealed structural and discursive power issues 
internal to the collaborative process related to implicit restrictions on knowledge use and 
conversation. This has consequences for ultimate WPAC outputs since actors finding their 
interests restricted are less able to ensure that ultimate policy plans represent their interests. An 
industry interviewee acknowledged this concern: “they’ll hear the science and right away think, 
well, I’m not a scientist and I didn’t go to college or university so I’m not going to participate in 
this part of the conversation” (AB15). A civil society interviewee explained that sometimes those 
lacking technical knowledge are “intimidated by some of the group. Not intentional intimidation, 
just the way it is” (AB11).  
Knowledge and information in the Athabasca watershed were generally contested, 
sometimes aggressively. One interviewee, in reference to the oil sands, noted that “there is always 
a lot of [industry] influence on information production and sharing” (AB12). Interviews and 
email records directly addressing the Athabasca WPAC identified perceived bias in technical 
information and reporting as being pro-environment (from five interviewees), and, at the same 
time, pro-energy industry (from another five interviewees).  
There were also perceptions that not all information control within the Athabasca WPAC 
was implicit or unintentional. Three interviewees, in claims corroborated by records of email 
conversations between board members, referred to the use of coercive or discursive “intimidation 
tactics” on the part of industry or pro-industry interests to control the release of information. 
These same sources revealed concerns over information control in the AWC State of the 
Watershed Reports, referenced above. People who identified this issue pointed to industry 
concerns over perceived pro-environment bias in the reports. Industry interviewees confirmed 
that they viewed the tone of the reports as problematic. In another example, staff members 
prepared technical fact sheets for a number of water quality issues in the basin but were not 
permitted to release all of them. Four interviewees noted that industry tried to control the release 
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of this and other information because otherwise “[the public] will get ideas” (AB18). At the time 
of writing, the AWC’s State of the Watershed Phase 3 had been completed but not yet posted by 
the AWC staff on their website because of conflict related to perceived bias and information 
control. If power in its first dimension is identified as “who prevails”, the delayed release of the 
State of the Watershed report indicates that those industry actors interested in controlling 
information have, at least so far, succeeded in exerting instrumental power.  
Capacity issues in Alberta were also inductively linked to geographic and demographic 
factors specific to the Athabasca Watershed. According to seven interviewees, the differences in 
capacity and resources between the energy industry and the dispersed and traditionally 
marginalized First Nations populations downstream of the oil sands strongly affects the nature of 
collaboration in the basin, and the ability of collaborative plans to effectively represent the 
interests of all actors. Interviewees and documents indicated that WPACs operating in watersheds 
where capacity levels are more balanced have been able to work more effectively to produce 
watershed plans with significantly less conflict (e.g., North Saskatchewan Watershed Alliance 
2012). These issues did not inductively emerge in analysis of the Thames-Sydenham group but 
may be present if specifically investigated.  
4.4.3 Industry motivations for participation 
The motivations for industry participation in collaboration were investigated to determine if any 
power imbalances present would necessarily be detrimental to the achievement of collaborative 
process goals. In Ontario, interviews, records of policy interventions into the development of the 
CWA, and personal observations, indicated that the driving motivations for resource industry 
participation were overwhelmingly defensive (e.g., Legislative Assembly of Ontario  2006). Six 
interviewees cited the protection of business interests, and prevention of restrictions on industrial 
growth, development and expansion as the main motivators of industry. According to one 
industry interviewee, “I didn’t want to see an overly restrictive regime of regulation or policies 
put in place that would hamper development” (ON18). Opportunities to gather information, to get 
ahead of the game, to build relationships with other actors in a non-confrontational setting, and to 
ensure that industry was fairly represented were also cited by industry and government 
interviewees as important motivations. Two industry interviewees, and industry reports and 
promotional materials, identified maintenance of a social license to operate, and a corporate ethos 
of social responsibility, as further motivations (Sarnia Lambton Environmental Association 
2011).  
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In Alberta, seven interviewees asserted that industry participated to protect their interests, to 
defend the status quo, to minimize costs and to prevent restrictions on development. Seven 
interviewees, as well as meeting notes, also referenced the pursuit and maintenance of a social 
license to operate. One industry interviewee remarked on positive returns from being able to use 
the AWC logo in firm sustainability materials (AB15). He also noted that the company gets more 
out of participation in the AWC than the AWC does out of the company. Two interviewees 
referred to collaboration as an opportunity to gather information and get ahead of the game in 
pursuing policy goals outside of the WPAC. Three industry interviewees viewed collaboration as 
a chance to influence and teach other stakeholders, and to correct misinformation regarding the 
highly controversial oil sands region: “for those with a limited technical capacity, you're teaching 
them – teaching is a strong word, that's not even the right word – but you're helping them to 
understand the basis for whatever the issue is” (AB17). Three interviewees also indicated that 
industry appreciates the chance to build relationships with other actors, and to engage with 
environmental non-governmental organizations in a less hostile forum.  
The non-regulatory nature of the Alberta WPAC process did lead eight interviewees to 
focus on the challenges presented by a collaborative process depending solely on the buy-in of 
involved actors. All industry interviewees emphasized that it would be much easier to justify the 
expenditure of resources for a real commitment to collaboration to shareholders if participation 
was legislated, or if collaboration had the potential to threaten their business. Five Alberta 
interviewees highlighted that a process with more potential impact would draw people with the 
power to actually make decisions. 
4.4.4 Industry impact and commitment to collaboration 
The impact of collaboration on industry operations was examined to determine if powerful actors 
were fully committing to the collaborative process. Another function of this query was to assess 
the degree to which it may be assumed that collaboratively-made policy recommendations or 
decisions would impact industry operations or profitability. In the Thames-Sydenham Source 
Protection Region, collaboration has had little impact on resource industry operations. The 
restriction of collaboration to only municipal source water protection meant that major resource 
industries were largely defined out of the process because most industrial activities are not 
located within municipal water intake zones. The exception to this includes several municipal 
intakes on the Great Lakes. In these cases, the province provided special instructions for Great 
Lakes intakes that precluded the use of regulatory prohibitions by committees. All Ontario 
industry interviewees, and four other government and staff interviewees, emphasized that Source 
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Water Protection has not imposed anything on industry that is more restrictive than the regulatory 
regime already in place: “we would have [had meetings with Ministers] if the stakes were higher 
and it would have had a more direct influence on our industry” (ON10). When asked about 
industry’s response to potentially restrictive regulations resulting from the Clean Water Act, an 
industry interviewee responded, “force us to do it and we'll leave. And that’s the way all industry 
is now because there's so little industry left in Ontario” (ON17). A provincial government 
interviewee further reinforced this position, and the type of structural power highlighted above:  
“[these industries are] recalcitrant, don't work with the government, generally a subsidiary of a 
US conglomerate, could care less about the political climate. They've basically got us over a 
barrel, and collaboration with them? Not going to happen” (ON14). 
In Alberta, there was recognition from six government and industry interviewees that 
industry does not need to participate in collaboration because processes are unable to impose 
anything that will significantly alter or affect industry operations. Six government and industry 
actors made reference to the fact that industry does not need to be there. For example, 
they don't need to be at the table of the WPAC. They can go straight to the province 
based on the fact that they've got agreements that give them permission to do that. If 
they are at the table it's because it’s at their discretion. They choose to be, they 
appreciate the social license they get by being there because they’re together with 
other groups and they’re showing up as being constructive, maybe being restorative, 
being supportive of progressive change and that's helpful to them. (AB13) 
Coding for emergent themes also identified the importance of the degree to which industry 
representatives in collaborative processes were able to actually impact the decisions and 
operations of the corporations they were representing. In Ontario, two government interviewees 
noted that major corporations often send representatives from their public relations or 
sustainability departments who do not have any influence on decision-making:  
It might be a public relations matter of, 'Send Bill because Bill can manage these 
people and make them go away.' The CAO may never know that the corporations 
bought into this collaborative governing structure and that there's a public expectation. 
(ON14) 
Furthermore, when individuals are sent to represent a sector, there is no guarantee that they are 
important, or accountable, to their sector. For example, 19 major industry interests in Chemical 
Valley (Figure 4.2) participate together through a single industry association, the Sarnia Lambton  
 105 
Table 4.3 Key results organized according to case and emergent theme 
 Case 
Ontario Alberta 
Access to decision-
makers 
• Evidence of preferential elite level 
access and industry lobbying  
• Structural bias of the province 
toward industry interests 
• Evidence of preferential elite level 
access  
• Structural bias of the province toward 
energy industry interests 
Technical, financial 
and institutional 
capacity 
• Process design, honoraria and 
facilitation were used to promote 
equitable interaction 
• Education on technical issues partly 
addressed issues of technical 
capacity 
• Significant resource imbalances 
resulted in a conflict laden setting at 
the watershed scale 
• Participation was restricted due to 
technical knowledge constraints 
• There was apparent coercive control 
over the release of information 
perceived as biased 
Industry 
motivations for 
participation 
• Resource industries are motivated to 
participate in collaboration to protect 
their business interests, prevent 
restrictions on growth, get ahead of 
the game, build relationships, ensure 
industry is fairly represented, and to 
maintain a social license to operate 
• Resource industries are motivated to 
participate in collaboration to protect 
their interests, defend the status quo, 
minimize costs, prevent restrictions 
on growth, build relationships, gather 
information, get ahead of the game, 
and influence other stakeholders 
• Motivation to participate is negatively 
affected by the voluntary nature of the 
WPAC process 
Industry impact 
and commitment to 
collaboration 
• Most major resource industries were 
defined out of the process in the 
Thames-Sydenham Region and the 
province more broadly 
• Government and industry both 
acknowledge structural barriers to 
creating restrictive regulations 
• Industries are not committing people 
with decision-making capacity as 
collaborative group participants 
• Industry is willing to commit 
resources to collaboration but has 
not demonstrated a commitment to 
change practices based on 
collaboration 
• Industry does not need to participate 
in collaboration because WPACs lack 
the strength to require changes 
• Industries are not committing people 
with decision-making capacity as 
collaborative group participants 
• Industry is willing to commit 
resources to collaboration but has not 
demonstrated a commitment to 
change practices based on 
collaboration. Majority privately-
owned companies may be an 
exception to this trend 
 
Environmental Association (Sarnia Lambton Environmental Association 2013). One staff 
interviewee noted that Chemical Valley companies participate through a single representative but 
that the individual firms often have different interests and it is therefore difficult for one person to 
speak for all of industry. 
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In Alberta, six interviewees from government and industry similarly noted that industry 
representatives do not have the authority to make decisions for their entire sector. This also arose 
with respect to representatives of large corporations, especially, as pointed out by two industry 
and two other interviewees, where industry representatives are expected to toe the company line: 
they send the lowest common denominator person to sit at the table and just be there 
as a presence to say, “Well, we were there.” But there’s no decision-making power, 
there’s no real traction with moving forward. They’re there in body, but not in spirit 
and in commitment. (AB16) 
Industry promotional, technical and sustainability reporting documents refer to the financial, 
scientific and technical contributions they make to collaboration but do not make any reference to 
the two-way relationship expected from collaboration as defined above (e.g., Alberta Newsprint 
Company 2014; Sarnia Lambton Environmental Association 2011). The exception to this was 
Suncor Energy Inc. (2014:26), a participant in the AWC and in the Thames-Sydenham through 
the Sarnia Lambton Environmental Association. One of their Sustainability Reports outlines that, 
“Collaboration is central to our community investment strategy. We are here to connect and 
support, as well as learn from, our partners”. However, the Suncor documents that identify the 
AWC only reference one way involvement such as input onto the AWC Science Technical 
Committee or financial support (e.g., Suncor Energy Inc. 2012).  There was more evidence of 
collaborative representatives engaging from a position of real commitment when the industry 
present was not legally bound by the need to satisfy shareholder demands and to ensure 
profitability (e.g., Alberta Newsprint Company 2014).  
 
4.5 Cross Case Analysis and Discussion 
This section compares and analyzes findings from the cases in order to illuminate the different 
issues affecting, and affected by, resource industry participation in collaboration for water 
governance at watershed scales. Two main categories of findings emerged. The first examines 
how power plays out as resource industries participate in collaboration, with a specific focus on 
the way that scale shapes power dynamics in watershed-based collaboration. The second category 
identifies the consequences of resource industry participation for collaborative processes and the 
achievement of desired outcomes.     
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4.5.1 Power and the ability to influence 
Results in both cases indicated clear differences in the scales at which actors were able to exert 
influence. Investigation into potential avenues of influence in both cases revealed that the 
resource industry firms involved possess established, preferential access to political decision 
makers. Collaboration is undermined if well organized and connected actors such as industry are 
able to preferentially influence high level decisions such as the definition of the problem to be 
collaborated upon, or the final policy decision, through avenues outside of the collaborative 
process (Parkins 2010; Williams 2012). When decisions are made at elite levels, they are much 
more likely to reflect privileged positions because they are not subject to public scrutiny (Fuchs 
2007). 
Power theory highlights the physical or effective exclusion of actors from the decision-
making process. Potential conflicts may not be realized because those concerned do not have an 
effective voice, perpetuating existing power structures (Gaventa 1980).  In Ontario, the exclusion 
of some actors with potentially relevant voices at the watershed scale has been examined and 
problematized by others (Baird, et al. 2014; Canadian Environmental Law Asssociation 2004; 
Hania 2013). The collaborative problem frame in Ontario, established ahead of time by the 
province, also meant that most major natural resource industries in Ontario were not affected, 
thus defining out many industrial actors and conflict-laden issues related to source water 
protection. In effect, there was no need for industry to attempt to exert power within the 
collaborative process because, through dynamics identified by Bachrach and Baratz (1962), 
effective participation in decisions and non-decisions prior to collaboration upheld the 
traditionally privileged position of industry. A lack of obvious conflict in the Thames-Sydenham 
case clearly does not indicate that Source Water Protection was uncontested, but rather suggests 
that influence was exerted out of the public eye and conflicts of interest remained invisible.  
Agenda definition in Alberta, in contrast to Ontario, occurred partially at the watershed 
scale.  Significant visible conflict and influence at this level reflected both a lack of facilitation, 
and significant resource imbalances among participants. The ability to mobilize resources is 
integral in determining who will prevail in contested settings (Clancy 2014a). In both provinces, 
resource industries possessed greater technical, financial and institutional capacity than other 
actors and were able to bring those resources to bear both inside and outside of collaborative 
processes. Both collaborative groups attempted to address barriers to participation by providing 
financial compensation for participants. However, equity with respect to technical and 
institutional resources, and the connections backing actors participating on behalf of industries or 
 108 
well-organized interests, cannot be (Clancy 2014a), and were not (Baird, et al. 2014; Hania 
2013), addressed at the watershed scale in either case.  
In Alberta, it was obvious that the unequal distribution of technical and institutional 
resources, and the lack of attention to this, prevented some actors from being able to effectively 
participate or defend their interests. This included the ability to engage in, or resist, both implicit 
and explicit attempts to control information. Exertion of power over information reflects 
contested views of the knowledge used to inform WPAC plans and documents, thus shaping 
public perceptions and eventual policies in the interests of those with greater capacity (Williams 
2012). Differences in capacity arose far less frequently in Ontario, despite the fact that capacity 
issues have been identified in other studies examining Source Water Protection (e.g., Baird, et al. 
2014; Hania 2013). This reflects the fact that issues with a significant impact on industry actors 
were defined out through problem pre-definition. In such situations, these issues are not subject to 
contestation within the process itself (Parkins 2010), as they were in Alberta. 
Major natural resource industries that are able to mobilize resources to influence at higher 
scales also have the ability to work outside of the process as collaborative groups develop and 
implement solutions. Consensus or collaboratively made decisions mean little if some actors are 
able to undermine the process by also either actively or passively exerting influence to shape 
ultimate outcomes (Emerson, et al. 2012; Pares 2011; Parkins 2010). Neither the Thames-
Sydenham Source Protection Committee nor the AWC have yet attempted to implement plans 
and it is thus too early to effectively assess if or how this is happening. However, Clare et al 
(2013) document attempts to build a Wetlands Policy in Alberta through collaboration and 
consensus that were undermined at the last minute by powerful energy sector interests through 
elite level connections. It is therefore prudent to consider this possibility for the collaborative 
processes examined in this study.  
4.5.2 Consequences of resource industry participation 
Industry did not need to participate in collaboration in either province. Despite this, their 
voluntary presence in both contexts indicates that they were able to identify benefits to 
participation that justify the expenditure of resources on collaboration. In the cases examined, 
collaboration represented an opportunity for resource industries to proactively defend their 
interests. It was a chance to build social license and legitimacy, and to influence information and 
knowledge (Gunningham 2009). Collaboration in both cases was thus viewed by industry largely 
as a public relations exercise, not, as collaborative theory would propose, as a credible 
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commitment to reexamine assumptions and share learning in pursuit of improved environmental 
outcomes (e.g., Innes and Booher 2003; Kallis, et al. 2009). 
According to power theory, the actions of a given actor will be more readily accepted if that 
actor occupies a position viewed as legitimate (Beetham 2013; Clegg 1989; Lukes 2005). The 
increasingly integral role of industries with respect to state functioning already means that the 
authority of industry is becoming more widely accepted, especially with respect to information 
production and self-regulation (Falkner 2012). The facilitation of industry participation in 
collaboration by government, and the actions taken by industry with respect to collaboration in 
the cases examined thus served to further increase the discursive power of industry. In Ontario, 
the relatively passive participation of industry in collaboration directly helped to establish 
legitimacy because it contributed to perception of industry as a community player (Austin and 
Seitanidi 2012) and a sense that industry was playing by the rules (Beetham 2009). In Alberta, 
legitimacy building efforts were not necessarily directed towards the Athabasca WPAC, where 
the process was contested and vitriolic, but instead toward broader company shareholders. This is 
reflected in comments made by an industry interviewee about the benefits his company receives 
from being able to use the AWC logo (AB5). In both cases, the effect is even greater influence 
over public perceptions and values, and enhancement of the ability of industry to pursue policy 
goals in contested settings. This is entirely antithetical to collaborative governance theory that 
emphasizes the emancipatory, equalizing effects of collaboration.  
Theory on collaboration often emphasizes potential benefits related to shared knowledge 
and learning (Ansell and Gash 2007; Innes and Booher 2003). Achieving these benefits requires 
that actors have the capacity to change their perspectives based on their evolving knowledge and 
understanding. When corporations send representatives to collaborative groups who are unable to 
concomitantly influence industry or group operations, as was the situation in both cases, many of 
the potential relationship building, shared learning and problem solving benefits of collaboration 
are lost.  
4.6 Conclusion 
Findings from both provinces indicated that resource industries were able to exert direct influence 
on government policy makers through existing elite level relationships and lobbying activities 
outside of the collaborative forum. Furthermore, they were able to do so in ways that were not 
necessarily available to environmental or civil actors. This runs directly counter to the power 
balancing ideals of collaborative theory (e.g., Ansell and Gash 2007). Industry privilege was 
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strengthened by the fact that the governments of both provinces operate from positions defined by 
obligations to ensure the profitability of industry, often at the expense of better environmental 
policies and outcomes (as per Falkner 2012). Findings indicated that collaboration did not address 
water issues in ways that industry viewed as significant or threatening to their operations. 
Collaboration is thus not changing the way that water policy decisions with potentially significant 
impacts for natural resource industries are made. 
In both Ontario and Alberta, there was no need for industry to participate in collaboration. 
Consistent with research that identifies the integral role of business and industry to the political 
economy of governments, the resource industries in question possessed structural power that 
allowed elite level access to policy makers, the mobilization of significant financial, technical and 
institutional resources, and some degree of control over information production and use relative 
to collaboration (as in Falkner 2012; Fuchs 2007; Williams 2012). Large, corporate resource 
industries are able to exert significant influence at scales from the local to global, including at the 
watershed and provincial scales examined in this study. While local civil and environmental 
actors are able to mobilize to exert influence at higher scales, these instances are the exception 
rather than the rule (Fuchs 2007) and did not appear prominently in the cases studied.  
Effective participation in collaboration for water governance, as here defined, depends upon 
a genuine commitment to the principles of mutual acceptance of problem definition, shared 
learning, and examination of assumptions that are presupposed by theory (Ansell and Gash 2007; 
Innes and Booher 2003; Kallis, et al. 2009). In processes where major corporate natural resource 
industries are active participants, it is unclear whose interests collaboration is serving. If the end 
goal of collaboration is better, more legitimate, social and environmental outcomes, then the 
pursuit of time and resource intensive collaborative processes that have little ability to influence 
the scale at which important decisions are made is problematic.  
Collaboration in situations of significant power imbalances has been identified as unlikely 
to succeed by other scholars (Holley, et al. 2012; Lubell and Lippert 2011). This study goes 
further to indicate that collaboration in such situations, in addition to failing to achieve better 
social and environmental outcomes than traditional command-and-control models, may also be 
exacerbating the very conditions they are designed to address. In the Athabasca River Watershed, 
where power imbalances are extreme and agenda definition did not define out powerful interests 
as it did in Ontario, it is unsurprising that the collaborative process has been marked by 
significant conflict. Collaboration in such circumstances should only be undertaken with a careful 
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eye toward the exercise of influence both within and external to the collaborative process, if it is 
undertaken at all. 
Using power theory to examine the impacts of natural resource industries on collaborative 
processes reveals a number of pathways and methods of influence that are not immediately 
visible because of their subversive nature. Some of these pathways only become visible when 
political and socioeconomic contexts are examined at provincial, federal or international scales. 
Others pathways require delving into the factors shaping cultural ideals and values. In most cases, 
power is more “powerful” when practiced in secret (Fuchs 2007). By engaging in power analyses, 
scholars are able to reveal power, expose it to scrutiny, and potentially lessen the degree to which 
privileged actors are able to dominate environmental policy making processes. 
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5 Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
Research findings have thus far been presented as a collection of individual research manuscripts. 
The goal of this chapter is to synthesize the overall significant, original contribution to knowledge 
made through this research. The study purpose and objectives are first reviewed. Salient findings 
from the previous three chapters are then presented and synthesized into a set of broad, 
overarching conclusions related to the involvement of natural resource industry firms in 
collaboration for water governance as assessed using a power-based approach. Significant, 
original, and interesting contributions to knowledge are then summarized. These are followed by 
findings and recommendations relevant to collaborative water governance participants and 
practitioners. The chapter concludes with a review of the limitations of the study and a proposal 
for potential areas of future research. 
5.1 Purpose and Objectives 
The purpose of this research was to critically examine the roles of the state and industry in 
collaborative water governance processes through a power lens. Research emphasized the ways in 
which interrelationships between these two key actors impact collaborative processes and 
outcomes, and the overall feasibility of using collaboration in water policy-making contexts 
where industry is a critical player. A systematic review was first used to establish the existence 
of, and map out, a gap in academic thought related to the application of theory on power to 
collaboration for water governance. Two empirical cases were then used to gain insights into the 
implications of resource industry firm involvement in collaboration through a power lens.  
The study pursued four specific objectives: 
1. To draw on existing literature to create a conceptual framework for examining power and 
its implications for collaborative approaches to water governance; 
2. To apply the framework developed in Objective One to determine the extent to which 
relationships of power are explicitly or implicitly identified and addressed in literature on 
collaborative approaches to water governance; 
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3. Building upon findings from Objective Two, to empirically examine the positions of the 
state and industry in Canada with respect to power in collaboration for water governance, 
and;  
4. To determine if, or under which conditions, as revealed by analysis grounded in power 
theory, collaborative approaches to governance for water can achieve desired social and 
environmental outcomes. 
5.2 Major Findings 
Findings from this research were presented in three interrelated manuscripts. Chapter Two 
examined the extent to which research on collaboration for water governance addresses and 
accounts for power and power related issues. Chapters Three and Four built directly upon 
findings from Chapter Two and used a power lens to guide empirical analysis of two comparative 
cases. Chapter Three addressed the nature and implications of state actions and decisions with 
respect to collaborative processes addressing issues of water governance that involve major 
natural resource industries. Chapter Four shifted focus to the natural resource industries 
themselves and the motivations and implications of their participation for both collaborative 
water governance processes and their outcomes. The remainder of this section briefly summarizes 
each chapter and highlights key findings. 
Chapter Two presented findings from a study that used a systematic review methodology 
(Petticrew and Roberts 2006) to examine literature on collaborative approaches to water 
governance (e.g., Fish, et al. 2010; Lubell and Lippert 2011; Pares 2011). The review applied the 
conceptual framework established in Chapter One to determine how, and to what extent, literature 
on collaborative approaches to water governance addressed issues of power. Power is particularly 
relevant to the study of collaborative approaches to water governance because theoretical 
constructions of collaboration rest upon the key assumption that collaborative actors will be able 
to participate with relative equity within processes (Ansell and Gash 2007; Barry 2011; 
Echeverria 2001; Gray 1989; Innes and Booher 2010; Koontz, et al. 2004; Margerum 2007; 
Memon and Weber 2010). Many of the espoused benefits of collaboration (e.g., representative 
outcomes, knowledge sharing, shared learning, etc.) depend on this presumed equity to emerge 
(Ansell and Gash 2007; Innes and Booher 2010; Memon and Weber 2010). Theory used to 
construct the conceptual framework that guided the systematic review was drawn from literature 
on power (e.g., Clegg 1989; Flyvbjerg 1998a; Foucault and Gordon 1980; Gaventa 2006; 
Haugaard and Clegg 2009; Lukes 2005), global governance (e.g., Cerny 2010; Falkner 2008; 
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Falkner 2012; Fuchs 2007; Levy and Newell 2005b; Newell 2012a), and political science and 
state theory (e.g., Brooks and Stritch 1991; Hessing, et al. 2005; Howlett and Ramesh 1995; 
Kraft and Kamieniecki 2007; Macdonald 2007; Wu, et al. 2010). Results revealed that while 
power-related concerns were commonly present in the literature analyzed through the systematic 
review, the majority of articles did not fully recognize or account for power beyond more visible 
and obvious expressions (e.g., Benson, et al. 2013; Dewulf, et al. 2011; Huffman 2009; 
Mandarano and Paulsen 2011; Parker, et al. 2009; Van Buuren, et al. 2012; Van Riper 2012; 
Weible 2011). As a result, many of the factors shaping collaborative processes and their 
outcomes remained unaccounted for.  
Those issues of power most frequently identified tended to reflect visible instrumental or 
structural faces of power (e.g., inclusion or exclusion of specific stakeholder groups, unequal 
capacities to participate, retention of decision-making power by the state). Hidden issues of 
structure and discourse (e.g., who was or was not favoured by the dominant discourse, control 
over information production and use) received comparatively little attention. Exceptions included 
scholarship addressing large, well-studied instances of collaboration (e.g., Gambert 2010; Pares 
2011; Shilling, et al. 2009), and traditionally marginalized communities (e.g., Memon and Kirk 
2012) There was frequent recognition that collaboration is fundamentally shaped by the 
socioeconomic and political conditions within which it is nested (e.g., Abers and Keck 2009; 
Benson, et al. 2013; Cutts, et al. 2010; Fish, et al. 2010; Hardy 2010; Lubell and Lippert 2011; 
Marshall, et al. 2010; Neef 2009; Robinson, et al. 2011), but attention to the specific ways that 
relationships of power manifest was rare. This is significant because the manifestation of these 
power issues has the potential to prevent collaborative processes from achieving desired 
outcomes.   
Many issues of hidden structure and discourse remain so because they reflect actions and 
decisions that take place at scales beyond the local or regional unit of analysis. Using power to 
analyze the factors affecting collaborative processes and their success thus revealed the necessity 
of examining both internal process characteristics, and the ways that external conditions and 
activities at different scales shape collaboration and its outcomes. Chapter Two thus established a 
need to examine collaboration through the lens of power to reveal a fuller picture of the factors 
shaping collaborative processes and outcomes.  This reflects specific calls in the literature to 
address the impact that power has on collaborative processes in literature on collaborative 
approaches to environmental governance (e.g., Ansell and Gash 2007; Blackstock, et al. 2012; 
Emerson, et al. 2012; Taylor and de Loë 2012), 
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The key contributions from Chapter Two were the identification of a gap largely related to 
the understanding and treatment of hidden power in literature on collaborative approaches to 
water governance, and initial work towards filling that gap. The identified gap has consequences 
for the potential achievement of desired social and environmental outcomes. Chapter Three was 
the first of two chapters to empirically address a gap related to the nature of these consequences 
through a cross case analysis of two instances of collaboration focusing on water governance: the 
Athabasca Watershed Council (AWC) in Alberta, Canada, and the Thames-Sydenham and 
Region Source Protection Committee in Ontario, Canada. Guided by the conceptual framework 
established in Chapter One and refined in Chapter Two, Chapter Three examined the role of the 
state in mediating outcomes from collaborative approaches to water governance defined by the 
presence of major natural resource industry firms. Governments often initiate and host 
collaborative processes, and play a role in implementation of outputs. Hence, they control many 
aspects of collaboration (Bidwell and Ryan 2006; Gunningham 2009; Hardy 2010; Koontz and 
Thomas 2006; Margerum 2007; Reed and Bruyneel 2010) and are thus important nodes for the 
study of power.  
  Analysis of the two cases revealed that provincial governments in Alberta and Ontario 
exerted significant control over collaborative outcomes, although they did so at different stages of 
the policy cycle, using different mechanisms, and through different forms of power. Both 
governments, to varying degrees, acted in response to cultural path dependency, institutional 
fragmentation, and significant pressures exerted by a dominant, capitalist socioeconomic system 
favouring the interests of economic actors over others. In Ontario, processes were tightly 
controlled from agenda setting, through deliberation, information production and use, to final 
approval of collaboratively developed Source Protection Plans. In Alberta, processes were not as 
strictly controlled, but outputs were also not integrated into provincial decision-making in a 
meaningful way. In both cases, state mechanisms of control have limited the ability of processes 
to achieve desired social and environmental outcomes. 
Using power theory to examine state actions and decisions with respect to collaboration in 
situations where major resource industry firms are participants revealed three significant 
implications for collaborative water governance scholarship. All three implications at least 
partially challenge the benefits proposed by many collaborative theorists. In concert with growing 
voices from the collaboration literature (e.g., Gunningham 2009; Koontz and Thomas 2006; 
Lubell and Lippert 2011; McClosky 2000; Newig and Fritsch 2009), they also question whether 
collaboration has the ability to produce improved environmental conditions.  
 116 
First, collaborative approaches to water governance that do not adequately account for 
power inequalities existing both within and outside of collaborative processes have the very real 
potential of providing the appearance of democratic participation while simultaneously acting to 
entrench existing power structures and reinforce the status quo (Fish, et al. 2010; Lubell and 
Lippert 2011; McClosky 2000; Pares 2011; Schmidt 2014). Second, the lack of ability to impact 
actions and decisions related to important political or economic issues has the potential to 
disempower actors. This occurs despite participation in processes intended to empower local 
action and participation (Lubell 2004a; Lubell and Lippert 2011; Shilling, et al. 2009). Finally, 
retention of state control over processes can prevent collaborative benefits such as shared 
knowledge and learning from either emerging, or being effectively integrated into policy 
decisions. While state control over final decisions is often required to fulfill legal and democratic 
obligations, this finding offers a nuanced challenge to the assertion by many collaborative 
scholars that state control is required for effective and successful collaborative processes (e.g., 
Fish, et al. 2010; Gunningham 2009; Holley, et al. 2012; Murray 2005). The finding suggests a 
need to more clearly analyze the influences on state actions and decisions in exercising that 
control in order to realize the proposed benefits of collaboration. 
Where Chapter Three identified the key finding that the state fundamentally shapes the 
nature, process and outcomes of collaboration through actions and decisions external to the 
collaborative process, Chapter Four shifted the analytical lens away from the state and delved 
more deeply into how the actions, motivations and decisions of a prominent set of influential 
actors, natural resource industry firms, impacted collaborative processes and outcomes. The goal 
of Chapter Four was to examine the implications of major resource industry firm participation on 
regional or watershed scale collaborative processes aimed at achieving improved social and 
environmental outcomes. This chapter also used empirical data from the Ontario and Alberta 
cases. 
Key findings from Chapter Four revealed that natural resource sector firms were able to 
mobilize significant resources to exert influence at institutional scales from the individual to the 
global, including at the collaborative group and provincial levels, in ways that are usually not 
available to other actors. Firms had multiple avenues of influence for achieving their policy goals 
outside of collaborative processes and viewed collaboration largely as a public relations exercise. 
This view contradicts the conditions for collaboration identified by other scholars with respect to 
a commitment to work interdependently to produce shared outcomes (e.g., Ansell and Gash 2007; 
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Blackstock, et al. 2012; Gray 1985; Koontz, et al. 2004). The collaborative process also provided 
firms with the opportunity to shape knowledge and information at the watershed scale. 
Collaboration, in both Alberta and Ontario, has done little to change the way that important 
decisions with respect to industry activities and water are being made. This finding directly 
addresses Objective Four, which sought to assess the potential of collaborative processes to 
achieve desired social and environmental outcomes relative to water. If water issues important to 
the objectives of collaborative groups cannot be addressed by those groups, regardless of the 
mechanisms through which this occurs, then collaborative processes are unlikely to achieve 
desired outcomes. Chapter Four also reinforced findings reported in Chapter Three that suggested 
that collaboration appears to be perpetuating the status quo with respect to the way that important 
decisions about water are being made, further entrenching hegemonic decision-making patterns.  
The power analysis in Chapter Four also revealed the importance of examining the exertion 
of influence at stages from problem definition through to implementation. The Ontario case 
revealed that an absence of visible in-process conflict did not necessarily represent an equitable or 
conflict free process. Processes that reach agreement are often viewed as “successful” processes 
(Connick and Innes 2003; Emerson, et al. 2009; Leach, et al. 2002). However, sites of conflict 
often occur out of the public eye and, despite having a significant impact on collaborative 
processes and outcomes, are only revealed by an examination of where and how influence is 
exerted. Thus, a major finding from this research is that imbalances in power were not, and 
cannot be, addressed at the watershed scale. Collaborative processes must be studied and 
designed with an understanding that power and influence exerted external to processes 
profoundly shapes both the processes themselves, and their outcomes. 
5.3  Contributions 
5.3.1 Academic Contributions 
This study responds to two significant research questions noted in the academic literature. It first 
addresses growing criticism from literature on collaborative approaches to environmental 
governance that collaboration is not necessarily returning expected improved social and 
environmental outcomes (e.g., Gunningham 2009; Koontz and Thomas 2006; Lubell and Lippert 
2011; McClosky 2000; Newig and Fritsch 2009). In pursuit of the four identified study 
objectives, research examined the factors affecting the achievement of desired outcomes using a 
power theory-based approach, and the influence of those factors on achieving desired outcomes. 
The study also responds to comments that power represents an understudied area with respect to 
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collaboration (Frame, et al. 2004; Gunningham 2009; Taylor and de Loë 2012) despite broad 
acknowledgement that power strongly influences processes (e.g., Ansell and Gash 2007; 
Blackstock, et al. 2012; Emerson, et al. 2012). 
Research was guided by a theoretical framework that integrated insights from literature on 
collaborative environmental governance (e.g., Ansell and Gash 2007; Connick and Innes 2003; 
Emerson, et al. 2012; Holley, et al. 2012; Innes and Booher 2010; Margerum 2007; Margerum 
and Robinson 2015; Memon and Weber 2010; Sabatier et al. 2005), global governance (e.g., 
Cerny 2010; Falkner 2008; Falkner 2012; Fuchs 2007; Levy and Newell 2005; Newell 2012), 
state theory (e.g., Brooks and Stritch 1991; Hessing, et al. 2005; Howlett and Ramesh 1995; 
Kraft and Kamieniecki 2007; Macdonald 2007; Wu, et al. 2010), and power (e.g., Clegg 1989; 
Flyvbjerg 1998; Foucault and Gordon 1980; Gaventa 2006; Haugaard and Clegg 2009; Lukes 
2005). Findings from the systematic review and the case studies will be relevant to literature on 
collaborative approaches to water governance (e.g., Innes, et al. 2007; Koontz and Newig 2014; 
Margerum and Robinson 2015; Memon and Kirk 2012; Sabatier et al. 2005) and collaborative 
approaches to environmental governance (e.g., Emerson, et al. 2012; Gerlak and Heikkila 2011; 
Holley, et al. 2012; Innes and Booher 2010; Newig and Fritsch 2009). Findings specific to 
industry firm involvement in collaborative water governance processes may also be of use to 
researchers studying corporate social responsibility (e.g., Auld, et al. 2008; Pearce II and Doh 
2005) and business and environmental policy (Kraft and Kamieniecki 2007; Macdonald 2007; 
Newell 2012a). 
Five significant contributions to the literature can be identified. First, a potential gap related 
to the application of power theory to theory on collaboration for water governance was confirmed 
and characterized through the application of the conceptual framework to literature on 
collaborative approaches to water governance through a systematic review. The review 
established that, while many researchers are aware that power is an important variable (Ansell 
and Gash 2007; Blackstock, et al. 2012; Cutts, et al. 2010; Emerson, et al. 2012; Innes and 
Booher 2010), the majority of that literature does not fully account for power beyond that which 
is easily visible and is exercised at the watershed scale (e.g., Benson, et al. 2013; Dewulf, et al. 
2011; Huffman 2009; Mandarano and Paulsen 2011; Parker, et al. 2009; Van Buuren, et al. 2012; 
Van Riper 2012; Weible 2011). Notable exceptions include Pares (2011), Gambert (2010), 
Memon and Kirk (2012), and Shilling et al. (2009). At the same time, many researchers, without 
necessarily identifying power, have called for studies that examine the influence of external 
contexts and institutional frameworks on collaborative processes (e.g., Abers and Keck 2009; 
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Benson, et al. 2013; Cutts, et al. 2010; Emerson, et al. 2012; Fish, et al. 2010; Hardy 2010; 
Lubell and Lippert 2011; Marshall, et al. 2010; Neef 2009; Robinson, et al. 2011). The 
framework itself makes clear that power has potentially far-reaching and significant impacts on 
collaboration for water governance, beyond those that are normally observed (e.g., control over 
discourse, control over the information used). The review findings and proposed power proxies 
represent a starting point for a more systemic approach to the study of collaboration that accounts 
for power and the tangible effects it has across scales. Findings advance scholarship such that it is 
no longer sufficient to view power as an external condition that can be superficially identified or 
ignored. Instead, power must be accounted for in the study of collaborative approaches to water 
governance because of its fundamental impact on outcomes. There is some literature examining 
collaboration in environmental governance fields beyond water that does address power (e.g., 
Parkins 2010; Takeda and Ropke 2010). This work could be of use in furthering the application 
of power theory to research on collaborative approaches to water governance.  
In order to empirically examine the issues of power identified in Chapter Two, examples of 
collaboration were sought that were characterized by significant and extreme imbalances in 
capacity, influence and power. For this reason power relative to collaboration was examined in 
the context of the involvement of major natural resource industry firms. The second major 
contribution is this empirical characterization of the ways that power is being exerted relative to 
collaborative governance processes addressing water by both state and influential industrial 
actors. While collaborative researchers have identified and, in some cases, addressed, a number of 
the individual power issues that the conceptual framework predicted would shape collaborative 
processes and outcomes, this study organized and linked these individual concerns through the 
conceptual framework. Issues such as exclusion (Borisova, et al. 2012; Judkins and Larson 
2010), retention of state control (Holley, et al. 2012; Koontz, et al. 2004), and the ability of actors 
to exert influence at different scales (Emerson, et al. 2012; Gambert 2010) are often examined in 
relative isolation. Study findings make clear that examining these issues as interdependent can 
provide a clearer picture of the potential for a given collaborative process to generate desired 
social and environmental outcomes.  
A third contribution is the finding that collaboration for water governance is fundamentally 
shaped by power exerted outside of collaborative processes, significantly at the agenda setting 
and implementation stages. This represents an initial attempt to fill a gap in theory, the existence 
of which was confirmed in Chapter Two, related to the examination of power in collaborative 
approaches to water governance. This finding also presents a challenge to those scholars who 
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emphasize the necessity of state control for effective and successful collaborative processes (e.g., 
Fish, et al. 2010; Gunningham 2009; Holley, et al. 2012; Murray 2005). While ultimate state 
control is often legally required and can be one of the most effective ways to regulate industry, 
the study identified a number of potential ways that states mediate power that can negatively 
affect the ability of processes to produced desired social and environmental outcomes. Revealing 
the existence and strength of these power relationships (e.g., elite level access, control over 
agenda setting, privileging of economic interests) can enable a better assessment of the types of 
collaborative outcomes that can feasibly be accomplished through collaboration. 
This leads to a fourth contribution, a stronger rationale for the incorporation of power into 
scholarship on collaborative approaches to water governance, and broader environmental 
governance. Despite the fact that much research on collaborative approaches to water governance 
identifies power as fundamental to collaborative processes (e.g., Blackstock, et al. 2012; Innes 
and Booher 2010; Lubell and Lippert 2011; Taylor and de Loë 2012), it has not yet been 
explicitly characterized. Empirically examining collaborative processes through a power lens, it 
became obvious that a wide range of factors that shape collaborative processes and outcomes are 
often not accounted for including, for example, the positioning of the state with respect to 
collaboration as a function of broad socioeconomic pressures, the availability of multiple avenues 
of influence for powerful actors, and the shaping of collaborative agendas through closed problem 
definition processes.   
Finally, the study provided insights into the motivations of industry firms with respect to 
collaboration for water governance through analysis of the nature of their participation. 
Motivations and characterizations with respect to the behavior of industry on environmental 
issues have been extensively studied in a number of disciplines (e.g. Falkner 2008; Fuchs 2007; 
Gunningham, et al. 2003; Hessing, et al. 2005; Levy and Newell 2005b; Macdonald 2007; 
Parsons and Moffat 2014). However, with a few exceptions (e.g., Gunningham 2009; Holley, et 
al. 2012; Parkins 2010), this area has remained understudied with respect to collaboration for 
water or environmental governance. Findings revealed that, in the presence of multiple avenues 
of influence external to collaborative processes, industry participation represented a desire to 
build relationships and legitimacy, influence knowledge and opinions, and gather information. 
Given that collaboration presupposes that participation indicates at least some level of 
commitment to “two-way communication and influence between agencies and stakeholders” 
(Ansell and Gash 2007:546; Blackstock, et al. 2012; Koontz, et al. 2004), the motivations of 
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these influential actors have the potential to significantly shape the ability of collaboration to 
achieve desired outcomes. 
5.3.2 Recommendations for Practice 
Collaborative approaches to water governance are widely used around the globe in situations 
where major natural resource industry firms are active. Within the provincial contexts studied in 
this doctoral research, a number of other watersheds are characterized by the presence of 
significant industries (e.g., Bow River Basin Council 2015; Lake Erie Source Protection 
Committee 2015; North Saskatchewan Watershed Alliance 2015; Trent Conservation Coalition 
Source Protection Committee 2015). Across Canada more broadly, resource industry firms are 
also active in sites of collaborative governance in British Columbia (Frame, et al. 2004; von der 
Porten and de Loë 2013a), New Brunswick (van Tol Smit, et al. 2015) and the territories (de Loë 
and Morris 2014). In Australia, national water policy strategies guide water planning through 
watershed-based collaborative groups, including in regions where industries are active 
(Gunningham 2009; Holley, et al. 2012). Collaborative processes are also common in the United 
States, Mexico and Europe (e.g., Gambert 2010; Judkins and Larson 2010; Pares 2011; Sabatier 
et al. 2005). The study generated a number of recommendations for those designing, hosting or 
participating in collaborative approaches to water governance in contexts where resource industry 
firms are active. They are particularly relevant for government actors but will also be useful for 
those in other sectors. These recommendations are directly derived from empirical findings 
1. Be aware of the visible and invisible ways that power can manifest in collaboration, 
especially in situations where power imbalances are significant. 
Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 provides a useful starting point for identifying tangible ways that power 
can affect collaborative approaches to water governance. Many best practices in collaboration 
already reflect acknowledgement of concerns related to the visible exertion of power. For 
example, facilitation is a common process characteristics used to address issues of 
misinformation, manipulation, coercion, and co-optation (Ansell and Gash 2007; Parkins and 
Mitchell 2005). However, collaboration is more likely to achieve desired social and 
environmental outcomes if practitioners address all aspects of power, including those that are 
hidden or occur at scales that transcend the watershed level. Recently, there have been calls for 
more investigation into the impact of the political and socioeconomic conditions within which 
collaboration is situated (Emerson, et al. 2012; Koontz and Newig 2014). As the findings of 
Chapters 3 and 4 make clear, these conditions, and the ways they shape and mediate the exercise 
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of power, have profound impacts on collaboration. As such, practitioners who delve into issues of 
power in a critically reflexive manner have the potential to design more effective collaborative 
processes. These issues include, but are not limited to, control over and production of knowledge; 
privileging of specific views by dominant discourses; influence over agenda setting and 
implementation (to be discussed in more detail below); government constraints due to economic 
or other obligations; and patterns of access to important decision-makers. When power 
imbalances are significant, care should be taken to ensure that collaboration does not disempower 
populations, exacerbate conflict (Barry 2011) or reinforce existing unequal power structures 
(Fish, et al. 2010).  
2. Pay careful attention to how agenda setting, problem definition and implementation are 
conducted, and what interests are favoured in this processes.  
Agenda setting and problem definition are contestable social processes shaped by the preferences 
of those with control over this stage of the policy cycle (Hessing, et al. 2005; Howlett and 
Ramesh 1995; Torgerson 2005a). The way problems are defined will bound the range of 
solutions possible for a given problem (Torgerson 2005b). If collaboration occurs after a policy 
agenda is set, as was the case in Ontario, the problem in question may already have been framed 
according to a specific bias (Bingham, et al. 2005; Howlett and Ramesh 1995). In this way, other 
interests or perspectives may be denied access to decision making, even when deliberative 
processes are used, because those interests will not necessarily have a legitimate stake in the issue 
as it has been defined (Freudenburg 2005).   
In order to account for power exercised at this stage in the policy cycle, those setting up 
collaborative processes have two main options. The first, and the preferred method, is to 
collaboratively set the agenda. Empirical research has shown that collective agreement on 
problem definition enables effective collaboration (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Koontz, et al. 
2004; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). In general, if this phase is broadly accessible and run with 
attention to power, there is a greater likelihood that the eventual agenda will better reflect the 
diverse perspectives and emergent understanding expected of collaboration. However, 
collaborative agenda setting is time consuming and can be undesirable to participants who would 
rather devote time to addressing an identified problem instead of debating what the problem is 
(Frame, et al. 2004). It can also result in problem definitions that are either politically 
uncomfortable or ineffective if, for instance, they contradict government priorities, or if decisions 
do not yield robust environmental protections (Koontz, et al. 2004; McClosky 2000). Finally, 
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collaborative agenda setting may also be difficult for states grounded in command and control 
culture, or for those bodies constrained by limits on time or resources. 
In situations where collaborative agenda setting is currently viewed as unfeasible, the next 
best option is based on increasing openness and transparency at the agenda setting stage. Those 
designing processes can acknowledge influences on agenda setting and reflect upon what interests 
are favoured by proposed problem framings, which interests are defined in or out of processes, 
and why. For instance, problem framing in Ontario limited attention to municipal source water 
protection, effectively defining out many water problems caused by industry. Consultation and 
public participation, even if it is not collaborative, will be useful in this regard.   
3. Collaboration that does not account for power can disempower some actors 
Results from Chapters Three and Four indicate that implementation that does not respect the time 
and effort put in to collaborative processes has the potential to actually disempower actors and 
destroy trust. States proposing and promoting collaboration but maintaining tight control over 
implementation need to be aware of, and responsive to, this potential. Respecting the 
collaborative process in implementation may require closing back doors into policy decisions that 
are normally available to more influential actors. This has the potential to be politically 
uncomfortable but is also necessary. Transparency and openness at this stage are once again key 
to achieving effective socially and environmentally beneficial outcomes. 
4. Ensuring effective collaboration may require mandated participation with binding outcomes 
Findings in Chapter Four revealed that the voluntary nature of the process made it possible for 
major resource industry firms to superficially participate in collaboration without committing to 
the outcomes. This is a somewhat predictable outcome since the industries in question have a 
number of other policy influence venues that are more effective than the collaborative process (as 
per Ansell and Gash 2007). The voluntary nature of collaboration has two significant implications 
with respect to resource industry firm participation. First, theory on collaborative governance 
highlights transformative potential when participants are open to reexamining their positions and 
values based on new information and emergent learning (Fish, et al. 2010; Kallis, et al. 2009). If 
firms are able to send representatives who do not have decision-making power, any 
transformative or emergent learning that occurs is unlikely to translate into company-wide actions 
and decisions. Second, firms in these situations are able to reap benefits related to the 
maintenance of their social license, opportunities to influence knowledge, and the collection of 
information without necessarily incurring any costs with respect to improved environmental 
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performance. Mandated participation, either alone or in combination with binding outcomes, 
would ensure that those individuals with the power to make decisions are at the table and 
authentically participating in collaborative decisions (Gunningham 2009).  
5. Collaboration may not be appropriate in all situations 
Collaboration is not appropriate in all situations (Innes and Booher 2010; von der Porten and de 
Loë 2013a). Under conditions of extreme power imbalance, collaboration is unlikely to succeed 
in producing better, more implementable social and environmental outcomes (Gunningham 
2009). Extreme power imbalances are more likely in situations where differences in capacity are 
significant, where non-institutionalized interests are dispersed and unorganized (Ansell and Gash 
2007; Buanes, et al. 2004), and where governments themselves are likely to favour some interests 
over others. These conditions are more likely in places where major natural resource industry 
firms are involved. Under such conditions, the use of strong, well-enforced government 
regulations may be more effective in achieving improved environmental outcomes.    
6. A committed, long-term investment in collaboration may have the potential to slowly create 
the conditions for improved environmental conditions. 
Results also supported the position that collaboration has the potential to change environmental 
conditions over the long term. Findings from both cases supported the view that long-term 
relationship and awareness building through collaboration have the potential to shift the priorities 
of society. Interestingly, hope for substantial change was not viewed as achievable through the 
collaborative process itself, but rather through shifts in voter preferences leading to changes in 
traditional electoral systems. Given that many government decisions in Canada correspond to 
four year electoral cycles, long term planning is often challenging (Harrison 1996; Howlett 
2009). Current investment in highly normative processes such as collaboration indicates that there 
is some appetite for a more normative approach to environmental policy making, despite the fact 
that many collaborative processes are undertaken for largely instrumental reasons (Emerson, et al. 
2012). As such, continued use of collaboration under appropriate conditions, preferably with a 
better accounting of power, is recommended as a strategy for long term, lasting change. 
5.4 Study Limitations and Ideas for Future Research 
This study was grounded in an interpretation of power based on Lukes. The three dimensions of 
power used by Lukes (2005), commonly applied in contexts related to environmental issues and 
business interactions (Falkner 2008; Falkner 2012; Fuchs 2007; Macdonald 2007; Parkins 2010; 
Takeda and Ropke 2010; Zeitoun and Allan 2008), represent one conceptualization of power 
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within a vast and contested literature (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Haugaard 2002; Haugaard and 
Clegg 2009). Many other forms and frameworks of power have been developed beyond the 
instrumental, structural and discursive dimensions identified here. These other interpretations 
have the potential to expand upon the findings presented above. For example, examining power 
as legitimacy, as per Arendt (1970) or Parsons (1963) could generate insights that are not 
revealed through an examination of power as domination. At the same time, approaching power 
as legitimacy could miss some of the insights that were captured by the domination view of 
power used in this thesis. There is also still significant work to be done examining power using 
Lukes’ (2005) ideas in the context of collaborative approaches to water governance. The 
systematic review and empirical cases presented in this dissertation have provided a start in this 
direction.  
Efforts were made throughout the data collection process to engage with First Nations and 
Métis actors. This reflected an attempt to incorporate perspectives with which I have limited first 
hand experience. In the Athabasca basin, conflict within the AWC resulted in a reluctance of First 
Nations actors to participate in the study. First Nations and Métis groups who had chosen not to 
participate in the AWC from its inception were also contacted and also declined interviews. In 
Ontario, three First Nations members sit on the Thames-Sydenham and Region Source Protection 
Committee; none responded to interview requests. As a result, this thesis is missing their very 
important perspective. While not a replacement for First Nations and Métis participation in this 
study, work by my colleague, Sue von der Porten, extensively addresses issues relating to First 
Nations actors and collaboration for water governance in Canada (von der Porten and de Loë 
2013a; von der Porten and de Loë 2013b; von der Porten and de Loë 2014). 
Several interesting issues were raised throughout the study process that were beyond the 
scope of the manuscripts presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Collaborative agenda setting has been 
proposed as a potential strategy to balance power more effectively within collaborative processes 
(Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Koontz, et al. 2004; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000), and is 
recommended above. However, other studies have found that participants are not necessarily 
interested in spending the time or resources necessary to undertake this process (e.g., Frame, et al. 
2004). Further investigation into collaborative agenda setting would be helpful in determining the 
feasibility of strategies to address power within collaborative approaches to water governance.  
Almost all interviewees in Alberta noted that the voluntary and non-regulatory nature of 
collaborative process goals defined by Water For Life affected the impact of the process and the 
types of people and interests that were involved, especially with respect to resource industry 
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firms. The question of voluntary versus forced collaboration has also been raised by others (e.g., 
O'Leary and Bingham 2009). Examining which factors are required to attract industrial firm 
representatives with the authority to actually change industry operations has the potential to 
improve collaborative processes and their outcomes. The study also revealed significant 
differences in motivation and behavior between industry representatives from publically traded 
companies and from majority privately owned companies. Investigating the impact of these 
company characteristics on collaboration will also help determine the potential for collaboration 
to influence industry operations.    
Government interviewees in Alberta occasionally made reference to the need for the 
Province of Alberta to maintain its social license to operate. This is a term generally applied to 
business or industrial interests and their need to maintain the support of communities or 
populations affecting their capacity to operate (Parsons and Moffat 2014). Without a more 
thorough review of the literature, it is not possible to determine if the perception that states need 
to hold and maintain a social license to operate is a gap to be addressed, but it is an interesting 
question with respect to democratic theory. Under democratic systems, governments tend to be 
viewed as legitimate by virtue of the fact that they have been elected (McClosky 2000). The 
perception that the Province of Alberta needs to maintain a social license could indicate that the 
democratic electoral system in that province is not producing a government that effectively 
responds to the interests of its population. Further investigation would be interesting.   
Finally, the membership of the Thames-Sydenham and Region Source Protection 
Committee was almost entirely male. At the time of publication, 20 of the 21 sector 
representatives, and the committee chair, were male. Of the three non-voting First Nations 
representatives, one was female. Of the 11 Committee members interviewed, ten were male. The 
one female committee member interviewed had left the committee several years prior. While 
other Source Protection Committees within Ontario have more balanced representation, the role 
of gender in shaping collaborative group processes and outcomes has the potential to present 
interesting findings with respect to collaborative environmental governance. This issue was well 
beyond the scope of this study because of the focus on industry involvement in collaborative 
approaches to water governance, but seems worthy of further investigation. The Thames-
Sydenham and Region Source Protection Committee presents a prime case for investigation. 
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5.5 Research Reflections 
5.5.1 Reflections on Transdisciplinarity 
This is a thesis that owes its existence to transdisciplinarity for a number of reasons. First, my 
background as a hydrologist and ecosystem scientist prevented my acceptance in many of the 
departments that house individuals with expertise in governance, water and power. The approach 
adopted by the Department of Environment and Resource Studies both allowed me access to 
these experts, and valued the knowledge I brought with me to the program. I can’t claim that 
learning an entirely new intellectual language, research format and epistemological approach was 
painless but it was ultimately rewarding and it is an experience for which I am grateful.  
Second, my theoretical framework represents an amalgamation of theories and thinking that 
fit with my research questions. They are not bound by discipline. This was both liberating and 
occasionally problematic, as when I found myself searching for examples of scholarly precedence 
for which very little could be found (e.g., collaborative environmental governance scholars 
explicitly using neopluralist theory). However, this enabled me to make use of the frameworks 
and knowledge that were most relevant to my work and ultimately produced a thesis that better 
represents the way I view the world.  
Finally, transdisciplinarity is an approach that emphasizes critical consciousness, dialogue, 
and the transformation of social and political structures (Hirsch Hadorn, et al. 2006). While this 
thesis does not necessarily wholly fulfill those functions (an issue addressed below), it does 
identify and address their importance throughout. As the transdisciplinary doctoral program, and 
both institutional support and comfort with its implications, evolves, I do think that future theses 
in Environment and Resource Studies at the University of Waterloo will do a better job of being 
truly trandisciplinary than those of us at the vanguard.   
5.5.2 Personal Reflections 
I began this doctoral process thinking that the privileging of economic interests in environmental 
policy making could not possibly be as bad as I thought. I had witnessed significant injustices in 
other countries but for inexplicable reasons still believed that my home country and province 
were somehow immune. This, combined with the belief that all humans, regardless of position or 
political status, are able to relate to each other on some level, inspired me to investigate the 
potential of collaboration to address environmental problems. In the end, I’ve discovered that 
economic privileging is often just as bad, if not worse, than I thought
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examined. In conversations with academics, elders and peers, I’ve learned that this knowledge 
should not be surprising but that has still not made the realization any less jarring.  
The cases selected purposefully represented some of the largest and most powerful 
economic interests in Canada. They were excellent examples of exacerbated power imbalances. 
At the same time, their nature meant that there was scant evidence of collaboration actually 
functioning effectively. It may thus be somewhat counter-intuitive that my findings have not 
wholly discouraged me with respect to the potential of collaboration. Dialogue, readings and 
conversations in the field have convinced me that the type of community building that 
collaboration represents, when power and contextual factors are effectively recognized and 
accounted for, does have the ability to create better social and environmental outcomes in the 
long term. Whether or not provincial governments are able to design collaborative processes that 
effectively recognize and account for power is still a question to be explored. I am more hopeful 
for the potential of collaboration at the community scale.     
Finally, after a substantial commitment to the study of water at the graduate level, this 
research has led me to realize that the issues that manifest in water governance are rarely issues 
inherent to water itself. It has become increasingly clear that the structural privileging of powerful 
economic interests is at the heart of the vast majority of current environmental and social issues. 
It has only been through a great deal of experiential and academic learning that I have been able 
to clearly recognize prevailing hegemonic norms and societal myths as the product of profoundly 
unfair global power structures instead of as universal truths. While recognizing power in the 
world is a useful precursor to creating change, I have often been concerned throughout the 
doctoral process that my work is critical at the expense of being productive. Moving forward, I 
find myself less drawn to addressing individual environmental issues from theoretical 
perspectives. I am instead motivated to work to disaggregate entrenched power centres, either 
through research or practice, in ways that are empowering, socially productive and action-based.  
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Appendix 2 
Semi-structured interview guide 
Do you represent a group, organization or interest in the collaborative process? 
 
Follow up: 
What is your role in the group, organization of interest that you represent? 
 
What are [your goals/the goals of your organization] when participating in collaboration? 
 
Follow up:  
Do you think you are influencing policy? 
Where and to whom do you go when you want to influence policy? 
 
Are there any issues that you felt were not appropriate to bring forward in the collaborative 
process? 
 
Follow up: 
If so, how do you address those issues? 
 
Did you feel like everything was ‘on the table’ or were there some issues that were already 
decided or off limits? 
 
Follow up: 
Why do you think they were off limits? Who decided them? 
Do you feel that the parameters set out in the set up/legislation restricted what you would have 
liked to talk about? 
 
How would you characterize the participation of different stakeholders in the process? 
 
Follow up: 
Did you feel that everyone was able to participate equally? 
Can you explain why this occurred? 
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Were there people who were excluded? 
 
(for state actors) How was the collaborative output used? 
 
Given the study objectives, is there anything I haven’t asked that you think I should know? 
 
In light of the study objectives, can you identify other individuals I should interview? 
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Appendix 3 
List of Documents Analyzed 
Alberta Documents 
Number Name Date Source 
1 Water Act 1991 
Government of 
Alberta 
2 Water For Life 2003 Alberta Environment 
3 Enabling Partnerships 2005 Alberta Environment 
4 Water For Life: A Renewal 2008 
Government of 
Alberta 
5 
Water For Life: Action Plan 
 2009 
Government of 
Alberta 
6 
Review of Value and Funding Options for 
Airshed Zones and Watershed Planning and 
Advisory Councils to Support Cumulative 
Effects Management 2011 
Urban Systems and 
University of Alberta 
School of Business 
7 
AB Federation of Labour letter to Merwan 
Saher, Auditor General of Alberta 2011 
Alberta Federation of 
Labour 
8 
Consistency and accountability in implementing 
watershed plans in Alberta 2009 
Unger 2009 for the 
Environmental Law 
Centre 
9 2014-2017 Business Plan 2014 
Alberta Innovates - 
Energy and 
Environment Solutions 
10 
Alberta Watershed Council Member terms of 
reference 2013 
Alberta Watershed 
Council 
11 Lower Athabasca Regional Plan 2012 
Government of 
Alberta 
12 
Alberta provincial case study: analysis of water 
strategies for the prairie watershed region 2005 
International Institute 
for Sustainable 
Development 
13 Response to interviewee email of Sept 5, 2014 2014 
[name withheld due to 
ethics requirements] 
14 
Running out of steam? Oils sands development 
and water use in the Athabasca river watershed: 
science and market based solutions 2007 
Munk Centre and 
University of Alberta 
15 Strengthening Partnerships 2008 Alberta Water Council 
16 What We Heard 2008 Alberta Water Council 
17 Suncor Report on Sustainability Summary 2014 2014 Suncor Energy 
18 Suncor Firebag 2010 ECRB Performance 2010 Suncor Energy 
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Presentation Commercial Scheme Approval No. 
8870 
19 
Alberta Watershed Council Motion 1 September 
2014 2014 
[name withheld for 
confidentiality] 
20 Alberta Watershed Council Motion 2 2014 
[name withheld for 
confidentiality] 
21 
Diana McQueen, Minister of Environment, 
Letter to North Saskatchewan Watershed 
Alliance 2012 
Alberta Environment 
and Sustainable 
Resource 
Development 
22 
Integrated Watershed Management Plan - Letter 
to North Saskatchewan Watershed Alliance 2012 
Alberta Environment 
and Sustainable 
Resource 
Development 
23 
Government of Alberta review of the IWMP - 
Letter to North Saskatchewan Watershed 
Alliance 2013 
Alberta Environment 
and Sustainable 
Resource 
Development 
24 Athabasca Watershed Council 2014 
Alberta Watershed 
Council Website 
25 
Atlas of the North Saskatchewan River 
Watershed in Alberta 2012 
North Saskatchewan 
Watershed Alliance 
26 
Integrated Watershed Management Plan for the 
North Saskatchewan River in Alberta 2012 
North Saskatchewan 
Watershed Alliance 
27 Vermilion River Watershed Management Plan 2012 
North Saskatchewan 
Watershed Alliance 
28 Annual Report 2012-2013 2013 
Alberta Watershed 
Council 
29 Annual Report 2011-2012 2012 
Alberta Watershed 
Council 
30 Annual Report 2010-2011 2011 
Alberta Watershed 
Council 
31 
Traditional knowledge overview for the 
Athabasca River Watershed 2011 Brenda Parlee 
32 State of the Watershed Report: Phase 1 2011 Hatfield Consultants 
33 State of the Athabasca Watershed 2008 2008 
Keepers of the 
Athabasca/Canadian 
Parks and Wilderness 
Society Northern 
Alberta 
34 Suncor Report on Sustainability Summary 2009 2009 Suncor Energy 
35 Suncor Report on Sustainability Summary 2010 2010 Suncor Energy 
36 Suncor Report on Sustainability Summary 2011 2011 Suncor Energy 
37 Suncor Report on Sustainability Summary 2012 2012 Suncor Energy 
38 Suncor Report on Sustainability Summary 2013 2013 Suncor Energy 
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39 
Carbon Disclosure Project Request for 
Information 2011 Suncor Energy 
40 
Carbon Disclosure Project Request for 
Information 2012 Suncor Energy 
41 
Carbon Disclosure Project Request for 
Information 2013 Suncor Energy 
42 
Boreal Forest Conservation Framework 2009 
Annual Action Plan 2009 Suncor Energy 
43 
Alberta Newsprint Company EnviroVista 
Progress Report 2014 
Alberta Newsprint 
Company 
44 
Alberta Newsprint Company EnviroVista 
Progress Report 2013 
Alberta Newsprint 
Company 
45 ANC Whitecourt Star Ad 
Augus
t 14, 
2013 
Whitecourt Star 
Online - p13 
46 
Alberta Newsprint Company EnviroVista 
Progress Report 2012 
Alberta Newsprint 
Company 
47 
Alberta Newsprint Company EnviroVista 
Progress Report 2010 
Alberta Newsprint 
Company 
48 Alberta's Forest Sector Water CEP Plan 2011 
Alberta Forest 
Products Association 
49 Handbook for State of the Watershed Reporting 2008 Alberta Environment 
50 
Recommendations for a Watershed Management 
Planning Framework for Alberta 2008 Alberta Water Council 
51 
Report of the Auditor General of Alberta 
October 2014 2014 
Office of the Auditor 
General of Alberta 
52 
Athabasca State of the Watershed Report: Phase 
2 2012 
Fiera Biological 
Consulting 
53 Interactive Atlas n.d. Athabasca University 
6  
Ontario Documents: 
Number Name Date Source 
101 
Technical Rules: Assessment Report, Clean 
Water Act 2006 2009 
Government of 
Ontario 
102 
Protecting Ontario's Drinking Water: Toward a 
Watershed-based Source Protection Planning 
Framework 2003 
Advisory Committee 
on Watershed-based 
Source Protection 
Planning 
103 
Reconciling our Priorities: Annual Report 2006-
2007 2007 
Environment 
Commissioner of 
Ontario 
104 
Submission in Response to Source Protection 
Reports by the Implementation Committee and 2005 
Canadian 
Environmental Law 
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the Technical Experts Committee Association 
105 Clean Water Act 2006 
Government of 
Ontario 
106 
Policy decision notice update: administrative 
changes to the technical rules 2008 
Ministry of the 
Environment 
107 
Summary Report: Consultation Sessions on the 
White Paper on Watershed-based Source 
Protection Planning 2004 
Government of 
Ontario 
108 The Clean Water Act: A Plain Language Guide 2007 
Ministry of 
Environment 
109 
Official Report of Debates, August 24, 2006, 
Clean Water Act 2006 
Standing Committee 
on Social Policy 
110 
Threats related to on-site sewage (septic) 
systems 2011 
Ministry of 
Environment 
111 
Official Report of Debates, August 21, 2006, 
Clean Water Act 2006 
Standing Committee 
on Social Policy 
112 Draft Drinking Water Source Protection Act 2004 
Ministry of 
Environment 
113 
Watershed-based Source Protection: 
Implementation Committee Report to the 
Minister of the Environment 2004 
Implementation 
Committee 
114 A Threats Assessment Framework 2004 
Technical Experts 
Committee 
115 
White Paper on Watershed-based Source 
Protection Planning 2004 
Ministry of 
Environment 
116 
Ministry of Environment Liaison Officer 
Program Update 2009 
Ministry of 
Environment 
117 
Memorandum: Local municipalities receive 
funding from the Ministry of the Environment's 
Source Protection Implementation Fund 2013 York Region 
118 Guide to proposed terms of reference 2009 
Thames-Sydenham 
and Region Source 
Protection Committee 
119 
Preliminary identification of data and knowledge 
gaps, and research needs 2006 
Watershed Science 
Centre 
120 Thames-Sydenham and Region 2014 
Thames-Sydenham 
and Region Source 
Protection Region 
Website 
121 
Thames Sydenham and Region Source 
Protection Committee Mission Statement and 
Guiding Principles 2008 
Thames Sydenham 
and Region Source 
Protection Committee 
Website 
122 
Environmental Compliance in the Petrochemical 
Area in the Sarnia Area 2005 
Ministry of 
Environment 
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123 Report on Spills in the Great Lakes Basin 2006 
International Joint 
Commission 
124 
Sarnia-Lambton Environmental Association 
Website 
Access
ed 
2014 
Sarnia-Lambton 
Environmental 
Association 
125 
Sarnia-Lambton Environmental Association 
2011 Progress Review Technical Summary 2011 
Sarnia-Lambton 
Environmental 
Association 
126 
A Discussion Paper on Requirements for the 
Content and Preparation of Source Protection 
Plans 2009 
Ministry of 
Environment 
127 
Ontario's Approach to Drinking Water Source 
Protection n.d. 
Sommer Casgrain-
Robertson 
128 Ontario Petroleum Institute Website n.d. 
Ontario Petroleum 
Institute 
129 Ian Smith Compensation Letter 2009 
Ministry of the 
Environment 
130 
2007 Ontario Soil and Crop Improvement 
Association Resolutions 2007 
Ontario Soil and Crop 
Improvement 
Association 
131 
Farm Source Water Protection: OFEC 
Framework 2013 
Ontario Farm 
Environmental 
Coalition 
132 
Source Protection Planning Bulletin - Overview 
of Source Protection Plan Requirements 2013 
Ministry of 
Environment 
133 Source Water Protection 2014 
Ontario Auditor 
General 
134 
Draft Source Protection Plan - Intro and 
Background 2012 
Thames Sydenham 
and Region Source 
Protection Committee 
135 Draft Source Protection Plan - Oxford County 2012 
Thames Sydenham 
and Region Source 
Protection Committee 
136 
Draft Source Protection Plan - no Oxford 
County 2012 
Thames Sydenham 
and Region Source 
Protection Committee 
137 
Thames Sydenham and Region Source 
Protection Committee Source Protection Plan 
Explanatory Document 2014 
Thames Sydenham 
and Region Source 
Protection Committee 
138 Compiled Source Protection Plan Change Logs 2014 
Thames Sydenham 
and Region Source 
Protection Committee 
139 
Source Protection Municipal Implementation 
Fund Recipients 2013 
Ministry of the 
Environment and 
Climate Change 
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